divorce hearing in Wisconsin

1973It does not include neglect which consists in a total sleeping on one’s rights.’ ” Padek v. Thornton (1958), 3 Wis. 2d 334, 338 , 88 N. W. 2d 316 .

1973It does not include neglect which consists in a total sleeping on one’s rights.’ ” Padek v. Thornton (1958), 3 Wis. 2d 334, 338 , 88 N. W. 2d 316 .

2023Id.

2021Id. ¶35 Conversely, in this case, the circuit court did not inquire into the parties’ understanding of, and agreement to, any stipulation regarding the 15 application of a tax discount to the parties’ retirement accounts at the final divorce hearing.

2001Neither Kim nor Sandra cites to any Wisconsin case law that has addressed this issue, nor have we found any. 6 However, both parties discuss Parker v. Parker, 152 Wis. 2d 1 , 447 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1989), and Voecks , which address whether incarceration constitutes a substantial change of circumstances warranting modification of an existing child support order.

2001Neither Kim nor Sandra cites to any Wisconsin case law that has addressed this issue, nor have we found any. 6 However, both parties discuss Parker v. Parker, 152 Wis. 2d 1 , 447 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1989), and Voecks , which address whether incarceration constitutes a substantial change of circumstances warranting modification of an existing child support order.

1985At the divorce hearing, the trial judge specifically questioned Mr. Rintelman on his understanding of whether the payments would continue even if his wife remarried, and he stated it was his understanding they would continue. 118 Wis. 2d at 590 .

1985At the divorce hearing, *79 the trial judge specifically questioned Mr. Rintelman on his understanding of whether the payments would continue even if his wife remarried, and he stated it was his understanding they would continue. 118 Wis. 2d at 590 .

1984Edwards v. Edwards, 97 Wis. 2d 111, 113 , 293 N.W.2d 160 (1980), dealt with the issue of consideration of the divorced father’s potential earning capacity rather than his actual earnings at the time of the divorce hearing.

1984Edwards v. Edwards, 97 Wis. 2d 111, 113 , 293 N.W.2d 160 (1980), dealt with the issue of consideration of the divorced father’s potential earning capacity rather than his actual earnings at the time of the divorce hearing.

1980Mere inability to pay child support cannot form the basis for a finding of contempt: "`. . . it has long been settled in Wisconsin that a person cannot be held in contempt of court for the failure to pay money unless the refusal is willful and contemptuous and not a result of his inability to pay.'" Balaam, supra, 52 Wis.2d at 29 ; quoted with approval, Besaw v. Besaw, 89 Wis.2d 509, 516 , 279 N.W.2d 192 (1979). [1] It is not clear from the record if this amount was for the four children or also included another child of his that apparently lived with her. [2] According to the majority opinion

1980Mere inability to pay child support cannot form the basis for a finding of contempt: "`. . . it has long been settled in Wisconsin that a person cannot be held in contempt of court for the failure to pay money unless the refusal is willful and contemptuous and not a result of his inability to pay.'" Balaam, supra, 52 Wis.2d at 29 ; quoted with approval, Besaw v. Besaw, 89 Wis.2d 509, 516 , 279 N.W.2d 192 (1979). [1] It is not clear from the record if this amount was for the four children or also included another child of his that apparently lived with her. [2] According to the majority opinion

1980We held in Balaam that the trial court's consideration of the husband's earning capacity, rather than his actual earnings, was improper because there was no finding — nor even a basis for a possible finding — that the husband was not "fairly or diligently working at the occupation which he [was] best suited for, nor that he [was] willfully accepting employment and resultant lower compensation for the purpose of reducing his ability to pay alimony and support money." 52 Wis.2d at 28-9 . [4] *120 Similarly, this case reveals no evidence — and hence, in this record, no basis for a finding — that

1980We held in Balaam that the trial court’s consideration of the husband’s earning capacity, rather than his actual earnings, was improper because there was no finding — nor even a basis for a possible finding — that the husband was not “fairly or diligently working at the occupation which he [was] best suited for, nor that he [was] willfully accepting employment and resultant lower compensation for the purpose of reducing his ability to pay alimony and support money.” 52 Wis.2d at 28-9 . 4 Similarly, this case reveals no evidence — and hence, in this record, no basis for a finding — that Robert

1979In Heinemann v. Heinemann, 202 Wis. 639 , 233 N.W. 552 (1930), the district attorney, then charged with performing the duties later assigned to the divorce counsel and, still later, reassigned to the family court commissioner, failed to appear at the divorce hearing, and the answer and counterclaim of the defendant, upon which the defendant was granted a divorce from a non-testifying plaintiff, was not served upon him.

1979In Heinemann v. Heinemann, 202 Wis. 639 , 233 N.W. 552 (1930), the district attorney, then charged with performing the duties later assigned to the divorce counsel and, still later, reassigned to the family court commissioner, failed to appear at the divorce hearing, and the answer and counterclaim of the defendant, upon which the defendant was granted a divorce from a non-testifying plaintiff, was not served upon him.

1979She cites the court to Thies v. MacDonald, 51 Wis.2d 296, 301, 302 , 187 N.W.2d 186 (1971) which states: “Though the doctrine of res judicata is not applied in its usual strictness when the question involves custody or support because the interests of children are involved, King v. King, 25 Wis.2d 550 , 131 N.W.2d 357 (1964), policy still dictates that a decision made on a certain state of facts be given the effect of res judicata so long as that factual situation has not materially changed.

1979She cites the court to Thies v. MacDonald, 51 Wis.2d 296, 301, 302 , 187 N.W.2d 186 (1971) which states: “Though the doctrine of res judicata is not applied in its usual strictness when the question involves custody or support because the interests of children are involved, King v. King, 25 Wis.2d 550 , 131 N.W.2d 357 (1964), policy still dictates that a decision made on a certain state of facts be given the effect of res judicata so long as that factual situation has not materially changed.