Wage Act claim in Massachusetts

2026Because we conclude that the FSCs do not apply to Kim's two statutory claims in any event, we need not address the extent to which, as to those claims, the FSCs may be enforced by non- 206, 216-218 (Wage Act claims arbitrable under clause mandating arbitration of "virtually all claims arising out of the franchise relationship"); Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C., 75 Mass. App. Ct. 271, 271-272 (2009) (arbitration clause applicable to "[a]ll disagreements and controversies arising with respect to this [a]greement, or with respect to its application to circumstances not clearly set forth in this [

2018See Dixon v. Perry & Slesnick, P.C. , 75 Mass. App. Ct. 271 , 275-276, 914 N.E.2d 97 (2009) (Wage Act claim required to be submitted to arbitration pursuant to general arbitration clause with no reference to Wage Act).

2026Solutions, Inc., 991 F.3d 344, 346-347 (1st Cir. 2021) (summary judgment for employer on Wage Act claim proper; no dispute as to May 24 date of discharge based on employee's averment that, though employer paid him through that date, it terminated his employment on May 17 when manager told him he was being "let go immediately"). c.

2026That statute is designed to combat "unscrupulous employers" who violate the statute "by withholding earned wages." Calixto v. Coughlin, 481 Mass. 157, 160 (2018), quoting Segal v. Genitrix, LLC, 478 Mass. 551 , 560 (2017).

2023"By its plain language, . . . § 150 mandates the award of treble damages for lost wages and benefits once an aggrieved employee prevails on a Wage Act claim." George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 374-375 (2017).

2023"By its plain language, . . . § 150 mandates the award of treble damages for lost wages and benefits once an aggrieved employee prevails on a Wage Act claim." George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371, 374-375 (2017).

2020See Monell v. Boston Pads, LLC, 471 Mass. 566, 576 (2015) ("wherever possible, no provision of a legislative enactment should be treated as superfluous" [citation omitted]). 9 Unlike some statutes, § 27F of the Prevailing Wage does not state expressly that it is the exclusive remedy for any improper employer actions related to the payment of prevailing wages.

2019While we may affirm on "any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the [trial] court," Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686 (1993), it is another matter to reverse on a ground not adequately raised below.

2019While we may affirm on "any ground apparent on the record that supports the result reached in the [trial] court," Gabbidon v. King, 414 Mass. 685, 686 (1993), it is another matter to reverse on a ground not adequately raised below.

2017See, e.g., DeSantis v. Commonwealth Energy Sys., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 768, 771 (2007) (upholding award of *379 prejudgment interest on damages for lost wages and benefits under Wage Act).

2017See, e.g., DeSantis v. Commonwealth Energy Sys., 68 Mass. App. Ct. 759, 768, 771 (2007) (upholding award of *379 prejudgment interest on damages for lost wages and benefits under Wage Act).

2013Given that George’s responsibilities were gradually reduced over time, and that the relevant time period for the Wage Act claim looks back three years from the date of filing the case, G.L.c. 149, §150; Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 375 (2008), i.e., during the period when George had been demoted to vice president and had his stated compensation slashed, I find that George has alleged sufficient facts to support his claim that he should be considered an employee under the Wage Act, if not for all, at least for some, of the relevant period.

2013Given that George’s responsibilities were gradually reduced over time, and that the relevant time period for the Wage Act claim looks back three years from the date of filing the case, G.L.c. 149, §150; Salvas v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 452 Mass. 337, 375 (2008), i.e., during the period when George had been demoted to vice president and had his stated compensation slashed, I find that George has alleged sufficient facts to support his claim that he should be considered an employee under the Wage Act, if not for all, at least for some, of the relevant period.

2012See Eck v. Godbout, supra at 728-729 .

2012See Eck v. Godbout, supra at 728-729 .

2012See id.; Krock v. Lipsay, supra. New York’s choice-of-law principles, following the modem trend, aim to give “controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.” Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,481 (1963).

2012See id.; Krock v. Lipsay, supra. New York’s choice-of-law principles, following the modem trend, aim to give “controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation.” Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,481 (1963).

2009Dixon argues that she must have waived her right to seek judicial resolution of her Wage Act claim “explicitly and voluntarily,” citing Blanchette v. School Comm. of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176, 184 (1998).

2005This claim rests on the assertion that the Supreme Judicial Court’s ruling in Wiedmann v. The Bradford Group, Inc., 444 Mass. 698, 709-10 (2005), which was decided four months after this Court’s memorandum and order on a bifurcated juiy trial, alters the Court’s ability to award treble damages pursuant to G.L.c. 149, §150.