20 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1958–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Evening News Assn.green2 sentences1974(Smith v. Evening News Assoc., 371 U. S. 195 ; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 ; Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 .) In affirming the jurisdiction of a State court in a suit by an individual employee for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court stated: “ The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.” (Smith v. Evening News Assoc., supra, p. 197.) 1974(Smith v. Evening News Assoc., 371 U. S. 195 ; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 ; Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 .) In affirming the jurisdiction of a State court in a suit by an individual employee for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court stated: “ The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.” (Smith v. Evening News Assoc., supra, p. 197.) | 1 | 2 |
Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transportationgreen1 sentence2015Corp. v Vermont, 404 F3d 638, 642 [2d Cir 2005].) “ICCTA ‘preempts all “state laws that may reasonably be said to have the effect of managing or governing rail transportation, while permitting the continued application of laws having a more remote or incidental effect on rail transportation.” ’ The pre-emption inquiry focuses on ‘the degree to which the challenged regulation burdens rail transportation.’ ” (Island Park, LLC v CSX Transp., 559 F3d 96, 102-103 [2d Cir 2009] [citations omitted].) CSXT also acknowledges that preemption has limits. | 1 | 1 |
Green Mountain Railroad Corporation v. State Of Vermontgreen1 sentence2015Corp. v Vermont, 404 F3d 638, 642 [2d Cir 2005].) “ICCTA ‘preempts all “state laws that may reasonably be said to have the effect of managing or governing rail transportation, while permitting the continued application of laws having a more remote or incidental effect on rail transportation.” ’ The pre-emption inquiry focuses on ‘the degree to which the challenged regulation burdens rail transportation.’ ” (Island Park, LLC v CSX Transp., 559 F3d 96, 102-103 [2d Cir 2009] [citations omitted].) CSXT also acknowledges that preemption has limits. | 1 | 1 |
Geller v. County Line Auto Salesgreen1 sentence2000(See, Geller, supra, 86 F3d, at 22 [“the intent of Congress ‘was not to foreclose every state action with a conceivable effect upon ERISA plans, but to maintain exclusive federal control over the regulation of such plans’ ”], quoting New York State Health Maintenance Org. | 1 | 1 |
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurancegreen1 sentence2000(See, New York State Conference of Blue Cross, supra, 514 US, at 657 [“The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans”].) As “[t]he plan was only the context in which this garden variety [alleged] fraud occurred” (Geller, at 23), the Court determines that the subrogation cause of action is not preempted by ERISA. | 1 | 1 |
Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal.green1 sentence1992(Franchise Tax Bd. v Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US 1, 24, n 26 ; accord, Retail Shoe Health v Reminick, 62 NY2d 173 .) The income execution issued by the attorney for Arlein Mary Arnold against the pension of Harry W. | 1 | 1 |
Retail Shoe Health Commission v. Reminickgreen1 sentence1992(Franchise Tax Bd. v Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US 1, 24, n 26 ; accord, Retail Shoe Health v Reminick, 62 NY2d 173 .) The income execution issued by the attorney for Arlein Mary Arnold against the pension of Harry W. | 1 | 1 |
| National Labor Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon
green
2 sentences1983As held by the Supreme Court in San Diego Unions v Garmon ( 359 US 236,244 ): “When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.” The court in Billy Jack For Her {supra), examined those Supreme Court teachings that are to be applied to a pre-emption analysis and concluded “that a finding of preemption is unavoidable here because of the close relationship betwee 1974(San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 ; Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274 .) The pre-emption doctrine thus set forth is apparently broad enough to encompass the kind of conduct alleged in the present complaint. | 5 | 1960–1983 |
Hines v. Davidowitz
green
2 sentences1984Under the doctrine of pre-emption, direct conflict is unnecessary; a State law which has a valid purpose, may be invalid where its effect is to pose an “obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” (Hines v Davidowitz, 312 US 52, 67 .) The current trend in the United States Supreme Court has been away from pre-empting the States in the absence of a clear Congressional mandate to that effect. 1981“The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal program (Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 ; People v. Broady, 5 NY2d 500 , cert. den. 361 U. S. 8 ; see 16 Am. | 4 | 1971–1984 |
Pennsylvania v. Nelson
green
2 sentences1981“The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal program (Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 ; People v. Broady, 5 NY2d 500 , cert. den. 361 U. S. 8 ; see 16 Am. 1978The pre-emption doctrine is set forth in People v Broady ( 5 NY2d 500 ) and summarized in Matter of Marino v Town of Ramapo ( 68 Misc 2d 44, 57 ) as follows: "The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal pro | 3 | 1971–1981 |
Broady v. New York
green
2 sentences1981“The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal program (Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 ; People v. Broady, 5 NY2d 500 , cert. den. 361 U. S. 8 ; see 16 Am. 1978The pre-emption doctrine is set forth in People v Broady ( 5 NY2d 500 ) and summarized in Matter of Marino v Town of Ramapo ( 68 Misc 2d 44, 57 ) as follows: "The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal pro | 3 | 1971–1981 |
People v. Broady
green
2 sentences1981“The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal program (Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U. S. 497 ; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 ; People v. Broady, 5 NY2d 500 , cert. den. 361 U. S. 8 ; see 16 Am. 1978The pre-emption doctrine is set forth in People v Broady ( 5 NY2d 500 ) and summarized in Matter of Marino v Town of Ramapo ( 68 Misc 2d 44, 57 ) as follows: "The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal pro | 2 | 1978–1981 |
Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25
green
2 sentences1978Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently reiterated its position that the pre-emption doctrine will not be applied where the particular rule of law sought to be invoked before another tribunal is so structured and administered that, in virtually all instances, it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the interests promoted by the Federal labor statutes (Farmer v Carpenters, 430 US 290, 297 ). 1977Conversely, this State law action is unconcerned with whether the acts of conspiracy were in the labor context and the State court would have authority to determine if the conspiracy existed, and whether the conspiracy had all the necessary ingredients of common-law conspiracy to comply with State case law. (8 NY Jur, Conspiracy, p 494; Farmer v Carpenters, 430 US 290 , supra.) But the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions and has refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that is merely a peripheral concern of labor management relations, or touched interests so deeply rooted in l | 2 | 1977–1978 |
Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union No. 776
green
2 sentences1962Union of Operating Engineers, 281 F. 2d 313 ; Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 .) In summary, the court- finds that the complaint must be dismissed (1) for lack of jurisdiction because there is no factual statement of exhaustion of remedies or that further appeal would be futile, and (2) that the allegation of union control of seniority comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. 1958(See Garner v. Teamsters Union , 346 U. S. 485 ; Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. , 348 U. S. 468 ; Retail Clerks Int. | 2 | 1958–1962 |
Perez. v. Campbell
green
1 sentence1984(See, e.g., Perez v Campbell, 402 US 637 .) Under the supremacy clause, a State law is invalid when it conflicts directly with Federal law, thus rendering compliance with both impossible. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
People v. De Jesus
green
1 sentence1983(People v De Jesus, 54 NY2d 465 .) The Court of Appeals recently considered the doctrine of pre-emption in Consolidated Edison Co. v Town of Red Hook ( 60 NY2d 99 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Town of Red Hook
green
1 sentence1983(People v De Jesus, 54 NY2d 465 .) The Court of Appeals recently considered the doctrine of pre-emption in Consolidated Edison Co. v Town of Red Hook ( 60 NY2d 99 ). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Independence Discount Corp. v. Bressner
green
1 sentence1978Corp., supra.) The only ERISA exception relevant to this action is section 1144 (subd [b], par [4]) of title 29 of the United States Code, which declares only that the pre-emption clause shall not apply to any "generally applicable criminal law of a State”, but does not define that phrase. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Marino v. Town of Ramapo
green
1 sentence1978The pre-emption doctrine is set forth in People v Broady ( 5 NY2d 500 ) and summarized in Matter of Marino v Town of Ramapo ( 68 Misc 2d 44, 57 ) as follows: "The pre-emption doctrine requires State laws to defer to Federal legislation where either of three elements exist: (1) the scheme of Federal legislation is so complete and pervasive that no room is left for the State to supplement it; (2) the Federal interest is so dominant that State laws on the same subject must yield; or (3) the enforcement of the State statute presents a substantial conflict with the administration of the Federal pro | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Barclay's Ice Cream Co. v. Local No. 757 of the Ice Cream Drivers & Employees Union
green
1 sentence1977On the question of the authority and jurisdiction of a State court to issue an injunction pendente lite despite a claim of pre-emption, see Barclay’s Ice Cream Co. v Local 757 ( 41 NY2d 269, 270 ), in which the Court of Appeals, in affirming an order granting an injunction pendente lite, held: “We reject the proposition that under the doctrine of pre-emption our State courts must defer in this case to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board and thus are powerless to protect against the unlawful coercive activity designed by this union to erect an embargo on the flow of o | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Humphrey v. Moore
green
1 sentence1974(Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U. S. 335, 342 .) The pre-emption doctrine is not applicable to suits for breach of the duty of fair representation, regardless of whether the breach constitutes an unfair labor practice. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.
green
1 sentence1974(Smith v. Evening News Assoc., 371 U. S. 195 ; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 ; Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 .) In affirming the jurisdiction of a State court in a suit by an individual employee for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court stated: “ The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.” (Smith v. Evening News Assoc., supra, p. 197.) | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Local 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers v. Lucas Flour Co.
green
1 sentence1974(Smith v. Evening News Assoc., 371 U. S. 195 ; Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238 ; Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95 .) In affirming the jurisdiction of a State court in a suit by an individual employee for breach of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court stated: “ The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301.” (Smith v. Evening News Assoc., supra, p. 197.) | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Vaca v. Sipes
green
1 sentence1974(Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 ; Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F. 2d 231 , cert. den. 402 U. S. 952 .) Such a suit may be brought in a State court but, again, Federal substantive law must be applied. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge
green
1 sentence1974(San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236 ; Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274 .) The pre-emption doctrine thus set forth is apparently broad enough to encompass the kind of conduct alleged in the present complaint. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Dill v. Greyhound Corporation
green
1 sentence1974(Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 ; Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F. 2d 231 , cert. den. 402 U. S. 952 .) Such a suit may be brought in a State court but, again, Federal substantive law must be applied. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Groze v. California
green
1 sentence1974(Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171 ; Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F. 2d 231 , cert. den. 402 U. S. 952 .) Such a suit may be brought in a State court but, again, Federal substantive law must be applied. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Catholic Med. Cen. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc. v. Rockefeller
green
1 sentence1971Center of Brooklyn & Queens v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp. 1268 [D. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond
green
1 sentence1971The pre-emption doctrine applies where valid regulations enacted by a Federal agency conflict with State legislation, although the latter may merely supplement the former (Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U. S. 297 ; Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U. S. 525 ; Catholic Med. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Campbell v. Hussey green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
James v. Valtierra
green
1 sentence1971The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra ( 402 U. S. 137 ) is not dispositive. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| International Ass'n of MacHinists v. Gonzales green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| National Labor Relations Board v. Local Union No. 450 green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Plumbers, Steamfitters, Refrigeration, Petroleum Fitters, & Apprentices of Local 298 v. County of Door green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.