M'Naghten test in Alaska

2021The second prong (sometimes referred to as the “moral incapacity” or “wrongfulness” prong) 1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2020). 2 Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 808-09 (Alaska 1970) (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining history of insanity defense in Alaska); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 910-12 (Alaska 1973) (explaining legislature’s amendments to M’Naghten rule). 3 Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Alaska 1962), overruled on other grounds by Schade, 512 P.2d at 910-12 . – 12 – 2702 asks whether the defendant had the capacity to understand that their co

2021The second prong (sometimes referred to as the “moral incapacity” or “wrongfulness” prong) 1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2020). 2 Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 808-09 (Alaska 1970) (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining history of insanity defense in Alaska); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 910-12 (Alaska 1973) (explaining legislature’s amendments to M’Naghten rule). 3 Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Alaska 1962), overruled on other grounds by Schade, 512 P.2d at 910-12 . – 12 – 2702 asks whether the defendant had the capacity to understand that their co

2021The second prong (sometimes referred to as the “moral incapacity” or “wrongfulness” prong) 1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2020). 2 Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 808-09 (Alaska 1970) (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining history of insanity defense in Alaska); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 910-12 (Alaska 1973) (explaining legislature’s amendments to M’Naghten rule). 3 Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Alaska 1962), overruled on other grounds by Schade, 512 P.2d at 910-12 . – 12 – 2702 asks whether the defendant had the capacity to understand that their co

2021Id. at 653, 658-59 . 32 Id. at 658-59 . 33 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952). 34 Id. 35 Hart, 702 P.2d at 658-59 (footnote omitted). – 21 – 2702 legislature’s elimination of the wrongfulness prong of the M’Naghten test because that issue was not raised by the parties.36 Two years later, the Court issued Patterson v. State, which made clear that this Court believed that “wrongfulness” was still part of Alaska’s insanity test.37 The Court cited to Chase v. State, in which the Alaska Supreme Court treated the two prongs of the M’Naghten test as essentially interchangeable.38 The Court

2021In other words, Hart would have qualified as insane under the A.L.I. “volitional prong” definition of insanity but he would not have qualified as insane under the M’Naghten rule.30 Hart argued that a statutory scheme that held a person who lacked substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law criminally responsible violated, inter alia, the due 28 Id. (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 ). 29 Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska App. 1985). 30 Id. at 658 . – 20 – 2702 process clauses of the United States and Alaska constitutions.31 We rejected this challenge, relyi

2021In other words, Hart would have qualified as insane under the A.L.I. “volitional prong” definition of insanity but he would not have qualified as insane under the M’Naghten rule.30 Hart argued that a statutory scheme that held a person who lacked substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law criminally responsible violated, inter alia, the due 28 Id. (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 ). 29 Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651 (Alaska App. 1985). 30 Id. at 658 . – 20 – 2702 process clauses of the United States and Alaska constitutions.31 We rejected this challenge, relyi

2021The second prong (sometimes referred to as the “moral incapacity” or “wrongfulness” prong) 1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2020). 2 Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 808-09 (Alaska 1970) (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining history of insanity defense in Alaska); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 910-12 (Alaska 1973) (explaining legislature’s amendments to M’Naghten rule). 3 Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Alaska 1962), overruled on other grounds by Schade, 512 P.2d at 910-12 . – 12 – 2702 asks whether the defendant had the capacity to understand that their co

2021The second prong (sometimes referred to as the “moral incapacity” or “wrongfulness” prong) 1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2020). 2 Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 808-09 (Alaska 1970) (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining history of insanity defense in Alaska); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 910-12 (Alaska 1973) (explaining legislature’s amendments to M’Naghten rule). 3 Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Alaska 1962), overruled on other grounds by Schade, 512 P.2d at 910-12 . – 12 – 2702 asks whether the defendant had the capacity to understand that their co

2021Id. at 653, 658-59 . 32 Id. at 658-59 . 33 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952). 34 Id. 35 Hart, 702 P.2d at 658-59 (footnote omitted). – 21 – 2702 legislature’s elimination of the wrongfulness prong of the M’Naghten test because that issue was not raised by the parties.36 Two years later, the Court issued Patterson v. State, which made clear that this Court believed that “wrongfulness” was still part of Alaska’s insanity test.37 The Court cited to Chase v. State, in which the Alaska Supreme Court treated the two prongs of the M’Naghten test as essentially interchangeable.38 The Court

2021Id. at 653, 658-59 . 32 Id. at 658-59 . 33 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800-01 (1952). 34 Id. 35 Hart, 702 P.2d at 658-59 (footnote omitted). – 21 – 2702 legislature’s elimination of the wrongfulness prong of the M’Naghten test because that issue was not raised by the parties.36 Two years later, the Court issued Patterson v. State, which made clear that this Court believed that “wrongfulness” was still part of Alaska’s insanity test.37 The Court cited to Chase v. State, in which the Alaska Supreme Court treated the two prongs of the M’Naghten test as essentially interchangeable.38 The Court

2021App. 1982) (“Involuntary intoxication is a complete defense where the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong, the same standard as applied in an insanity defense.”); State v. Mriglot, 564 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (“Since involuntary intoxication acts to excuse the criminality of an act, it must rise to the level of insanity, which in this jurisdiction is determined by the M’Naghten test.”), discussed in State v. Stacy, 326 P.3d 136, 145 (Wash. App. 2014); but see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 783 (Colo. 2005) (holding that involuntary

2021App. 1982) (“Involuntary intoxication is a complete defense where the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong, the same standard as applied in an insanity defense.”); State v. Mriglot, 564 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (“Since involuntary intoxication acts to excuse the criminality of an act, it must rise to the level of insanity, which in this jurisdiction is determined by the M’Naghten test.”), discussed in State v. Stacy, 326 P.3d 136, 145 (Wash. App. 2014); but see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 783 (Colo. 2005) (holding that involuntary

2021App. 1982) (“Involuntary intoxication is a complete defense where the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong, the same standard as applied in an insanity defense.”); State v. Mriglot, 564 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (“Since involuntary intoxication acts to excuse the criminality of an act, it must rise to the level of insanity, which in this jurisdiction is determined by the M’Naghten test.”), discussed in State v. Stacy, 326 P.3d 136, 145 (Wash. App. 2014); but see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 783 (Colo. 2005) (holding that involuntary

2021App. 1982) (“Involuntary intoxication is a complete defense where the defendant is so intoxicated that he is unable to distinguish between right and wrong, the same standard as applied in an insanity defense.”); State v. Mriglot, 564 P.2d 784, 786 (Wash. 1977) (en banc) (“Since involuntary intoxication acts to excuse the criminality of an act, it must rise to the level of insanity, which in this jurisdiction is determined by the M’Naghten test.”), discussed in State v. Stacy, 326 P.3d 136, 145 (Wash. App. 2014); but see People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 783 (Colo. 2005) (holding that involuntary

2021The second prong (sometimes referred to as the “moral incapacity” or “wrongfulness” prong) 1 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S.Ct. 1021 (2020). 2 Pope v. State, 478 P.2d 801, 808-09 (Alaska 1970) (Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining history of insanity defense in Alaska); Schade v. State, 512 P.2d 907, 910-12 (Alaska 1973) (explaining legislature’s amendments to M’Naghten rule). 3 Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1001-02 (Alaska 1962), overruled on other grounds by Schade, 512 P.2d at 910-12 . – 12 – 2702 asks whether the defendant had the capacity to understand that their co

2021Presumably the cognitive incapacity prong was not included in deference to Alaska Supreme Court case law that had held that the two prongs were functionally the same.6 In 1982, the Alaska legislature revised Alaska’s insanity laws.7 These revisions were part of a national trend that occurred in response to several high-profile cases in which defendants had been found not guilty by reason of insanity under the 4 See Kahler, 140 S.Ct. at 1025 (explaining M’Naghten test). 5 Former AS 12.45.083(a) (1972) (emphasis added); see also Model Penal Code § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).

1987Confirming this point is the letter transmitting the report from the Judiciary Committee to the Speaker of the House, which described the report as “a commentary and sectional analysis of the bill as it passed from the House Judiciary Committee on May 29, 1982 ... [which] should be helpful in identifying the provision of the bill and clarifying the intent of each section.” 3 House Journal, Supplement No. 63 at 1 (1982) (emphasis added); cf. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen’s Union, 585 P.2d 870, 874 (Alaska 1978) (letter of intent accompanying bill to amend statute considered indicative of amendment’s

1987Confirming this point is the letter transmitting the report from the Judiciary Committee to the Speaker of the House, which described the report as “a commentary and sectional analysis of the bill as it passed from the House Judiciary Committee on May 29, 1982 ... [which] should be helpful in identifying the provision of the bill and clarifying the intent of each section.” 3 House Journal, Supplement No. 63 at 1 (1982) (emphasis added); cf. Hafling v. Inlandboatmen’s Union, 585 P.2d 870, 874 (Alaska 1978) (letter of intent accompanying bill to amend statute considered indicative of amendment’s

1979See McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653, 664 , rehearing granted, 570 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1977). 7 .

1979See McKinney v. State, 566 P.2d 653, 664 , rehearing granted, 570 P.2d 733 (Alaska 1977). 7 .

1977We did discuss the interrelationship between intoxication and the insanity defense in McIntyre v. State, 379 P.2d 615, 616-17 (Alaska 1963), a case decided under a version of the M’Naghten standard for insanity. 26 In McIntyre , we adopted the majority view that draws a distinction between the mental effect of intoxication which is the result of a particular alcoholic bout and an alcoholic psychosis such as delirium tremens, resulting from long continued habits of excessive *665 drinking. 27 We concluded that “The former does not amount to legal insanity, whereas the latter may.” 379 P.2d at 6

1977We did discuss the interrelationship between intoxication and the insanity defense in McIntyre v. State, 379 P.2d 615, 616-17 (Alaska 1963), a case decided under a version of the M’Naghten standard for insanity. 26 In McIntyre , we adopted the majority view that draws a distinction between the mental effect of intoxication which is the result of a particular alcoholic bout and an alcoholic psychosis such as delirium tremens, resulting from long continued habits of excessive *665 drinking. 27 We concluded that “The former does not amount to legal insanity, whereas the latter may.” 379 P.2d at 6