administration of Miranda warning in New York

2023The defendant was not in custody at the time that he made the first set of challenged statements ( see People v Yukl , 25 NY2d 585 ; People v Gore , 117 AD3d 845, 845-846 ), and the remaining challenged statements, made while the defendant was in custody but prior to the administration of Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436 ), were spontaneous and not triggered by any police questioning or other conduct that reasonably could have been expected to elicit a declaration from him ( see People v Adams , 157 AD3d 897 , 898; People v Goldson , 136 AD3d 1053, 1054 ).

2023Giving deference to the court's credibility determinations ( see People v Hirji , 185 AD3d 1053 , 1055), the evidence at the suppression hearing supported the court's conclusion that the [*2]statements the defendant made prior to the administration of Miranda warnings were not the product of a custodial interrogation ( see Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436 ; People v Yukl , 25 NY2d 585 ).

2025The defendant contends that statements he made to law enforcement officials while being transported in a police vehicle after the administration of Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436, 444 ) should have been suppressed, since the totality of the circumstances indicates that his waiver was not voluntary.

2025The defendant's contention that his statements to law enforcement officials should have been suppressed on the ground that his waiver of Miranda rights ( see Miranda v Arizona , 384 US 436 ) was rendered invalid, because the police failed to provide him with a qualified translator to aid in the administration of Miranda warnings, is unpreserved for appellate review.

2018The defendant's argument that statements he made before and after the administration of Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ) should have been suppressed as part of a "single continuous chain of events" in which he was subjected to custodial interrogation ( People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 ), is without merit.

2017The defendant points to People v Chapple ( 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]), in which the Court of Appeals held that after a custodial statement has been impermissibly taken prior to the administration of Miranda warnings, a statement taken later, after the Miranda warnings have been given, is also inadmissible “unless there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning.” (See also People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005].) Attempting to analogize from Chappie, the defe

2018The defendant's argument that statements he made before and after the administration of Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 ) should have been suppressed as part of a "single continuous chain of events" in which he was subjected to custodial interrogation ( People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122, 130 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Chapple, 38 NY2d 112, 115 ), is without merit.

2017The defendant points to People v Chapple ( 38 NY2d 112, 115 [1975]), in which the Court of Appeals held that after a custodial statement has been impermissibly taken prior to the administration of Miranda warnings, a statement taken later, after the Miranda warnings have been given, is also inadmissible “unless there is such a definite, pronounced break in the interrogation that the defendant may be said to have returned, in effect, to the status of one who is not under the influence of questioning.” (See also People v Paulman, 5 NY3d 122 [2005].) Attempting to analogize from Chappie, the defe

2012Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court correctly concluded that she was not in custody when she made certain statements to detectives (see People v Centano, 76 NY2d 837, 838 [1990]; People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]) and, therefore, that the administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444-445 [1966]) was not required during the interview.

2012Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the hearing court correctly concluded that she was not in custody when she made certain statements to detectives (see People v Centano, 76 NY2d 837, 838 [1990]; People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585, 589 [1969], cert denied 400 US 851 [1970]) and, therefore, that the administration of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444-445 [1966]) was not required during the interview.

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, his statements to police on that date were not the product of a custodial interrogation requiring the administration of Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview (see People v Passino, 53 AD3d 204, 205-206 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 748 [2009]; see generally People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]).

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, his statements to police on that date were not the product of a custodial interrogation requiring the administration of Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview (see People v Passino, 53 AD3d 204, 205-206 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 748 [2009]; see generally People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]).

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, his statements to police on that date were not the product of a custodial interrogation requiring the administration of Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview (see People v Passino, 53 AD3d 204, 205-206 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 748 [2009]; see generally People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]).

2016Contrary to defendant’s contention, his statements to police on that date were not the product of a custodial interrogation requiring the administration of Miranda warnings at the outset of the interview (see People v Passino, 53 AD3d 204, 205-206 [2008], affd 12 NY3d 748 [2009]; see generally People v Alls, 83 NY2d 94, 100 [1993], cert denied 511 US 1090 [1994]).

2012Contrary to defendant’s contention, the police officer’s general statements concerning cooperation were not “ ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ ” and thus did not constitute interrogation (People v Brown, 52 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 923 [2009], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]; see People v Adams, 244 AD2d 897 , 898-899 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 887 [1998]).

2012Contrary to defendant’s contention, the police officer’s general statements concerning cooperation were not “ ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ ” and thus did not constitute interrogation (People v Brown, 52 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 923 [2009], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]; see People v Adams, 244 AD2d 897 , 898-899 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 887 [1998]).

2012Despite that inquiry, the record fully supports County Court’s determination that defendant was not in custody at that point so as to require the administration of Miranda warnings (see Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440 [1984]; People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891, 893-894 [1987]; see also People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 500 [2006]).

2012Despite that inquiry, the record fully supports County Court’s determination that defendant was not in custody at that point so as to require the administration of Miranda warnings (see Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440 [1984]; People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891, 893-894 [1987]; see also People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 500 [2006]).

2019The record demonstrates that the defendant was lucid and coherent during the interview and gave no indication that he would have been unable to comprehend "the immediate import of [the Miranda ] warnings" ( People v Williams , 62 NY2d 285, 289 ; see People v Capela , 97 AD3d at 761 ).

2013The record demonstrates that he was lucid and coherent during the interview and gave no indication that he would have been unable to comprehend “the immediate import of [the Miranda] warnings” (People v Williams, 62 NY2d 285, 289 [1984]).

2016Miranda warnings are required prior to the questioning of an inmate in a prison setting only “where ‘the circumstances of the detention and interrogation . . . entail added constraint that would lead a prison inmate reasonably to believe that there has been a restriction on that person’s freedom over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility’ ” (People v Hadfield, 119 AD3d 1224, 1225 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1002 [2014], quoting Alls, 83 NY2d at 100 ; see Passino, 53 AD3d at 205-206 ).

2016Miranda warnings are required prior to the questioning of an inmate in a prison setting only “where ‘the circumstances of the detention and interrogation . . . entail added constraint that would lead a prison inmate reasonably to believe that there has been a restriction on that person’s freedom over and above that of ordinary confinement in a correctional facility’ ” (People v Hadfield, 119 AD3d 1224, 1225 [2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1002 [2014], quoting Alls, 83 NY2d at 100 ; see Passino, 53 AD3d at 205-206 ).

2012Contrary to defendant’s contention, the police officer’s general statements concerning cooperation were not “ ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ ” and thus did not constitute interrogation (People v Brown, 52 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 923 [2009], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]; see People v Adams, 244 AD2d 897 , 898-899 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 887 [1998]).

2012Contrary to defendant’s contention, the police officer’s general statements concerning cooperation were not “ ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ ” and thus did not constitute interrogation (People v Brown, 52 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 923 [2009], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]; see People v Adams, 244 AD2d 897 , 898-899 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 887 [1998]).

2012Contrary to defendant’s contention, the police officer’s general statements concerning cooperation were not “ ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ ” and thus did not constitute interrogation (People v Brown, 52 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 923 [2009], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]; see People v Adams, 244 AD2d 897 , 898-899 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 887 [1998]).

2012Contrary to defendant’s contention, the police officer’s general statements concerning cooperation were not “ ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response’ ” and thus did not constitute interrogation (People v Brown, 52 AD3d 1175, 1176 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 923 [2009], quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 [1980]; see People v Adams, 244 AD2d 897 , 898-899 [1997], lv denied 91 NY2d 887 [1998]).

2012Despite that inquiry, the record fully supports County Court’s determination that defendant was not in custody at that point so as to require the administration of Miranda warnings (see Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440 [1984]; People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891, 893-894 [1987]; see also People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 500 [2006]).

2012Despite that inquiry, the record fully supports County Court’s determination that defendant was not in custody at that point so as to require the administration of Miranda warnings (see Berkemer v McCarty, 468 US 420, 439-440 [1984]; People v Bennett, 70 NY2d 891, 893-894 [1987]; see also People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 500 [2006]).

2010However, since the defendant failed to raise this specific argument at the Huntley hearing (see People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]), it is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Nadal, 57 AD3d 574, 575 [2008]; People v Thompson, 27 AD3d 495, 496 [2006]).

2008However, since the defendant failed to raise this specific argument in support of suppression during the Huntley hearing (see People v Huntley, 15 NY2d 72 [1965]), it is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v Rogers, 34 AD3d 504, 504-505 [2006]; People v Thompson, 27 AD3d 495, 496 [2006]; People v Caballero, 23 AD3d 1031, 1032 [2005]).

2006Considering the totality of these circumstances (see People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35, 37 [1977]), we find that his statements were voluntary despite the passage of time between the administration of Miranda warnings, which he knowingly and voluntarily waived, and his oral confession (see People v Hasty, 25 AD3d 740, 741 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 834 [2006]; People v Gonzalez, 5 AD3d 696, 697 [2004], lv denied 3 NY3d 640 [2004]; People v Cody, 260 AD2d 718, 720 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 1002 [1999]; People v Lang, 226 AD2d 245 [1996], lv denied 88 NY2d 967 [1996]; People v Baker, 208 AD2d 758, 758

1996The totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s initial statement to the police, including the non-custodial nature and brevity of the encounter prior to defendant’s incriminating statement, the administration of Miranda warnings and defendant’s knowing waiver of his constitutional rights when advised that the police wished to question him regarding a particular homicide that might shed light on the kidnapping of defendant’s son, negate defendant’s claim of improper police conduct designed to elicit an involuntary statement (cf., People v Anderson, 42 NY2d 35 ).

2018Even if the defendant was subjected to a period of custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent prior to the administration of Miranda warnings ( see People v Ferro, 63 NY2d 316, 322-323 ), he made no inculpatory statement, or any statement relating to his conduct in connection with the crime under investigation, until after such warnings had been properly given and his Miranda rights were effectively waived ( see People v White, 40 AD3d 662, 662 , affd 10 NY3d 286 ; People v Prater, 258 AD2d 600 , 601).

2010Moreover, the defendant’s statements, save for a brief statement he gave to a Detective Sergeant, were properly preceded by the administration of Miranda warnings, followed by a valid waiver of his rights (see People v White, 10 NY3d 286, 291 [2008], cert denied 555 US —, 129 S Ct 221 [2008]; People v Gruttadauria, 46 AD3d 837, 838 [2007]; People v Jenkins, 44 AD3d 565, 566 [2007]; People v Lowin, 36 AD3d 1153, 1154-1155 [2007]).

2007“The standard for analyzing whether a statement made prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was the product of custodial interrogation is whether a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought that he or she was free to leave the presence of the police” (People v Morales, 25 AD3d 624, 625 [2006] [citations omitted]; see People v Yukl, 25 NY2d 585 [1969]; People v Centano, 76 NY2d 837 [1990]).

2006In light of this overwhelming evidence, the erroneous admission of the statements made by the defendant after the administration of Miranda warnings was harmless error (see People v Paulman, supra; People v Morales, supra; People v Vachet, supra; People v Thompson, 296 AD2d 513 [2002]; People v Rifkin, supra).

2020We agree with the defendant that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in determining, after a Sandoval hearing ( see People v Sandoval , 34 NY2d 371 ), that if he chose to testify at trial, the prosecutor could cross-examine him regarding the facts underlying his conviction in September 2005, of arson in the third degree, and his conviction in November 2005, of unauthorized use of a vehicle in the first degree and reckless endangerment in the first degree.

2016The admission of evidence of prior convictions for the purpose of impeachment is within the discretion of the trial court, which must weigh the probative value of the defendant’s prior crimes on the issue of credibility against the potential prejudice to the defendant (see People v Rahman, 46 NY2d 882, 883 [1979]; People v Sandoval, 34 NY2d 371, 375 [1974]; People v Cruz, 21 AD3d 967 [2005]; People v Hines, 3 AD3d 580 [2004]; People v Williams, 292 AD2d 474, 475 [2002]; People v Forino, 287 AD2d 519 [2001]).