pre-emption doctrine in Ohio

1998EXCEPTIONS TO THE GARMON DOCTRINE The Supreme Court has refused “to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that otherwise would fall within the scope of Garmon if that activity ‘was a merely peripheral concern of the [Act] [or] touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [courts] could not infer that Congress had deprived States of all power to act.’ ” Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25 (1977), 430 U.S. 290, 296-297 , 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1061 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 348 , quoting Garmon,

1998EXCEPTIONS TO THE GARMON DOCTRINE The Supreme Court has refused “to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that otherwise would fall within the scope of Garmon if that activity ‘was a merely peripheral concern of the [Act] [or] touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [courts] could not infer that Congress had deprived States of all power to act.’ ” Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25 (1977), 430 U.S. 290, 296-297 , 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1061 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 348 , quoting Garmon,

1998EXCEPTIONS TO THE GARMON DOCTRINE The Supreme Court has refused “to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that otherwise would fall within the scope of Garmon if that activity ‘was a merely peripheral concern of the [Act] [or] touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [courts] could not infer that Congress had deprived States of all power to act.’ ” Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25 (1977), 430 U.S. 290, 296-297 , 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1061 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 348 , quoting Garmon,

1998EXCEPTIONS TO THE GARMON DOCTRINE The Supreme Court has refused “to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that otherwise would fall within the scope of Garmon if that activity ‘was a merely peripheral concern of the [Act] [or] touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [courts] could not infer that Congress had deprived States of all power to act.’ ” Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local 25 (1977), 430 U.S. 290, 296-297 , 97 S.Ct. 1056, 1061 , 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 348 , quoting Garmon,

2004Id., 286 F.3d at 497 . {¶ 23} The facts of Branche are different from those of Botz .

2004Id., 286 F.3d at 497 . {¶ 23} The facts of Branche are different from those of Botz .

2004Mitchell, 40 Ohio St.3d at 192 , 532 N.E.2d 753 . {¶ 6} The trial court dismissed Schumacher’s complaint because it found that his state-law claims were barred by the pre-emption doctrine.

2004Mitchell, 40 Ohio St.3d at 192 , 532 N.E.2d 753 . {¶ 6} The trial court dismissed Schumacher’s complaint because it found that his state-law claims were barred by the pre-emption doctrine.

2000Therein, the court explained that the NLRA forbids state and local regulation of activities that either are, or are arguably, protected by Sections 157 and 158, Title 29, U.S.Code. 1 In International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO v. Davis (1986), 476 U.S. 380 , 106 S.Ct. 1904 , 90 L.Ed.2d 389 , the Supreme Court explained: “As the Garmon line of cases directs, the pre-emption inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. * * * “The precondition for pre-emption, that the conduct be ‘arguably’ protected or prohibited, is not without substance.

2000Therein, the court explained that the NLRA forbids state and local regulation of activities that either are, or are arguably, protected by Sections 157 and 158, Title 29, U.S.Code. 1 In International Longshoremen’s Assn., AFL-CIO v. Davis (1986), 476 U.S. 380 , 106 S.Ct. 1904 , 90 L.Ed.2d 389 , the Supreme Court explained: “As the Garmon line of cases directs, the pre-emption inquiry is whether the conduct at issue was arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. * * * “The precondition for pre-emption, that the conduct be ‘arguably’ protected or prohibited, is not without substance.

1999Co. (1995), 514 U.S. 645, 656-657 , 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677-1678 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695, 706 (“New York Blues”), the Supreme Court discussed the intention of Congress in enacting ERISA, and concluded: “ ‘[The objective of ERISA was] to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government * * *.’ “The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit

1999Co. (1995), 514 U.S. 645, 656-657 , 115 S.Ct. 1671, 1677-1678 , 131 L.Ed.2d 695, 706 (“New York Blues”), the Supreme Court discussed the intention of Congress in enacting ERISA, and concluded: “ ‘[The objective of ERISA was] to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal Government * * *.’ “The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit

1997The cases are remanded for further proceedings.” Id., 518 U.S. at 503 , 116 S.Ct. at 2259 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 726 .

1997The cases are remanded for further proceedings.” Id., 518 U.S. at 503 , 116 S.Ct. at 2259 , 135 L.Ed.2d at 726 .

1993Furthermore, “the pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’ ” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 501 ; Pilot Life, at 48, 107 S.Ct. at 1553 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 48 .

1993Furthermore, “the pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’ ” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 501 ; Pilot Life, at 48, 107 S.Ct. at 1553 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 48 .

1993Furthermore, “the pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’ ” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 501 ; Pilot Life, at 48, 107 S.Ct. at 1553 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 48 .

1993Furthermore, “the pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’ ” Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 501 ; Pilot Life, at 48, 107 S.Ct. at 1553 , 95 L.Ed.2d at 48 .

1977This proposed expansion of the pre-emption doctrine would extend beyond its present justification judicial antipathy to double taxation (East Ohio Gas Co. v. Akron [1966], 7 Ohio St. 2d 73 ) and create a previously unforeseen impact upon municipal revenue.

1959Arey, v. Sherrill, City Mgr., 142 Ohio St., 574 , 53 N. E. [2d], 501, and Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St., 58 , 68 N. E. [2d], 64).

1959Arey, v. Sherrill, City Mgr., 142 Ohio St., 574 , 53 N. E. [2d], 501, and Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St., 58 , 68 N. E. [2d], 64).