M'Naghten test in New Jersey

2024I suspect that if psychiatrists were asked to fix a line, most would resort to an ethical or social concept, the truth of which they could not expertly demonstrate. [State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 76 (1959) (Weintraub, C.J. concurring).] A-2662-21 4 In this context, we bear in mind the origin of the M'Naghten rule, unchanged in New Jersey since its adoption in 1846, ten years before the birth of Sigmund Freud.

2024I suspect that if psychiatrists were asked to fix a line, most would resort to an ethical or social concept, the truth of which they could not expertly demonstrate. [State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 76 (1959) (Weintraub, C.J. concurring).] A-2662-21 4 In this context, we bear in mind the origin of the M'Naghten rule, unchanged in New Jersey since its adoption in 1846, ten years before the birth of Sigmund Freud.

2024As Justice LaVecchia extensively traced the history in State v. Singleton, New Jersey courts "adopted the M'Naghten test shortly after it was introduced in England." 211 N.J. 157 , 174 (2012) (citation omitted).

2024As Justice LaVecchia extensively traced the history in State v. Singleton, New Jersey courts "adopted the M'Naghten test shortly after it was introduced in England." 211 N.J. 157 , 174 (2012) (citation omitted).

2012Our state adopted the M’Naghten test shortly after it was introduced in England, see State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 204-05 (Oyer and Terminer 1846), and has employed it consistently thereafter, see, e.g., State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 39 , 214 A.2d 393 (1965); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 72 , 152 A.2d 50 (1959); State v. Maioni, 78 N.J.L. 339, 341-42 , 74 A. 526 (E. & A.1909).

2012Our state adopted the M’Naghten test shortly after it was introduced in England, see State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 204-05 (Oyer and Terminer 1846), and has employed it consistently thereafter, see, e.g., State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 39 , 214 A.2d 393 (1965); State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 72 , 152 A.2d 50 (1959); State v. Maioni, 78 N.J.L. 339, 341-42 , 74 A. 526 (E. & A.1909).

2024In Kansas v. Kahler, 589 U.S. 271 (2020), the Supreme Court surveyed varying approaches to the defense nationwide, holding the Due Process Clause does not require a uniform standard for proving whether a defendant could "distinguish right from wrong" as articulated in the moral-incapacity prong of the M'Naghten test.1 Indeed, the Court has declined to constitutionalize any particular version of the insanity defense, holding instead that a state's "insanity rule[ ] is substantially open to state choice." Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006).

2024In Kansas v. Kahler, 589 U.S. 271 (2020), the Supreme Court surveyed varying approaches to the defense nationwide, holding the Due Process Clause does not require a uniform standard for proving whether a defendant could "distinguish right from wrong" as articulated in the moral-incapacity prong of the M'Naghten test.1 Indeed, the Court has declined to constitutionalize any particular version of the insanity defense, holding instead that a state's "insanity rule[ ] is substantially open to state choice." Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006).

2024Ct. 2023) (same); State v. Raine, 829 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Doyle v. State, 5 Our concurring colleague cites Georgia case law to support the assertion that expert testimony should not be required to raise an insanity defense, but Georgia's insanity standard is less rigorous than the M'Naghten test and requires the defendant show only a lack of "mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong," without any requirement of proving "disease." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-2 .

2024Ct. 2023) (same); State v. Raine, 829 S.W.2d 506, 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (same); Doyle v. State, 5 Our concurring colleague cites Georgia case law to support the assertion that expert testimony should not be required to raise an insanity defense, but Georgia's insanity standard is less rigorous than the M'Naghten test and requires the defendant show only a lack of "mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong," without any requirement of proving "disease." Ga. Code Ann. § 16-3-2 .

2024State v. Bay, 722 P.2d 280 , 284–85 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Reynolds, 550 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (reaching a similar conclusion adopting the Arizona court's approach in Bay).5 Most other states that have addressed the subject in M'Naghten jurisdictions have required expert testimony.

2024State v. Bay, 722 P.2d 280 , 284–85 (Ariz. 1986); State v. Reynolds, 550 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (reaching a similar conclusion adopting the Arizona court's approach in Bay).5 Most other states that have addressed the subject in M'Naghten jurisdictions have required expert testimony.

2024A-2662-21 11 "The insanity defense is 'an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Gorthy, 226 N.J. 516, 533 (2016).

2024A-2662-21 11 "The insanity defense is 'an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.'" State v. Gorthy, 226 N.J. 516, 533 (2016).

2013State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 601 , 569 A.2d 1314 (1990) (embracing M’Naghten rule); accord State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 249-50 , 979 A.2d 312 (2009) (contrasting inability to distinguish between moral right and wrong with mere adherence to personal moral code).

2013State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 601 , 569 A.2d 1314 (1990) (embracing M’Naghten rule); accord State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 249-50 , 979 A.2d 312 (2009) (contrasting inability to distinguish between moral right and wrong with mere adherence to personal moral code).

2012See People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324 , 110 N.E. 945, 946-49 (1915) (recognizing ambiguity and discussing possible interpretations); see also Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1271-73 (10th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1079 , 128 S.Ct. 2875 , 171 L.Ed.2d 812 (2008) (same); Crenshaw, supra, 659 P.2d at 492-94 (same).

2012See People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324 , 110 N.E. 945, 946-49 (1915) (recognizing ambiguity and discussing possible interpretations); see also Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1271-73 (10th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1079 , 128 S.Ct. 2875 , 171 L.Ed.2d 812 (2008) (same); Crenshaw, supra, 659 P.2d at 492-94 (same).

2012See People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324 , 110 N.E. 945, 946-49 (1915) (recognizing ambiguity and discussing possible interpretations); see also Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1271-73 (10th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1079 , 128 S.Ct. 2875 , 171 L.Ed.2d 812 (2008) (same); Crenshaw, supra, 659 P.2d at 492-94 (same).

2009In 1945, the test was restated to require the accused to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, "that the extent and character of insanity which constitutes a defense against a criminal charge must be such as to render the accused incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of and with respect to the act committed." State v. Molnar, 133 N.J.L. 327, 331 , 44 A. 2d 197 (E. & A. 1945). [6] Of particular note is State v. Crenshaw, 98 Wash. 2d 789 , 659 P. 2d 488, 494-95 (1983), which excluded from the "sanctuary of the insanity defense" a killing done ostensibly to co

2009And the whole matter may be summed up in this: If the evidence makes it clear to your minds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner at the time of the act, was unconscious that he ought not to do it, he is to be acquitted; but if not, then he cannot be acquitted on the ground of insanity, whether he teas partially insane or not. [Id, at 204-05], We have followed the M’Naghten test consistently since its adoption in Spencer. 5 Immediately prior to its incorporation into the Code, our test for criminal responsibility was worded, like its statutory iteration, so as to hold that a defendant

2009And the whole matter may be summed up in this: If the evidence makes it clear to your minds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner at the time of the act, was unconscious that he ought not to do it, he is to be acquitted; but if not, then he cannot be acquitted on the ground of insanity, whether he teas partially insane or not. [Id, at 204-05], We have followed the M’Naghten test consistently since its adoption in Spencer. 5 Immediately prior to its incorporation into the Code, our test for criminal responsibility was worded, like its statutory iteration, so as to hold that a defendant

2024"Directed at the defendant's ability to 'know,' the M'Naghten test is essentially one of cognitive impairment. . . . [I]ts purpose is to determine whether the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing when he committed the crime." Worlock, 117 N.J. at 603 .

2024"Directed at the defendant's ability to 'know,' the M'Naghten test is essentially one of cognitive impairment. . . . [I]ts purpose is to determine whether the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing when he committed the crime." Worlock, 117 N.J. at 603 .

2012See State v. Cordasco, 2 N.J. 189, 196 , 66 A.2d 27 (1949) (adhering to M’Naghten rule and rejecting irresistible impulse formulation of insanity); Mackin v. State, 59 N.J.L. 495, 496-97 , 36 A. 1040 (E. & A.1896) (same).

2012See State v. Cordasco, 2 N.J. 189, 196 , 66 A.2d 27 (1949) (adhering to M’Naghten rule and rejecting irresistible impulse formulation of insanity); Mackin v. State, 59 N.J.L. 495, 496-97 , 36 A. 1040 (E. & A.1896) (same).

1997In New Jersey, insanity at common-law was determined by applying the M’Naghten standard, which states: If at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong, he was legally insane. [State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 212 , 287 A.2d 715 (1972).] As with involuntary intoxication, entrapment, and duress, the insanity defense has a high potential for serving as an instrument of pretext.

1997In New Jersey, insanity at common-law was determined by applying the M’Naghten standard, which states: If at the time of committing the act, the accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong, he was legally insane. [State v. Maik, 60 N.J. 203, 212 , 287 A.2d 715 (1972).] As with involuntary intoxication, entrapment, and duress, the insanity defense has a high potential for serving as an instrument of pretext.

2016Sometimes described as the ‘right and wrong’ test, its purpose is to determine whether the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing when he committed the crime.”); N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 (diminished capacity); see, e.g., State v. Taylor, 387 N.J.Super. 55, 61-62 , 902 A.2d 962 (App.Div.2006) (stating that, once affirmative defense of diminished capacity is raised, State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that, despite evidence of defendant’s mental disease or defect, she nonetheless “knew ” that she was committing the relevant offense); N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8 (intoxication);

2016Sometimes described as the ‘right and wrong’ test, its purpose is to determine whether the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing when he committed the crime.”); N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 (diminished capacity); see, e.g., State v. Taylor, 387 N.J.Super. 55, 61-62 , 902 A.2d 962 (App.Div.2006) (stating that, once affirmative defense of diminished capacity is raised, State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that, despite evidence of defendant’s mental disease or defect, she nonetheless “knew ” that she was committing the relevant offense); N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8 (intoxication);

2016Rep. 718 (H.L.1843); see also State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 616 , 532 A.2d 199 (1987) ("[T]he insanity defense as modified in New Jersey is strictly limited to the M’Naghten principle of whether or not the defendant was either unable to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing ... or, if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.”).

2016Rep. 718 (H.L.1843); see also State v. Breakiron, 108 N.J. 591, 616 , 532 A.2d 199 (1987) ("[T]he insanity defense as modified in New Jersey is strictly limited to the M’Naghten principle of whether or not the defendant was either unable to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing ... or, if he did know it, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong.”).

2016Sometimes described as the ‘right and wrong’ test, its purpose is to determine whether the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing when he committed the crime.”); N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 (diminished capacity); see, e.g., State v. Taylor, 387 N.J.Super. 55, 61-62 , 902 A.2d 962 (App.Div.2006) (stating that, once affirmative defense of diminished capacity is raised, State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that, despite evidence of defendant’s mental disease or defect, she nonetheless “knew ” that she was committing the relevant offense); N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8 (intoxication);

2016Sometimes described as the ‘right and wrong’ test, its purpose is to determine whether the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to understand what he was doing when he committed the crime.”); N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 (diminished capacity); see, e.g., State v. Taylor, 387 N.J.Super. 55, 61-62 , 902 A.2d 962 (App.Div.2006) (stating that, once affirmative defense of diminished capacity is raised, State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that, despite evidence of defendant’s mental disease or defect, she nonetheless “knew ” that she was committing the relevant offense); N.J.S.A. 2C:2-8 (intoxication);

2016Critically important, that analysis bears repeating in full: [NJeither respondent nor [DrJ Simring, his expert, offered any evidence to support the conclusion that, at the time of the knowing misappropriations, respondent “suffered a loss of competency, comprehension or will of a magnitude that could excuse or mitigate egregious misconduct that was clearly knowing, volitional *27 and purposeful.” Jacob, supra, 95 N.J. at 137 [ 469 A.2d 498 ].

2016Critically important, that analysis bears repeating in full: [NJeither respondent nor [DrJ Simring, his expert, offered any evidence to support the conclusion that, at the time of the knowing misappropriations, respondent “suffered a loss of competency, comprehension or will of a magnitude that could excuse or mitigate egregious misconduct that was clearly knowing, volitional *27 and purposeful.” Jacob, supra, 95 N.J. at 137 [ 469 A.2d 498 ].

2012See State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1978); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752, 1764 (1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88 , 755 A.2d 202, 210 (2000); Schmidt, supra, 110 N.E. at 949 ; State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007); State v. Cameron, 100 Wash.2d 520 , 674 P.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (en banc); Wilson v. State, 273 Wis. 522 , 78 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1956); see also United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2007) (discussing federal courts’ position that

2012See State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1978); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752, 1764 (1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88 , 755 A.2d 202, 210 (2000); Schmidt, supra, 110 N.E. at 949 ; State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007); State v. Cameron, 100 Wash.2d 520 , 674 P.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (en banc); Wilson v. State, 273 Wis. 522 , 78 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1956); see also United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2007) (discussing federal courts’ position that

2012See State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1979); State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800 , 686 P.2d 160, 168 (1984); see also Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826 (1952) (interpreting “wrong” to mean legal wrong in England).

2012See State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1979); State v. Boan, 235 Kan. 800 , 686 P.2d 160, 168 (1984); see also Regina v. Windle, 2 Q.B. 826 (1952) (interpreting “wrong” to mean legal wrong in England).

2012See State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1978); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752, 1764 (1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88 , 755 A.2d 202, 210 (2000); Schmidt, supra, 110 N.E. at 949 ; State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007); State v. Cameron, 100 Wash.2d 520 , 674 P.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (en banc); Wilson v. State, 273 Wis. 522 , 78 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1956); see also United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2007) (discussing federal courts’ position that

2012See State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1978); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752, 1764 (1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88 , 755 A.2d 202, 210 (2000); Schmidt, supra, 110 N.E. at 949 ; State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007); State v. Cameron, 100 Wash.2d 520 , 674 P.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (en banc); Wilson v. State, 273 Wis. 522 , 78 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1956); see also United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2007) (discussing federal courts’ position that

2012See State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1978); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752, 1764 (1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88 , 755 A.2d 202, 210 (2000); Schmidt, supra, 110 N.E. at 949 ; State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007); State v. Cameron, 100 Wash.2d 520 , 674 P.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (en banc); Wilson v. State, 273 Wis. 522 , 78 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1956); see also United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2007) (discussing federal courts’ position that

2012See State v. Skaggs, 120 Ariz. 467 , 586 P.2d 1279, 1284 (1978); People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765 , 217 Cal.Rptr. 685 , 704 P.2d 752, 1764 (1985); People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992) (en banc); State v. Cole, 254 Conn. 88 , 755 A.2d 202, 210 (2000); Schmidt, supra, 110 N.E. at 949 ; State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 647 S.E.2d 144, 170 (2007); State v. Cameron, 100 Wash.2d 520 , 674 P.2d 650, 653-54 (1983) (en banc); Wilson v. State, 273 Wis. 522 , 78 N.W.2d 917, 920 (1956); see also United States v. Ewing, 494 F.3d 607, 617 (7th Cir.2007) (discussing federal courts’ position that