pre-emption doctrine in Michigan

1972The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a lawsuit could be maintained by an individual employee and that state court jurisdiction was not pre-empted under the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959), stating (pp 197-198): "In Lucas Flour [Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 US 95 ; 82 S Ct 571 ; 7 L Ed 2d 593 (1962)] as well as in Atkinson [Atkinson v Sinclair Refining Co, 370 US 238 ; 82 S Ct 1318 ; 8 L Ed 2d 462 (1962)] the Court expressly refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine of the Garmon case; a

1972The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a lawsuit could be maintained by an individual employee and that state court jurisdiction was not pre-empted under the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959), stating (pp 197-198): "In Lucas Flour [Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 US 95 ; 82 S Ct 571 ; 7 L Ed 2d 593 (1962)] as well as in Atkinson [Atkinson v Sinclair Refining Co, 370 US 238 ; 82 S Ct 1318 ; 8 L Ed 2d 462 (1962)] the Court expressly refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine of the Garmon case; a

2004Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63-64 , 123 S.Ct. 518 , 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). ("If `law' were read broadly so as to include the common law, it might also be interpreted to include regulations, which would render the express reference to `regulation' in the pre-emption clause superfluous.").

2004Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63-64 , 123 S.Ct. 518 , 154 L.Ed.2d 466 (2002). ("If `law' were read broadly so as to include the common law, it might also be interpreted to include regulations, which would render the express reference to `regulation' in the pre-emption clause superfluous.").

1985As the United States Supreme Court said in Garner v Teamsters Union, 346 US 485, 488 ; 74 S Ct 161 ; 98 L Ed 228 (1953), regarding federal labor relations law pre-emption: "The national * * * Act * * * leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.

1985As the United States Supreme Court said in Garner v Teamsters Union, 346 US 485, 488 ; 74 S Ct 161 ; 98 L Ed 228 (1953), regarding federal labor relations law pre-emption: "The national * * * Act * * * leaves much to the states, though Congress has refrained from telling us how much.

1983In Johnson, supra, p 685 , the Supreme Court noted: "The very nature of the liquor business is such that local communities, as a matter of policy, should be permitted to regulate the traffic within their own bounds in the proper exercise of their police powers, subject to the larger control of the liquor commission as to those matters wherein the commission is given exclusive powers by the legislature.” In Scott v Arcada Twp Board, 268 Mich 170, 173 ; 255 NW 752 (1934), the Supreme Court examined a fact situation similar to the present, the plaintiff in that case seeking a permit to sell beer

1983In Johnson, supra, p 685 , the Supreme Court noted: "The very nature of the liquor business is such that local communities, as a matter of policy, should be permitted to regulate the traffic within their own bounds in the proper exercise of their police powers, subject to the larger control of the liquor commission as to those matters wherein the commission is given exclusive powers by the legislature.” In Scott v Arcada Twp Board, 268 Mich 170, 173 ; 255 NW 752 (1934), the Supreme Court examined a fact situation similar to the present, the plaintiff in that case seeking a permit to sell beer

1983In Johnson, supra, p 685 , the Supreme Court noted: "The very nature of the liquor business is such that local communities, as a matter of policy, should be permitted to regulate the traffic within their own bounds in the proper exercise of their police powers, subject to the larger control of the liquor commission as to those matters wherein the commission is given exclusive powers by the legislature.” In Scott v Arcada Twp Board, 268 Mich 170, 173 ; 255 NW 752 (1934), the Supreme Court examined a fact situation similar to the present, the plaintiff in that case seeking a permit to sell beer

1983In the Llewellyn Court’s example of this prong of the pre-emption doctrine, Noey v Saginaw, 271 Mich 595 ; 261 NW 88 (1935), language conferring on the liquor control commission "complete control” of, and the "sole right, power and duty to control”, the alcoholic beverage trade was held to pre-empt local regulation of the hours of sale.

1983In the Llewellyn Court’s example of this prong of the pre-emption doctrine, Noey v Saginaw, 271 Mich 595 ; 261 NW 88 (1935), language conferring on the liquor control commission "complete control” of, and the "sole right, power and duty to control”, the alcoholic beverage trade was held to pre-empt local regulation of the hours of sale.

1980The precise extent to which state law must be displaced to achieve those unifying ends sought by the national legislature has never been determined by the Congress. * * * We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States.” Amalgamated Ass’n of Motor Coach Employees of America v Lockridge, 403 US 274, 289 ; 91 S Ct 1909 ; 29 L Ed 2d 473 (1971). 13 Miranda Fuel Co, Inc, 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement denied 326 F2d 172 (CA 2, 1963).

1980The precise extent to which state law must be displaced to achieve those unifying ends sought by the national legislature has never been determined by the Congress. * * * We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States.” Amalgamated Ass’n of Motor Coach Employees of America v Lockridge, 403 US 274, 289 ; 91 S Ct 1909 ; 29 L Ed 2d 473 (1971). 13 Miranda Fuel Co, Inc, 140 NLRB 181 (1962), enforcement denied 326 F2d 172 (CA 2, 1963).

1977The United States Supreme Court declined to consider this question, stating as follows: "[Plaintiff] did not appeal the Superior Court’s ruling sustaining the demurrer with respect to the claims of discrimination and breach of contract, and we thus have no occasion to consider the applicability of the pre-emption doctrine to those counts.” 430 US 293, fn 3 . 7 In Vaca, the Court discusses this point as follows: "The collective bargaining system as encouraged by Congress and administered by the NLRB of necessity subordinates the interests of an individual employee to the collective interests of

1977For discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv L Rev 1337 (1972); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 Va L Rev 1435 (1970); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 Colum L Rev 469 (1972); Note, Preemption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, 37 George Wash L Rev 132 (1968). 2 For a recent summary of the exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, see Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 US 2

1977For discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv L Rev 1337 (1972); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 Va L Rev 1435 (1970); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 Colum L Rev 469 (1972); Note, Preemption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, 37 George Wash L Rev 132 (1968). 2 For a recent summary of the exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, see Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 US 2

1977For discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv L Rev 1337 (1972); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 Va L Rev 1435 (1970); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 Colum L Rev 469 (1972); Note, Preemption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, 37 George Wash L Rev 132 (1968). 2 For a recent summary of the exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, see Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 US 2

1977For discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv L Rev 1337 (1972); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 Va L Rev 1435 (1970); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 Colum L Rev 469 (1972); Note, Preemption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, 37 George Wash L Rev 132 (1968). 2 For a recent summary of the exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, see Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 US 2

1977Were we to hold * * * that the courts are foreclosed * * * from this traditional supervisory jurisdiction, the individual employee injured by arbitrary or discriminatory union conduct could no longer be assured of impartial review of his complaint, since the Board’s General Counsel has unreviewable discretion to refuse to institute an unfair labor practice complaint.” 386 US 171, 182 .

1977For discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv L Rev 1337 (1972); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 Va L Rev 1435 (1970); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 Colum L Rev 469 (1972); Note, Preemption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, 37 George Wash L Rev 132 (1968). 2 For a recent summary of the exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, see Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 US 2

1977For discussion of the pre-emption doctrine, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 Harv L Rev 1337 (1972); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 Va L Rev 1435 (1970); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 Colum L Rev 469 (1972); Note, Preemption of State Labor Regulations Collaterally in Conflict with the National Labor Relations Act, 37 George Wash L Rev 132 (1968). 2 For a recent summary of the exceptions to the Garmon doctrine, see Farmer v United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 US 2

1972An injunction by a state labor board against mass picketing which obstructed streets and plant entrances, violence and threats of violence was approved as properly under state jurisdiction in UAW v Wisconsin Board, 351 US 266 ; 76 S Ct 794 ; 100 L Ed 1162 (1956), despite the fact that the conduct constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b)(1)(A) and was thus within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.

1972An injunction by a state labor board against mass picketing which obstructed streets and plant entrances, violence and threats of violence was approved as properly under state jurisdiction in UAW v Wisconsin Board, 351 US 266 ; 76 S Ct 794 ; 100 L Ed 1162 (1956), despite the fact that the conduct constituted an unfair labor practice under § 8 (b)(1)(A) and was thus within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.

1972The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a lawsuit could be maintained by an individual employee and that state court jurisdiction was not pre-empted under the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959), stating (pp 197-198): "In Lucas Flour [Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 US 95 ; 82 S Ct 571 ; 7 L Ed 2d 593 (1962)] as well as in Atkinson [Atkinson v Sinclair Refining Co, 370 US 238 ; 82 S Ct 1318 ; 8 L Ed 2d 462 (1962)] the Court expressly refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine of the Garmon case; a

1972The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a lawsuit could be maintained by an individual employee and that state court jurisdiction was not pre-empted under the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959), stating (pp 197-198): "In Lucas Flour [Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 US 95 ; 82 S Ct 571 ; 7 L Ed 2d 593 (1962)] as well as in Atkinson [Atkinson v Sinclair Refining Co, 370 US 238 ; 82 S Ct 1318 ; 8 L Ed 2d 462 (1962)] the Court expressly refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine of the Garmon case; a

1972The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a lawsuit could be maintained by an individual employee and that state court jurisdiction was not pre-empted under the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959), stating (pp 197-198): "In Lucas Flour [Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 US 95 ; 82 S Ct 571 ; 7 L Ed 2d 593 (1962)] as well as in Atkinson [Atkinson v Sinclair Refining Co, 370 US 238 ; 82 S Ct 1318 ; 8 L Ed 2d 462 (1962)] the Court expressly refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine of the Garmon case; a

1972The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that such a lawsuit could be maintained by an individual employee and that state court jurisdiction was not pre-empted under the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v Garmon, 359 US 236 ; 79 S Ct 773 ; 3 L Ed 2d 775 (1959), stating (pp 197-198): "In Lucas Flour [Local 174, Teamsters v Lucas Flour Co, 369 US 95 ; 82 S Ct 571 ; 7 L Ed 2d 593 (1962)] as well as in Atkinson [Atkinson v Sinclair Refining Co, 370 US 238 ; 82 S Ct 1318 ; 8 L Ed 2d 462 (1962)] the Court expressly refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine of the Garmon case; a