pre-emption doctrine in Texas

1989A Texas appellate court discussed the pre-emption doctrine and the application of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 , 86 S.Ct. 657 , 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966), to the Railway Labor Act in Manchester v. International Association of Machinists, 567 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Civ.

1989A Texas appellate court discussed the pre-emption doctrine and the application of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 , 86 S.Ct. 657 , 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966), to the Railway Labor Act in Manchester v. International Association of Machinists, 567 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Civ.

1960Ed 546, 75 S. Ct. 480 , the United States Supreme Court made clear that the pre-emption doctrine applies whether the conduct charged is prohibited by Section 8 or protected by Section 7.

1958In the Weber case, supra, the court said: “Where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may be reasonably deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, the state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal *225 which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance.” Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 481 , 75 Sup. Ct. 488, 99 L.

2015As Justice O'Connor explained in her opinion for a unanimous Court: “The case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 , 166–167, 109 S.Ct. 971 , 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra, at 1194 (discussing the presumption against pre-emption). 8 In 1997, Congress pre-empted certai

2015As Justice O'Connor explained in her opinion for a unanimous Court: “The case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between them.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 , 166–167, 109 S.Ct. 971 , 103 L.Ed.2d 118 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also supra, at 1194 (discussing the presumption against pre-emption). 8 In 1997, Congress pre-empted certai

2015Second, the Court has determined that federal law pre-empts state law when, “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 , 61 S.Ct. 399 , 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 2 2 The majority's pre-emption analysis relies in part on a presumption against pre-emption.

2015Second, the Court has determined that federal law pre-empts state law when, “under the circumstances of [a] particular case, [state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 , 61 S.Ct. 399 , 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 2 2 The majority's pre-emption analysis relies in part on a presumption against pre-emption.

1993“The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth.” Id.

1993"The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth." Id.

1989A Texas appellate court discussed the pre-emption doctrine and the application of Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 , 86 S.Ct. 657 , 15 L.Ed.2d 582 (1966), to the Railway Labor Act in Manchester v. International Association of Machinists, 567 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Civ.

1989App.—Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 , 99 S.Ct. 1502 , 59 L.Ed.2d 773 (1979).

1989App.—Waco 1978, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 , 99 S.Ct. 1502 , 59 L.Ed.2d 773 (1979).

1978The general rule concerning the pre-emption doctrine was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 , 79 S.Ct. 773 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959): “When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.

1978The general rule concerning the pre-emption doctrine was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 , 79 S.Ct. 773 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959): “When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under Section 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.

1978To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.” Also see Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 25 (1977) 430 U.S. 290 , 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1061 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338 .

1978To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law.” Also see Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 25 (1977) 430 U.S. 290 , 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1061 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338 .

1969Ex Parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214 , 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Ex Parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522 , 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408 , 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956).

1969Ex Parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214 , 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Ex Parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522 , 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408 , 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956).

1969Ex Parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214 , 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Ex Parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522 , 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408 , 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956).

1969Ex Parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214 , 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Ex Parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522 , 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408 , 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956).

1969Ex Parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214 , 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Ex Parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522 , 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408 , 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956).

1969Ex Parte Twedell, 158 Tex. 214 , 309 S.W.2d 834 (1958); Ex Parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522 , 334 S.W.2d 425 (1960); Dallas General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Wamix, Inc., 156 Tex. 408 , 295 S.W.2d 873 (1956).

1967The existence of this exception to the pre-emption doctrine was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Local 100, of United Ass’n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963).

1967The existence of this exception to the pre-emption doctrine was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Local 100, of United Ass’n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963).

1958The case was recommended to the Supreme Court of California for further proceedings not inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court’s opinion, and the opinions in the Gus v. Utah Labor Relations Board and Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., supra. In the case of Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local No. 941 v. Whitfield Transportation, Inc., 154, Texas 91, 273 S.W. 2d 857, 860 , this Court, in declining to apply the pre-emption doctrine announced in Garner v. Teamsters, etc. Union, supra, said that “The Garner opinion observes with evidently studied pur

1913Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490 , 109 S.W. 911 , 17 L.R.A.

1913Creamer v. Briscoe, 101 Tex. 490 , 109 S.W. 911 , 17 L.R.A.

1911In the case of Clark v. Smith, 59 Tex. 275 , Justice West, speaking for the Supreme Court, on page 279, .uses this language: “The appellant, under the previous decisions of this court, could not under his pre-emption claim avail himself of the three years’ or five years’ statute of limitation.