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45 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 20 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. A.M.green2 sentences2026"The administration of Miranda warnings ensures that a defendant's right against self-incrimination is protected in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384 , A-2113-24 12 397 (2019). 2025"The administration of Miranda warnings ensures that a defendant's right against self-incrimination is protected in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019). | 9 | 12 |
State v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2017"The responsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform defendants of their rights ends with the proper administration of Miranda warnings." State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 448 (1992). 2015It is the "responsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform defendants of their rights [] with the proper administration of Miranda warnings." State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 448 (1992) (citing State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 47 (1968)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. McKnightgreen2 sentences2015It is the "responsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform defendants of their rights [] with the proper administration of Miranda warnings." State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 448 (1992) (citing State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 47 (1968)). 2015It is the "responsibility of law-enforcement authorities to inform defendants of their rights [] with the proper administration of Miranda warnings." State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 448 (1992) (citing State v. McKnight, 52 N.J. 35, 47 (1968)). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Nyhammergreen2 sentences2026To that end, a person subject to custodial interrogation "must be adequately and effectively apprised of his [or her] rights." Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 400 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 ). 2025To admit a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, "the State must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)); see also State v. A-2311-22 17 Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 , 405 n.11 (2009) (emphasizing the totality of the circumstances analysis). | 2 | 6 |
State v. O'NEALgreen2 sentences2025Our Supreme Court adopted the public safety exception in State v. O'Neal, holding that the questioning of a suspect prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was acceptable when the situation presented an A-1624-22 59 "objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated" with a weapon. 190 N.J. 601, 618 (2007) (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8). 2021Our Supreme Court adopted the public safety exception in State v. O'Neal holding that the questioning of a suspect prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was acceptable when the situations presented an "objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated" with a weapon. [Ibid. (quoting State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 618 (2007)).] In Stephenson, we delineated a framework to determine whether the public safety exception applied to a given situation, explaining: There must be a compelling and exigent need, under the totality of the circums | 2 | 4 |
State v. Pillargreen2 sentences2021State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. 2021State v. Pillar, 359 N.J. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Kareem T. Tillery (079832) (Essex County and Statewide)green2 sentences2025To admit a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, "the State must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)); see also State v. A-2311-22 17 Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 , 405 n.11 (2009) (emphasizing the totality of the circumstances analysis). 2024To admit a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, "the State must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)); see also Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 405, n.11 (emphasizing the totality of the circumstances analysis). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Stephensongreen2 sentences2025To establish the exception applies, the "State must generally demonstrate (1) there was an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public; (2) from an immediate danger; (3) associated with a weapon; and that (4) the questions asked were related to that danger and reasonably necessary to secure public safety." Melendez, 423 N.J. Super. at 24 (quoting State v. Stephenson, 350 N.J. Super. 517, 525 (App. Div. 2002)). 2025This court has held, A-0928-20 63 [i]n order to establish the need to invoke the exception, the State must generally demonstrate "(1) there was an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public; (2) from an immediate danger; (3) associated with a weapon; and that (4) the questions asked were related to that danger and reasonably necessary to secure public safety." [State v. Stephenson, 350 N.J. Super. 517, 525 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting State v. Prim, 730 N.E.2d 455, 463 (1999)).] The exception is not restricted to public places and may apply in private settings. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Preshagreen2 sentences2025To admit a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, "the State must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)); see also State v. A-2311-22 17 Nyhammer, 197 N.J. 383 , 405 n.11 (2009) (emphasizing the totality of the circumstances analysis). 2024To admit a statement obtained during a custodial interrogation, "the State must 'prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the suspect's waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of all the circumstances.'" State v. Tillery, 238 N.J. 293, 316 (2019) (quoting State v. Presha, 163 N.J. 304, 313 (2000)); see also Nyhammer, 197 N.J. at 405, n.11 (emphasizing the totality of the circumstances analysis). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences2020Id. at 21; State v. Cunningham, 153 N.J. 2020Id. at 21; State v. Cunningham, 153 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hickmangreen2 sentences2020Id. at 632 . 2020In State v. Hickman, 335 N.J. Super. 623, 631 (App. Div. 2000), we held that "[r]oadside questioning of a motorist is not transformed into 'custodial interrogation' that must be preceded by Miranda warnings simply because a police officer's questioning is accusatory in nature or designed to elicit incriminating evidence." Relying on Berkemer, we noted that a police officer telling a defendant he looked "really nervous" and asking if he had any contraband in the vehicle was not equivalent to a formal arrest and did not require the administration of Miranda warnings. | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Qngreen2 sentences2018See State v. Q.N., 179 N.J. 165, 176-77 (2004) (after the administration of Miranda warnings in the presence of the mother and the juvenile, the mother took an "active role in directing her son to 'answer the officer's questions.'"); see also State v. Belliard, 415 N.J. 2012Id. at 169, 843 A.2d 1140 . | 1 | 2 |
Patterson v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1994The Supreme Court declined to suppress the defendant’s statements, concluding that the administration of Miranda warnings had made the defendant “sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present during the questioning, and of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel!.]” Id. at 292-93 , 108 S.Ct. at 2395 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 272 . 1994The Supreme Court declined to suppress the defendant’s statements, concluding that the administration of Miranda warnings had made the defendant “sufficiently aware of his right to have counsel present during the questioning, and of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid of counsel!.]” Id. at 292-93 , 108 S.Ct. at 2395 , 101 L.Ed.2d at 272 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. J.R.green2 sentences2026A.A., 240 N.J. at 359. 2026In A.A., the Court recently amplified Presha, holding that the practice of providing an opportunity for the parent and child to confer privately after the administration of Miranda warnings "would enable parents to help children understand their rights and decide whether to waive them—as contemplated in Presha." 240 N.J. at 359. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sanchez-Medinagreen1 sentence2025Furthermore, "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474 . [Clark, 251 N.J. at 291-92 (alterations and omissions in original).] "The administration of Miranda warnings ensures that a defendant's right against self-incrimination is protected in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Primgreen1 sentence2025This court has held, A-0928-20 63 [i]n order to establish the need to invoke the exception, the State must generally demonstrate "(1) there was an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public; (2) from an immediate danger; (3) associated with a weapon; and that (4) the questions asked were related to that danger and reasonably necessary to secure public safety." [State v. Stephenson, 350 N.J. Super. 517, 525 (App. Div. 2002) (quoting State v. Prim, 730 N.E.2d 455, 463 (1999)).] The exception is not restricted to public places and may apply in private settings. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stasgreen2 sentences2024A-3186-21 74 Under New Jersey law, "even silence that precedes the administration of Miranda warnings—if it is 'at or near' the time of a defendant's arrest—cannot be used for any purpose at trial." Id. at 57-58 (quoting State v. Elkwisni, 190 NJ. 169, 181 (2007)). 2024"Under federal law, the use for any purpose at trial of a defendant's silence after his arrest and the administration of Miranda warnings violates his or her privilege against self-incrimination and his or her right to due process." State v. Stas, 212 N.J. 37, 57 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2024"However, . . . pre-arrest silence that is not 'at or near' the time of arrest, when there is no government compulsion and the objective circumstances demonstrate that a reasonable person in a defendant's position would have acted differently, can be used to impeach that defendant's credibility with an appropriate limiting instruction." Id. at 58 (citing State v. Lawrence Brown, 190 N.J. 144, 158-59 (2007)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mallozzigreen1 sentence2022The "'routine booking question' exception . . . exempts A-0537-19 26 from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.'" Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990); State v. Mallozzi, 246 N.J. Super. 509, 515 (App. Div. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Pennsylvania v. Munizgreen1 sentence2022The "'routine booking question' exception . . . exempts A-0537-19 26 from Miranda's coverage questions to secure the 'biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.'" Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601 (1990); State v. Mallozzi, 246 N.J. Super. 509, 515 (App. Div. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beygreen1 sentence2021See Bey, 112 N.J. at 68 n.13; Wright, 444 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Terrell Hubbard (073539)green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Belliardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re ETCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Roanegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Urban v. Haaggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Berubegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Elkwisnigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robert J. Smothers v. Gary R. McCaughtry Wardengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jenkins v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Doyle v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McCloskeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2025Furthermore, "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." Id. at 474 . [Clark, 251 N.J. at 291-92 (alterations and omissions in original).] "The administration of Miranda warnings ensures that a defendant's right against self-incrimination is protected in the inherently coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation." State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 397 (2019). 2021And the trial court recognized defendant's invocation of his right to counsel that ended the interview, concluding "defendant's rights were not violated and [his] statement was made with a valid waiver of those rights." law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney[] and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. [Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 .] A-2932-18 8 The administration of Miranda warnings does not obviate the need for our analysis of the statement's voluntariness, a legal issue requiring our independent r | 11 | 1987–2026 |
State v. Galloway
green
2 sentences2018Ibid. 2018Ibid. | 4 | 2017–2018 |
New York v. Quarles
green
2 sentences2025Our Supreme Court adopted the public safety exception in State v. O'Neal, holding that the questioning of a suspect prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was acceptable when the situation presented an A-1624-22 59 "objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated" with a weapon. 190 N.J. 601, 618 (2007) (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8). 2025The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the public safety exception in State v. O'Neal, 190 NJ. 601, 624 (2007) holding that the questioning of a suspect prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was acceptable when the situation presented an "objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated" with a weapon. 190 N.J. at 618 (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8). | 3 | 2011–2025 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020The definition of interrogation has been extended only to a police officer's words or actions that the officer "should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." [Ibid. (citation omitted) (quoting Innis, 466 U.S. at 301 ).] We agree with Judge DeAvila-Silebi that the detective's questioning prior to the administration of Miranda warnings "elicited general information from defendant that included his pedigree information, cell phone number, and other background information as it related to the victim and the victim's mother." Miranda warnings need not have 2020The definition of interrogation has been extended only to a police officer's words or actions that the officer "should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." [Ibid. (citation omitted) (quoting Innis, 466 U.S. at 301 ).] We agree with Judge DeAvila-Silebi that the detective's questioning prior to the administration of Miranda warnings "elicited general information from defendant that included his pedigree information, cell phone number, and other background information as it related to the victim and the victim's mother." Miranda warnings need not have | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Berkemer v. McCarty
green
2 sentences1987This appeal presents us with the following issues: whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), requiring the administration of Miranda warnings in connection with arrests for minor traffic offenses, should be applied retroactively; whether a police officer’s request for a suspect to submit to a breathalyzer test constitutes “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); and whether a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test may be used as evidence 1987This appeal presents us with the following issues: whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), requiring the administration of Miranda warnings in connection with arrests for minor traffic offenses, should be applied retroactively; whether a police officer’s request for a suspect to submit to a breathalyzer test constitutes “interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); and whether a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test may be used as evidence | 2 | 1987–2019 |
State v. Melendez
green
1 sentence2025To establish the exception applies, the "State must generally demonstrate (1) there was an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public; (2) from an immediate danger; (3) associated with a weapon; and that (4) the questions asked were related to that danger and reasonably necessary to secure public safety." Melendez, 423 N.J. Super. at 24 (quoting State v. Stephenson, 350 N.J. Super. 517, 525 (App. Div. 2002)). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Douglas
green
1 sentence2025Id. at ___ (slip op. at 5). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2025The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the public safety exception in State v. O'Neal, 190 NJ. 601, 624 (2007) holding that the questioning of a suspect prior to the administration of Miranda warnings was acceptable when the situation presented an "objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger associated" with a weapon. 190 N.J. at 618 (quoting Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n.8). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stansbury v. California
green
1 sentence2021O'Neal, 190 N.J. at 616 (quoting Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323 ). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Ebert green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Minnesota v. Murphy green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Deatore green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Muhammad green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| In the Matter of Fellows neutral | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Oregon v. Elstad green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.