divorce hearing in New York

1996While her earning potential may have increased as a result of her receiving a license, such did not warrant termination of maintenance, particularly in light of the substantial increase in the defendant’s income between the time of the parties’ divorce and the hearing on the subject motions (see, McCarthy v McCarthy, 214 AD2d 1000 ).

1964It would seem that the appearance by one of the parties under article 23 is mere surplusage and makes no difference whatsoever between the kind of decree so obtained and a mail-order divorce (see Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N. Y. 146 , supra).

1958For it must, of course, be recognized that the law of Florida on the subject (de Marigny v. de Marigny, 43 So. 2d 442 ) is not necessarily the law of Georgia.

1958What I do say is that I am unable to follow counsel when they fail to note that the New York decisions relied upon by them, and in which was discussed the problem of ascertaining and interpreting the law of the divorce State under the rule of Johnson v. Muelberger (supra), all involved Florida divorces and, therefore, the courts, in arriving at these decisions, were able to rely upon the authorities cited in the Johnson case, which involved a Florida divorce; and, in addition, the courts in those cases could rely upon the Johnson opinion itself insofar as it undertook to state the law of Flori

1957As our Court of Appeals pointed out in Krause v. Krause ( 282 N. Y. 355 ), a determination that a defendant who obtained an invalid divorce may not set up the invalidity of the divorce as a defense to an action for support by one whom he purported to marry subsequent to such divorce, does not mean that he is not the husband of his first wife.

1955The hearing was not — to use the language in Long v. Long ( 281 App. Div. 254, 258 ) — “ another trial at which the question of the validity of the husband’s domicile in the State of Nevada may be fully explored and an appropriate declaration may then be made.” Marriage, like other legal relationships, consists of the proverbial bundle of rights and corresponding duties and should not be considered merely a single entity (Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U. S. 279, 281-283 [concurring opinion] ; see Morris, Divisible Divorce, 64 Harv.