divorce hearing in Ohio

2026This Court has previously recognized that the statute, “creates ‘a presumption that the proper date for termination of marriage is the date of the final divorce hearing.’” Budd at ¶ 8 , quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 132 Ohio App.3d 616, 630 , (9th Dist. 1999), quoting Kohler v. Kohler, 1996 WL 455850 , *5 (9th Dist.

2024We have previously noted that the statute “creates ‘a presumption that the proper date for termination of marriage is the date of the final divorce hearing.’” Budd at ¶ 8, quoting Bowen v. Bowen, 132 Ohio App.3d 616 , 630 (9th Dist.1999), quoting Kohler v. Kohler, 9th Dist.

2026“Generally, if a party fails to appear at the final divorce hearing, ‘[a]ny deficiency claimed by appellant is explained by appellant’s failure to appear at his final divorce hearing.’” Lakkapragada v. Lakkapragada, 2014-Ohio- 331, ¶ 59 (2d Dist.), quoting Mankin v. Mankin, 2008-Ohio-6214, ¶ 15 (7th Dist.).

2024No. 07 MO 4, 2008-Ohio-6214, ¶ 1, 11-18 (considering direct appeal from divorce decree and challenge to the trial court’s division of the parties’ property following the appellant’s failure to attend the final divorce hearing to present evidence).

2022“Thus, settlement agreements ‘can only be set aside for the same reasons that any other contract could be rescinded, such as fraud, duress, or undue influence.’ ” Id., quoting Barstow at ¶ 38 . {¶11} Settlement agreements “may be either written or oral, and may be entered into prior to or at the time of a divorce hearing.” Hass v. Bauer, 156 Ohio App.3d 26 , 2004-Ohio-437 , 804 N.E.2d 80, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), citing Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 9th Dist.

2022“Thus, settlement agreements ‘can only be set aside for the same reasons that any other contract could be rescinded, such as fraud, duress, or undue influence.’ ” Id., quoting Barstow at ¶ 38 . {¶11} Settlement agreements “may be either written or oral, and may be entered into prior to or at the time of a divorce hearing.” Hass v. Bauer, 156 Ohio App.3d 26 , 2004-Ohio-437 , 804 N.E.2d 80, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), citing Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 9th Dist.

2021If the court selects dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property, 'during the marriage' means the period of time between those dates selected and specified by the court." {¶ 27} As the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized in Berish v. Berish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318 (1982), the circumstances of a particular case may make a date prior to the time of the parties' final divorce hearing more equitable for the determination and valuation of marital assets.

2019This includes: the property generating the royalties was marital property; the lease was entered by both parties during the marriage; the primary term of the lease ended before the hearing; the division orders had effective dates prior to the hearing date; the court intent to protect royalties paid pending the final divorce decree was made clear in its December 14, 2017 order; this was after the final day of the divorce hearing and a month before the divorce decree; in this order, the parties were commanded to deposit royalties with the clerk of courts pending the court’s final decision so the

2008The trial court apparently treated all testimony as credible but ultimately concluded that “the actions of the parties were certainly not clear, and not bilateral, and therefore, no de facto termination of marriage occurred prior to the date of the final divorce hearing,” relying upon the rule in Day, 40 Ohio App.3d at 158 , 532 N.E.2d 201 . 4.

2008The trial court apparently treated all testimony as credible but ultimately concluded that “the actions of the parties were certainly not clear, and not bilateral, and therefore, no de facto termination of marriage occurred prior to the date of the final divorce hearing,” relying upon the rule in Day, 40 Ohio App.3d at 158 , 532 N.E.2d 201 . 4.

2009Where the agreement is made outside the presence of the court, the court may properly sign a journal entry reflecting the settlement agreement in the absence of any factual dispute concerning the agreement." Haas v. Bauer (2004), 156 Ohio App.3d 26 , 33 , 804 N.E.2d 80 , citing, Muckleroy v. Muckleroy (Sept. 5, 1990), Summit App. No. 1443; See also, Mack v. Poison Rubber Co. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 34 , 470 N.E.2d 902 ; Grubic v. Grubic (September 9, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 73793, citing, Zigmont v. Toto (1988), 47 Ohio App.3d 181 , 547 N.E.2d 1208 . (a trial court may enter a judgment that ref

2009Where the agreement is made outside the presence of the court, the court may properly sign a journal entry reflecting the settlement agreement in the absence of any factual dispute concerning the agreement." Haas v. Bauer (2004), 156 Ohio App.3d 26 , 33 , 804 N.E.2d 80 , citing, Muckleroy v. Muckleroy (Sept. 5, 1990), Summit App. No. 1443; See also, Mack v. Poison Rubber Co. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 34 , 470 N.E.2d 902 ; Grubic v. Grubic (September 9, 1999), Cuyahoga App. No. 73793, citing, Zigmont v. Toto (1988), 47 Ohio App.3d 181 , 547 N.E.2d 1208 . (a trial court may enter a judgment that ref

1999See Coffman v. Coffman (1945), 76 Ohio App. 330, 333 , 32 O.O. 51, 52 , 62 N.E.2d 302, 303 (“We cannot look to the opinions of the court for refutation of the duly entered findings upon its journal”).

1999See Coffman v. Coffman (1945), 76 Ohio App. 330 , 333 ("We cannot look to the opinions of the court for refutation of the duly entered findings upon its journal.") Gregory Glick's eighth assignment of error is overruled.

2016Blakemore v. -3- Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶11} The time period of “during the marriage” is the period of time from the date of the marriage through the date of the final divorce hearing unless the trial court determines that the use of either or both of these dates would be inequitable.

2016Blakemore v. -3- Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶11} The time period of “during the marriage” is the period of time from the date of the marriage through the date of the final divorce hearing unless the trial court determines that the use of either or both of these dates would be inequitable.

2008No. 05 MA 26, 2006-Ohio-1289 , at ¶ 56 (a party that fails to set aside a magistrate's order as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(2)(b) "cannot raise any issue which could have been addressed in that order at the final divorce hearing") (citations omitted). {¶ 120} The trial court's judgment entry addressing the parties' objections is somewhat confused regarding John's arguments about the health insurance credit toward child support.

2006Id., citing Civ.R. 75(N)(2). {¶ 14} A party who neither moves to set aside an order entered under Civ.R. 53(C)(3)(a), nor moves to modify that order, cannot raise any issue which could have been addressed in that order at the final divorce hearing.

2006Spier , at ¶ 56, citing Douglas v. Douglas [sic] (1996), 110 Ohio App.3d 615 , 621 .

2006See Douglas v. Douglas (1996) 110 Ohio App.3d 615 , 621 ; Beran v. Beran, 6th Dist.

2024Montgomery No. 25883, 2014-Ohio-331, ¶ 59 , -7- citing Huff v. Huff, 8th Dist.

2024No. 25883, 2014-Ohio-331, ¶ 59 (explaining that, generally, if a party fails to appear at the final divorce hearing, any deficiency claimed by appellant is explained by appellant’s failure to appear at his final divorce hearing); McLoughlin at ¶ 32 (determining that, where disclosed assets are at issue, a party that chooses to “sit on [his or her] rights,” thereby “fail[ing] to take any action to insure [his or her] own interests,” cannot then use equity considerations to support later relief under Civ.R. 60(B).).

2017See also James v. James, 101 Ohio App.3d 668, 677 (2d Dist.1995) (appearance of partiality warranted disqualification of the referee who presided over the parties’ divorce hearing).

2008Id. *Page 28 {¶ 91} In this case, prior to the divorce hearing, appellant initially failed to disclose his ownership interest in the Becks Knob property.

2026See Humbarger v. Cassidy, 2024-Ohio-5361, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.) (upholding a trial court's refusal to consider evidence not presented during the final divorce hearing). {¶ 49} Accordingly, the trial court acted within its discretion in quashing the subpoena and declining to admit additional evidence.

2026Moreover, Civ.R. 53(D) provides that objections to a magistrate’s decision “shall be supported by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding.” Fogt v. Fogt, 2019-Ohio-1403, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.). {¶13} Scott failed to file a transcript of the divorce hearing or specific supplemental objections within the deadlines set by the magistrate’s order.

2026Indeed, “‘[i]t is well established that where a party fails to appear at the final hearing and present evidence concerning the parties’ assets and liabilities, the absent party may not then raise issues on appeal concerning the weight of the evidence regarding the assets and liabilities at issue.’” Gordon v. Gordon, 2009-Ohio-177, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.), quoting Sims v. Sims, 2000 WL 23184 , *4 (8th Dist.

2025See, e.g., Lichtenstein v. Lichtenstein, 2020-Ohio-5080, ¶ 63 (8th Dist.) (final divorce decree did not No. 24AP-285 4 render moot wife’s motion to modify temporary support orders because the issue was whether she was entitled to temporary support from the date of the final divorce hearing until the court issued the final divorce decree).

2024While there have been certain instances in which this Court has noted that a judgment can be void due a lack of due process, see Rondy v. Rondy, 13 Ohio App.3d 19, 22 (9th Dist. 1983), Mr. Ward has not convinced this Court that what is before this Court is comparable to those instances.

2024Gregory v. Gregory, 2007-Ohio-4098, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.). {¶ 26} During the divorce hearing, Shery described the marital residence as being “dysfunctional,” “odd in the marketplace,” and “a unicorn in the city.” At one point, she opined that “you can’t appraise it.” She nevertheless hired two appraisers to determine its value.

2024See also Wood at ¶ 7 (challenging in a direct appeal from divorce decree the manner in which the trial court conducted the hearing). {¶ 45} If Steven disagreed with how the trial court conducted the final hearing, the propriety of the trial court’s acceptance of the proposed decree, and/or the sufficiency of the evidence to support the asset division, he should have directly appealed the final judgment — decree of divorce to seek a reversal based on those issues.