17 Pennsylvania opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Schwinggreen2 sentences2015See also Commonwealth v. Schwing, 964 A.2d 8, 13 (Pa. Super. 2008) (even if the facts in DeJesus would initially afford the defendant relief, he failed to prove that the police - 15 - J-S41007-15 officer’s conduct tainted and invalidated his subsequent waiver of rights and statement since after the administration of Miranda warnings was completed, the officer then reviewed with the defendant his prior statements, which again were conducted and carried out upon videotaped interview); Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505 (Pa. Super. 2011) (failure to deliver Miranda warnings prior to interrog 2013See also Commonwealth v. Schwing, 964 A.2d 8, 13 (Pa.Super.2008)(even if the facts in DeJesus would initially afford the defendant relief, he failed to prove that the police officer’s conduct tainted and invalidated his subsequent waiver of rights and statement since after the administration of Miranda warnings was completed, the officer then reviewed with the defendant his prior statements, which again were conducted and carried out upon videotaped interview); Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505 (Pa.Super.2011) (failure to deliver Miranda warnings prior to interrogation did not invalidate | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. DeJesusgreen2 sentences2024“A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement should ordinarily suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” DeJesus, 787 A.2d at 406 (citation omitted). - 15 - J-A14042-24 Finally, we note: “[T]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine generally requires exclusion of evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, illegal searches.” Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). 2006Id. at [435-36, 787 A.2d at] 405-06. | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Garvingreen2 sentences2015Garvin, 50 A.3d at 698 . “[V]olunteered or spontaneous utterances by an individual are admissible without the administration of Miranda warnings.” Id. 2015Our Court has held - 11 - J-S74038-14 that “volunteered or spontaneous utterances by an individual are admissible without the administration of Miranda warnings.” Commonwealth v. Garvin, 50 A.3d 694, 698 (Pa. Super. 2012). | 1 | 2 |
Com. v. Seeney, T.green1 sentence2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 379 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Seeney, 316 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2024). 16 In this regard, we note Officer Ksepka testified he took the statement at the police station to “document and reinforce the same statement [Muszak had already given],” see N.T. 5/2/23, at 24, 44, which undermines the possibility, which the Commonwealth does not in any event assert, that intervening actions purged the original taint. - 11 - J-S12024-24 In light of the Commonwealth’s concession that Muszak was “in custody” at 11:28pm, the suppression court found Office | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gatlosgreen1 sentence2024“A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement should ordinarily suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” DeJesus, 787 A.2d at 406 (citation omitted). - 15 - J-A14042-24 Finally, we note: “[T]he ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ doctrine generally requires exclusion of evidence obtained from, or acquired as a consequence of, illegal searches.” Commonwealth v. Gatlos, 76 A.3d 44, 63 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Cooley, III, N., Aplt.green1 sentence2024See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cooley, 118 A.3d 370, 379 (Pa. 2015); Commonwealth v. Seeney, 316 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2024). 16 In this regard, we note Officer Ksepka testified he took the statement at the police station to “document and reinforce the same statement [Muszak had already given],” see N.T. 5/2/23, at 24, 44, which undermines the possibility, which the Commonwealth does not in any event assert, that intervening actions purged the original taint. - 11 - J-S12024-24 In light of the Commonwealth’s concession that Muszak was “in custody” at 11:28pm, the suppression court found Office | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnson, C., Aplt.green1 sentence2021His attempt to implicate his co-defendant during the interview “further evidenced not a coerced mind overborne with pain and intimidation but, instead, a freely calculating mind exploring ways to secure a more favorable result for himself.” Commonwealth [v.] Johnson, … 107 A.3d 52, 94 (Pa. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2018People v. Walters, 140 A.D.3d 1761, 1762 (4th Dpt. 2016) (police had probable cause to arrest defendant following complainant’s identification of defendant at crime scene). - 11 - J-S39014-18 Subsequent to her arrest and the administration of Miranda warnings at the police station, Appellant waived her Miranda rights and confessed to the robberies of Uncle Jack’s Store and Judy’s Country Store in Bradford County. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Templingreen1 sentence2014See also Templin, supra, at 965 (“Obviously, an inducement to waive following upon an assertion of rights after being given Miranda warnings implicates more than a due process concern with voluntariness of confession; it may burden the defendant’s constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination or the right to counsel.”); Morgan, infra. -8- J-A17031-14 Morgan, a Superior Court’s decision that relied upon and extended Gibbs,6 does not change our conclusions. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Lestergreen1 sentence2014In light of the foregoing, we conclude the instant matter is distinguishable from Gibbs. ____________________________________________ 5 See Friedman, 602 A.2d at 378 . (“In Gibbs, the statement found to be an inducement was made to defendant after he was read his rights and after he asked a question, ‘What good would it do me to tell you?’ This sequence of events rendered the detective’s response of possible benefits by telling the court of defendant’s cooperation an inducement.”); Commonwealth v. Lester, 572 A.2d 694, 697 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“We note that the Gibbs court restricted its decisio | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sepulvedagreen2 sentences2006Instead, a “custodial interrogation” occurs and Miranda warnings must be given when “the person is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted.” Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 579 Pa. 217, 228 , 855 A.2d 783, 790 (2004). 2006Instead, a “custodial interrogation” occurs and Miranda warnings must be given when “the person is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted.” Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 579 Pa. 217, 228 , 855 A.2d 783, 790 (2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2017Id. 2015The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona defined “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 . | 3 | 2012–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Williams
green
2 sentences2026Id. 2010Id. | 2 | 2010–2026 |
Commonwealth v. Charleston
green
2 sentences2015See also Commonwealth v. Schwing, 964 A.2d 8, 13 (Pa. Super. 2008) (even if the facts in DeJesus would initially afford the defendant relief, he failed to prove that the police - 15 - J-S41007-15 officer’s conduct tainted and invalidated his subsequent waiver of rights and statement since after the administration of Miranda warnings was completed, the officer then reviewed with the defendant his prior statements, which again were conducted and carried out upon videotaped interview); Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505 (Pa. Super. 2011) (failure to deliver Miranda warnings prior to interrog 2013See also Commonwealth v. Schwing, 964 A.2d 8, 13 (Pa.Super.2008)(even if the facts in DeJesus would initially afford the defendant relief, he failed to prove that the police officer’s conduct tainted and invalidated his subsequent waiver of rights and statement since after the administration of Miranda warnings was completed, the officer then reviewed with the defendant his prior statements, which again were conducted and carried out upon videotaped interview); Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505 (Pa.Super.2011) (failure to deliver Miranda warnings prior to interrogation did not invalidate | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Commonwealth v. Friedman
green
1 sentence2014In light of the foregoing, we conclude the instant matter is distinguishable from Gibbs. ____________________________________________ 5 See Friedman, 602 A.2d at 378 . (“In Gibbs, the statement found to be an inducement was made to defendant after he was read his rights and after he asked a question, ‘What good would it do me to tell you?’ This sequence of events rendered the detective’s response of possible benefits by telling the court of defendant’s cooperation an inducement.”); Commonwealth v. Lester, 572 A.2d 694, 697 (Pa. Super. 1990) (“We note that the Gibbs court restricted its decisio | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences2001Id. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285 . 2001Id. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Anderson
green
2 sentences1985In Anderson , widely cited with approval by subsequent panels of the Superior Court in analyzing Miranda , [7] that court concluded that McLaughlin had overruled the independent focus test saying: "[Therein], the Supreme Court . . . decided that the status of primary focus of an investigation alone did not require the administration of Miranda warnings. . . ." Id., 253 Pa.Superior Ct. at 346, 385 A.2d at 371 . 1985In Anderson , widely cited with approval by subsequent panels of the Superior Court in analyzing Miranda , [7] that court concluded that McLaughlin had overruled the independent focus test saying: "[Therein], the Supreme Court . . . decided that the status of primary focus of an investigation alone did not require the administration of Miranda warnings. . . ." Id., 253 Pa.Superior Ct. at 346, 385 A.2d at 371 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.