M'Naghten rule (Rhode Island) · Go Syfert
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M'Naghten rule in Rhode Island

10 Rhode Island opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2012 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Andrewsgreen
ri · 1957 · cited in 4 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1978–2012
2 sentences

2012Prior to State v. Johnson, M’Naghten was the prevailing test for determining criminal responsibility based on "whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from wrong in respect to the particular act charged.” State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 , 260 n. 3, 399 A.2d 469 , 472 n. 3 (1979) (quoting *11 Brakel & Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 379-80 (rev.2d ed.1971)); see State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 351-52 , 134 A.2d 425, 431 (1957) (intimating that the M’Naghten test was the prevailing view in Rhode Island); State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 276 , 58 A. 905, 910 (1904) (adopting the

2012Prior to State v. Johnson, M’Naghten was the prevailing test for determining criminal responsibility based on "whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from wrong in respect to the particular act charged.” State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 , 260 n. 3, 399 A.2d 469 , 472 n. 3 (1979) (quoting *11 Brakel & Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 379-80 (rev.2d ed.1971)); see State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 351-52 , 134 A.2d 425, 431 (1957) (intimating that the M’Naghten test was the prevailing view in Rhode Island); State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 276 , 58 A. 905, 910 (1904) (adopting the

44
United States v. Charles Freemangreen
ca2 · 1966 · cited in 3 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1979–1992
2 sentences

1992Second, the M’Naghten standard restricted expert testimony to the issue of a defendant’s cognitive ability and deprived the jury of a true and complete picture of a defendant’s mental state. 121 R.I. at 262 , 399 A.2d at 473 (citing United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir.1966)).

1992Second, the M’Naghten standard restricted expert testimony to the issue of a defendant’s cognitive ability and deprived the jury of a true and complete picture of a defendant’s mental state. 121 R.I. at 262 , 399 A.2d at 473 (citing United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 620 (2d Cir.1966)).

33
State v. Johnsongreen
ri · 1979 · cited in 6 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1980–2012
2 sentences

2012Prior to State v. Johnson, M’Naghten was the prevailing test for determining criminal responsibility based on "whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from wrong in respect to the particular act charged.” State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 , 260 n. 3, 399 A.2d 469 , 472 n. 3 (1979) (quoting *11 Brakel & Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 379-80 (rev.2d ed.1971)); see State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 351-52 , 134 A.2d 425, 431 (1957) (intimating that the M’Naghten test was the prevailing view in Rhode Island); State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 276 , 58 A. 905, 910 (1904) (adopting the

2012Prior to State v. Johnson, M’Naghten was the prevailing test for determining criminal responsibility based on "whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from wrong in respect to the particular act charged.” State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 , 260 n. 3, 399 A.2d 469 , 472 n. 3 (1979) (quoting *11 Brakel & Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 379-80 (rev.2d ed.1971)); see State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 351-52 , 134 A.2d 425, 431 (1957) (intimating that the M’Naghten test was the prevailing view in Rhode Island); State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 276 , 58 A. 905, 910 (1904) (adopting the

26
State v. Quigleygreen
ri · 1904 · cited in 5 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1978–2012
2 sentences

2012Prior to State v. Johnson, M’Naghten was the prevailing test for determining criminal responsibility based on "whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from wrong in respect to the particular act charged.” State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 , 260 n. 3, 399 A.2d 469 , 472 n. 3 (1979) (quoting *11 Brakel & Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 379-80 (rev.2d ed.1971)); see State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 351-52 , 134 A.2d 425, 431 (1957) (intimating that the M’Naghten test was the prevailing view in Rhode Island); State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 276 , 58 A. 905, 910 (1904) (adopting the

2012Prior to State v. Johnson, M’Naghten was the prevailing test for determining criminal responsibility based on "whether the defendant had the capacity to know right from wrong in respect to the particular act charged.” State v. Johnson, 121 R.I. 254 , 260 n. 3, 399 A.2d 469 , 472 n. 3 (1979) (quoting *11 Brakel & Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 379-80 (rev.2d ed.1971)); see State v. Andrews, 86 R.I. 341, 351-52 , 134 A.2d 425, 431 (1957) (intimating that the M’Naghten test was the prevailing view in Rhode Island); State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 276 , 58 A. 905, 910 (1904) (adopting the

15
Stovall v. Dennogreen
scotus · 1967 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1980–1980
2 sentences

1980Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 300 , 87 S. Ct. at 1971 , 18 L.

1980Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 300 , 87 S. Ct. at 1971 , 18 L.

11
State v. Johnsongreen
ri · 1978 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
2 sentences

1979The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether this court should abandon the M’Naghten test in favor of a new standard for determining the criminal responsibility of those who claim they are blameless by reason of mental illness. 1 State v. Johnson, 119 R.I. 749 , 383 A.2d 1012, 1013 (1978).

1979The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether this court should abandon the M’Naghten test in favor of a new standard for determining the criminal responsibility of those who claim they are blameless by reason of mental illness. 1 State v. Johnson, 119 R.I. 749 , 383 A.2d 1012, 1013 (1978).

11
United States v. Donald Kenneth Currensgreen
ca3 · 1961 · cited in 1 Rhode Island opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
1 sentence

1979See generally United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d at 765-66 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Arpin green
ri · 1980
2 sentences

1981Also, in Arpin , in addressing contentions similar to those raised by defendant in the instant case, we said that “killing was premeditation, the requisite criminal intent for murder in Rhode Island, and killing while legally insane are [not] inconsistent or mutually exclusive.” We concluded that “a careful analysis of the elements of the Rhode Island murder statute and the M’Naghten test for legal insanity does not support defendant’s argument that legal insanity and the criminal intent for murder cannot coexist at the time of the commission of a homicide.” [Citation omitted.] Id., 410 A.2d a

1981Also, in Arpin , in addressing contentions similar to those raised by defendant in the instant case, we said that “killing was premeditation, the requisite criminal intent for murder in Rhode Island, and killing while legally insane are [not] inconsistent or mutually exclusive.” We concluded that “a careful analysis of the elements of the Rhode Island murder statute and the M’Naghten test for legal insanity does not support defendant’s argument that legal insanity and the criminal intent for murder cannot coexist at the time of the commission of a homicide.” [Citation omitted.] Id., 410 A.2d a

11981–1981
Durham v. United States green
cadc · 1954
2 sentences

1971Rep. 718 or the rule in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.

1971Rep. 718 or the rule in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.

11971–1971
Miranda v. Arizona green
scotus · 1966
2 sentences

1969We need only discuss defendant’s first contention because, although defendant’s interrogation took place prior to the mandates enumerated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 438 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

1969We need only discuss defendant’s first contention because, although defendant’s interrogation took place prior to the mandates enumerated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 438 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

11969–1969

Where else courts name it

CA 66 (1964–2026) MS 57 (1968–2026) KS 45 (1960–2020) PA 45 (1955–2023) AZ 37 (1964–2018) IA 27 (1968–2024) WA 26 (1957–2023) MN 20 (1967–2026) NJ 20 (1959–2025) FL 17 (1959–2015) VA 16 (1998–2025) OK 14 (1963–2000) MD 12 (1961–1991) OR 12 (1966–2020) AK 10 (1970–2021) NV 10 (1967–2021) TX 10 (1970–2013) RI 10 (1969–2012) NC 9 (1974–1996) NE 8 (1973–2018) TN 7 (1969–1999) WI 6 (1960–2014) HI 5 (1967–2020) MA 5 (1967–2024) UT 4 (1982–1999) CO 4 (1990–1993) WV 4 (1990–2014) OH 4 (1982–2003) SC 3 (1986–1997) CT 3 (1979–1984) MT 3 (1963–1993) MI 2 (1973–2001) SD 2 (1976–1980) NM 2 (1955–1977) LA 2 (1976–1981)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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