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5 Hawaii opinions name it 1 courts 1967–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Moellergreen2 sentences2020And we recognized that “[b]oth Section 249-4 [codifying the insanity defense] and the M’Naghten rule hold that a person is criminally responsible for his act if he understands the nature of the act and knew that the act was wrong.” Id. at 114 , 433 P.2d at 140 . 2020And we recognized that “[b]oth Section 249-4 [codifying the insanity defense] and the M’Naghten rule hold that a person is criminally responsible for his act if he understands the nature of the act and knew that the act was wrong.” Id. at 114 , 433 P.2d at 140 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Dhaemersgreen2 sentences2002No. 227, in 1971 House Journal, at 785; see also State v. Moeller, 50 Haw. 110, 116 , 433 P.2d 136, 141 (1967) ("While we agree that the M'Naghten rule should have been discarded with the horse and buggy, it is part of our statutory law and as such, as long as we adhere to the rule that the legislature can prescribe rules of evidence, we must adhere to the statute.") (quoting State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332 , 150 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1967)). *852 Uyesugi argues that because the standard is no longer whether the defendant knows his act is wrong, the jury instructions should reflect the legislature's 2002No. 227, in 1971 House Journal, at 785; see also State v. Moeller, 50 Haw. 110, 116 , 433 P.2d 136, 141 (1967) ("While we agree that the M'Naghten rule should have been discarded with the horse and buggy, it is part of our statutory law and as such, as long as we adhere to the rule that the legislature can prescribe rules of evidence, we must adhere to the statute.") (quoting State v. Dhaemers, 276 Minn. 332 , 150 N.W.2d 61, 66 (1967)). *852 Uyesugi argues that because the standard is no longer whether the defendant knows his act is wrong, the jury instructions should reflect the legislature's | 1 | 2 |
State v. Nuetzelgreen2 sentences2002It adopted the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) "substantial capacity" formulation of the insanity definition instead, see Commentary to HRS § 704-400(1), that is that a "defendant is not criminally responsible for his acts if he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform the person's conduct to the requirements of the law." See also Nuetzel, 61 Haw. at 536 , 606 P.2d at 924 (noting that the A.L.I. insanity definition was a more "realistic" formulation and that it "conforms with the practical experience of psychiatrists[.]"). 2002It adopted the American Law Institute (A.L.I.) "substantial capacity" formulation of the insanity definition instead, see Commentary to HRS § 704-400(1), that is that a "defendant is not criminally responsible for his acts if he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of the person's conduct or to conform the person's conduct to the requirements of the law." See also Nuetzel, 61 Haw. at 536 , 606 P.2d at 924 (noting that the A.L.I. insanity definition was a more "realistic" formulation and that it "conforms with the practical experience of psychiatrists[.]"). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Goedeckegreen2 sentences1984People v. Goedecke, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625, 628-9 , 423 P.2d 777, 780-1 (1967); State v. Conley, supra. Cases decided by this court prior to enactment of the Hawaii Penal Code in 1972, HRS Title 37, Chapter 701, et seq., have recognized the diminished capacity doctrine. 1984People v. Goedecke, 56 Cal. Rptr. 625, 628-9 , 423 P.2d 777, 780-1 (1967); State v. Conley, supra. Cases decided by this court prior to enactment of the Hawaii Penal Code in 1972, HRS Title 37, Chapter 701, et seq., have recognized the diminished capacity doctrine. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1980In State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (1979), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed the sole issue of whether it should abandon the M’Naghten test in favor of the A.L.I. standard for determining criminal responsibility. 1980In State v. Johnson, 399 A.2d 469 (1979), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island addressed the sole issue of whether it should abandon the M’Naghten test in favor of the A.L.I. standard for determining criminal responsibility. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Territory v. Alcantara
green
2 sentences1967It would be better if the statute were repealed so that the courts could develop rules for determining mental competency more in harmony with advances made in this scientific field since the announcement of the M’Naghten rule in 1843.” [Citation and footnotes omitted] The essential element of murder in the first degree and in the second degree is malice aforethought, and homicide without “malice aforethought” is manslaughter under our laws. 7 This court in Territory v. Alcantra, 24 Haw. 197 , at page 200, said that “the essential difference between murder and manslaughter is that in the former 1967It would be better if the statute were repealed so that the courts could develop rules for determining mental competency more in harmony with advances made in this scientific field since the announcement of the M’Naghten rule in 1843.” [Citation and footnotes omitted] The essential element of murder in the first degree and in the second degree is malice aforethought, and homicide without “malice aforethought” is manslaughter under our laws. 7 This court in Territory v. Alcantra, 24 Haw. 197 , at page 200, said that “the essential difference between murder and manslaughter is that in the former | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.