divorce hearing in Texas

2005See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 86-7 , 108 S.Ct. 896 ; Lopez, 757 S.W.2d at 723 ; In re Marriage of Parker, 20 S.W.3d at 817-18 .

2005See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 86-7 , 108 S.Ct. 896 ; Lopez, 757 S.W.2d at 723 ; In re Marriage of Parker, 20 S.W.3d at 817-18 .

2012In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003); In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). ―The right of a prisoner to have access to the courts entails not so much his personal presence as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party.‖ D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166 ).

2012In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003); In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). ―The right of a prisoner to have access to the courts entails not so much his personal presence as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party.‖ D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166 ).

2012In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003); In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). ―The right of a prisoner to have access to the courts entails not so much his personal presence as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party.‖ D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166 ).

2012In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003); In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). ―The right of a prisoner to have access to the courts entails not so much his personal presence as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party.‖ D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166 ).

2011See Dickens, 957 S.W.2d at 659 (requiring the trial court to determine whether it had previously rendered judgment and the contents of that judgment).

2011See Dickens , 957 S.W.2d at 659 (requiring the trial court to determine whether it had previously rendered judgment and the contents of that judgment).

2025See Bobbitt v. Bass, 713 S.W.2d 217 , 218–19 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (affirming an order granting a bill of review in which husband testified that wife told him that she had filed for divorce in a “fit of haste, not to worry about it”; the parties continued to see each other and travel together; and a witness testified that he heard wife tell husband to disregard the divorce proceedings and that they would bill of review petitioner made a prima facie showing of a meritorious defense or ground of appeal, followed by a second hearing regarding the other remaining bill of rev

2024“In order to be considered on an appeal from a trial on the merits, summary judgment evidence must have been introduced and admitted 8 during the trial on the merits.” Paselk v. Rabun, 293 S.W.3d 600, 612 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. denied).

2023Moore draws a parallel between this case and Nguyen v. State, 506 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. ref’d).

2022Catlett, 630 S.W.2d at 483 ; see Samples Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex. 1982) (“A judgment is in fact rendered whenever the trial judge officially announces his decision in open court . . . in his official capacity for his official guidance whether orally or by written memorandum the sentence of law pronounced by him in any cause.”).

2022See Coggin, 738 S.W.2d at 378 ; Weaks, 471 S.W.2d at 456 .

2012In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 165 (Tex. 2003); In re D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). ―The right of a prisoner to have access to the courts entails not so much his personal presence as the opportunity to present evidence or contradict the evidence of the opposing party.‖ D.D.J., 136 S.W.3d at 314 (quoting Dodd v. Dodd, 17 S.W.3d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.), disapproved of on other grounds by Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166 ).

2007See Ceramic Tile Int = l, Inc. v. Balusek , 137 S.W.3d 722, 725 (Tex. App. C San Antonio 2004, no pet.); see also Nat = l Med.

2007See Jackson v. Van Winkle , 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss , 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. 2003) ( A It is incumbent upon a party who seeks a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to satisfy the court first, that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; second, that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; third, that it is not cumulative; fourth, that it is so material that it would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted. @ ).

2007See Jackson v. Van Winkle , 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss , 121 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. 2003) ( A It is incumbent upon a party who seeks a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to satisfy the court first, that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; second, that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner; third, that it is not cumulative; fourth, that it is so material that it would probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted. @ ).

2003See O’Carolan v. Hopper, 71 S.W.3d 529, 535 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). 15 against Debra’s wishes and should have abated the final divorce hearing pending the outcome of the guardianship proceeding.

2001See Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1001 ; see also Chapman v. King Ranch, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 693, 700-01 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed) (bill of review attacking judgment over one hundred years old; summary judgment reversed and cause remanded for trial).

2001See Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1001 ; see also Chapman v. King Ranch, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 693, 700-01 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed) (bill of review attacking judgment over one hundred years old; summary judgment reversed and cause remanded for trial).

2001See Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1001 ; see also Chapman v. King Ranch, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 693, 700-01 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed) (bill of review attacking judgment over one hundred years old; summary judgment reversed and cause remanded for trial).

2001See Alexander, 226 S.W.2d at 1001 ; see also Chapman v. King Ranch, Inc., 41 S.W.3d 693, 700-01 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. filed) (bill of review attacking judgment over one hundred years old; summary judgment reversed and cause remanded for trial).

1995Although this requirement has been construed as mandatory, see Travieso v. Travieso, 649 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ), we note that Travieso was a default judgment case rather than a consent judgment case.