16 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Elstadgreen2 sentences2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 2010The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.” (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.’ ”].) This is not a case in which it is alleged that the officers were following a policy of disregarding the teaching of Miranda . | 4 | 12 |
Missouri v. Seibertgreen2 sentences2004A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” (Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 314 ; accord, Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 643 , 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2611-2612 ].) Despite the failure to administer Miranda warnings, there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant’s statements on May 10 were involuntary, or that they were particularly incriminating. 2004A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” (Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 314 ; accord, Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S. 600 [ 159 L.Ed.2d 643 , 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2611-2612 ].) Despite the failure to administer Miranda warnings, there is nothing in the record to suggest that defendant’s statements on May 10 were involuntary, or that they were particularly incriminating. | 2 | 4 |
People v. San Nicolasgreen2 sentences2013The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.”’” (People v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 477 .) “‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.’” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 .) These principles are derived from two United States Supreme Court cases. 2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 | 2 | 3 |
People v. Bradfordgreen2 sentences2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 | 1 | 1 |
People v. Haleygreen2 sentences2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 2011The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.’ (Oregon v. Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. at p. 318 , fn. omitted; see also People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 [ 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 ] [“‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” ’].)” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 448 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 233 P.3d 1000 ] (Williams); accord, People v. Haley (2004) 3 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Storm
green
1 sentence2021In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.” (Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 314 ; People v. Storm (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1007 , 1030–1031.) The court properly admitted defendant’s statements to Officer Moore since his initial statements to Officer Tramel were not coerced or involuntary. 3 The state must preserve evidence “expected to play a significant role in the suspect’s defense. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. Cook
green
2 sentences2019(See People v. Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373 , 381, 221 Cal.Rptr. 499 , 710 P.2d 299 ["the police may not intrude into a hospital room" to see or hear the activities within "simply because hospital personnel routinely go in and out"].) Three statements were admitted from Wade's conversation with Caro: Caro indicated that she may have broken her foot by falling down the stairs; that she might have gotten hurt by "wrestling with a boy"; and after *497 receiving Miranda warnings and invoking her right to a lawyer, Caro spontaneously asked about where G.C. was located (and not about the other children 2019(See People v. Cook (1985) 41 Cal.3d 373 , 381, 221 Cal.Rptr. 499 , 710 P.2d 299 ["the police may not intrude into a hospital room" to see or hear the activities within "simply because hospital personnel routinely go in and out"].) Three statements were admitted from Wade's conversation with Caro: Caro indicated that she may have broken her foot by falling down the stairs; that she might have gotten hurt by "wrestling with a boy"; and after *497 receiving Miranda warnings and invoking her right to a lawyer, Caro spontaneously asked about where G.C. was located (and not about the other children | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Fletcher v. Weir
green
2 sentences2014Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606 .‖ (Ibid.) It is true that Fletcher rejected the contention that ― ‗an arrest, by itself, is governmental action which implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent.‘ ‖ (Fletcher, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 606 .) But in doing so, the high court merely 7 sought to distinguish an arrest from the administration of Miranda warnings for the purpose of limiting Doyle‘s prohibition on the use of silence for impeachment to post-Miranda silence. 2014Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606 .‖ (Ibid.) It is true that Fletcher rejected the contention that ― ‗an arrest, by itself, is governmental action which implicitly induces a defendant to remain silent.‘ ‖ (Fletcher, supra, 455 U.S. at p. 606 .) But in doing so, the high court merely 7 sought to distinguish an arrest from the administration of Miranda warnings for the purpose of limiting Doyle‘s prohibition on the use of silence for impeachment to post-Miranda silence. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Camino
green
1 sentence2013Elstad, supra, 470 U.S. 298 , “held that a suspect who responds ‘to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning’ may later waive his rights and confess after being ‘given the requisite Miranda warnings.’” (Camino, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1368 .) In Elstad, police arrived at the residence of a burglary suspect with an arrest warrant. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Scott
green
1 sentence2013The relevant inquiry is whether, in fact, the second statement was also voluntarily made.”’” (People v. Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 477 .) “‘A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.’” (People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 639 .) These principles are derived from two United States Supreme Court cases. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
People v. Honeycutt
green
2 sentences2011Rather, relying on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 ] (Honeycutt), he contends his subsequent statements should have been suppressed because the police “softened him up” with the earlier questions, “employ[ing] the tactic of ingratiating themselves with [him] by asking him seemingly innocuous questions about his school, his roommates, his hobbies . . . .” 24 Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d 150 , is distinguishable on its facts. 2011Rather, relying on People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 698 , 570 P.2d 1050 ] (Honeycutt), he contends his subsequent statements should have been suppressed because the police “softened him up” with the earlier questions, “employ[ing] the tactic of ingratiating themselves with [him] by asking him seemingly innocuous questions about his school, his roommates, his hobbies . . . .” 24 Honeycutt, supra, 20 Cal.3d 150 , is distinguishable on its facts. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. May
green
2 sentences1990Defendant's argument for a stricter California rule has been undercut by *276 our holding in People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], that article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution ("Truth-in-Evidence" provision of Proposition 8) eliminated judicially created state remedies for violation of self-incrimination rights that are not federally compelled. 1990Defendant's argument for a stricter California rule has been undercut by *276 our holding in People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309 [ 243 Cal. Rptr. 369 , 748 P.2d 307 ], that article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution ("Truth-in-Evidence" provision of Proposition 8) eliminated judicially created state remedies for violation of self-incrimination rights that are not federally compelled. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.