divorce hearing in Illinois

1979App. 2d 330 , 124 N.E.2d 66 , the court held that fear and confusion are not a valid reason for failing to bring to the court’s attention matters which were known to the litigant at the time of the divorce hearing.

1979App. 2d 330, 353 , 124 N.E.2d 66 , 77.) The court went on to note that by intentionally failing to disclose these facts at the divorce hearing, petitioner misled the court.

1977App. 3d 763 , 283 N.E.2d 922 , relied upon by plaintiff, does set forth the settled rule that litigants are responsible for following their case (see also Esczuk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 464, 467 , 236 N.E.2d 719, 721 ), but in the context of a case where plaintiff did, in fact, send notice of a divorce hearing to defendant but defendant simply contended he had not received the notice.

1977App. 3d 763 , 283 N.E.2d 922 , relied upon by plaintiff, does set forth the settled rule that litigants are responsible for following their case (see also Esczuk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 464, 467 , 236 N.E.2d 719, 721 ), but in the context of a case where plaintiff did, in fact, send notice of a divorce hearing to defendant but defendant simply contended he had not received the notice.

1977App. 3d 763 , 283 N.E.2d 922 , relied upon by plaintiff, does set forth the settled rule that litigants are responsible for following their case (see also Esczuk v. Chicago Transit Authority (1968), 39 Ill. 2d 464, 467 , 236 N.E.2d 719, 721 ), but in the context of a case where plaintiff did, in fact, send notice of a divorce hearing to defendant but defendant simply contended he had not received the notice.

1975There the divorce decree incorporated a property settlement agreement which specifically provided “ * * that all real estate * * * shall be sold and the net proceeds thereof, divided, equally, between the parties hereto.’ ” ( 12 Ill.App.3d 302, 304 .) The court concluded from that language and the relevant circumstances disclosed in the transcript of the divorce hearing that the parties intended a division of the property and that the agreement contemplated a sale as soon as feasible.

1954In Johnson v. Johnson, 381 Ill. 362 , page 370, this court stated: “The jurisdiction of courts of equity to hear and determine divorce cases, and all matters relating thereto, is conferred only by statute.

1945(Seuss v. Schukat, 358 Ill. 27 .) The money he paid to plaintiff in 1925 does bear, however, upon her charge that the challenged assignments reflect an attempt by her husband and his daughter to defraud her of her rights in his property.

1944Evans v. Woodsworth, 213 Ill. 404 ; Caswell v. Caswell, 120 Ill. 377 .” After reviewing further authorities the court states (p.213): “It is our conclusion that the circuit court of Lake county properly found that Philip Goldberg, at the time he filed his suit for a divorce and the hearing of the same was not a resident of Cook county, Illinois, but was a resident of Lake county, Illinois, and that he perpetrated a fraud upon said court in procuring said divorce, and that said court did not have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the suit, and that the same was null and void

1944Evans v. Woodsworth, 213 Ill. 404 ; Caswell v. Caswell, 120 Ill. 377 .” After reviewing further authorities the court states (p.213): “It is our conclusion that the circuit court of Lake county properly found that Philip Goldberg, at the time he filed his suit for a divorce and the hearing of the same was not a resident of Cook county, Illinois, but was a resident of Lake county, Illinois, and that he perpetrated a fraud upon said court in procuring said divorce, and that said court did not have jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter of the suit, and that the same was null and void