pre-emption doctrine in Pennsylvania

1995Because the Federal Government does not *341 regulate the compensation of victims, and because it is inconceivable that Congress intended to leave victims with no remedy at all, the pre-emption analysis established by Pacific Gas [& Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conversation & Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 , 103 S.Ct. 1713 , 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983) ] comfortably accommodates — indeed it compels — the conclusion that compensatory damages are not pre-empted whereas punitive damages are.

1995Because the Federal Government does not *341 regulate the compensation of victims, and because it is inconceivable that Congress intended to leave victims with no remedy at all, the pre-emption analysis established by Pacific Gas [& Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conversation & Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 , 103 S.Ct. 1713 , 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983) ] comfortably accommodates — indeed it compels — the conclusion that compensatory damages are not pre-empted whereas punitive damages are.

1984In Farmer v. Carpenters Local, supra, the Court stated: We have refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that otherwise falls within the scope of Garmon if that activity “was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act ... [or] touched interests so deeply rooted in local feelings and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of power to act”____ We also have refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine “where the particular rule of law sought to be invoked before another tr

1984In Farmer v. Carpenters Local, supra, the Court stated: We have refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine to activity that otherwise falls within the scope of Garmon if that activity “was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act ... [or] touched interests so deeply rooted in local feelings and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of power to act”____ We also have refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine “where the particular rule of law sought to be invoked before another tr

2010Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 , 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000). ¶ 17 The sparse legislative history of the OSH Act leaves little doubt that 29 U.S.C.A. § 653 (b)(4) evinces a congressional intent to preserve state tort law from preemption.

2010Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 868 , 120 S.Ct. 1913 , 146 L.Ed.2d 914 (2000). ¶ 17 The sparse legislative history of the OSH Act leaves little doubt that 29 U.S.C.A. § 653 (b)(4) evinces a congressional intent to preserve state tort law from preemption.

2005Duff, 532 A.2d at 504-05 .

1997This Court has held, however, in Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 343 , 623 A.2d 921 , appeal denied, 535 Pa. 642 , 631 A.2d 1013 (1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 , 114 S.Ct. 1057 , 127 L.Ed.2d 378 (1994), that the application of Section 402(d) in unemployment proceedings is not preempted by federal labor law, and an award of unemployment benefits to loeked-out employees is not an impermissible encroachment upon the NLRB’s regulation of collective bargaining.

1997This Court has held, however, in Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 343 , 623 A.2d 921 , appeal denied, 535 Pa. 642 , 631 A.2d 1013 (1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 , 114 S.Ct. 1057 , 127 L.Ed.2d 378 (1994), that the application of Section 402(d) in unemployment proceedings is not preempted by federal labor law, and an award of unemployment benefits to loeked-out employees is not an impermissible encroachment upon the NLRB’s regulation of collective bargaining.

1997This Court has held, however, in Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 343 , 623 A.2d 921 , appeal denied, 535 Pa. 642 , 631 A.2d 1013 (1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 , 114 S.Ct. 1057 , 127 L.Ed.2d 378 (1994), that the application of Section 402(d) in unemployment proceedings is not preempted by federal labor law, and an award of unemployment benefits to loeked-out employees is not an impermissible encroachment upon the NLRB’s regulation of collective bargaining.

1997This Court has held, however, in Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 343 , 623 A.2d 921 , appeal denied, 535 Pa. 642 , 631 A.2d 1013 (1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 , 114 S.Ct. 1057 , 127 L.Ed.2d 378 (1994), that the application of Section 402(d) in unemployment proceedings is not preempted by federal labor law, and an award of unemployment benefits to loeked-out employees is not an impermissible encroachment upon the NLRB’s regulation of collective bargaining.

1997This Court has held, however, in Schulmerich Carillons, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 343 , 623 A.2d 921 , appeal denied, 535 Pa. 642 , 631 A.2d 1013 (1993), and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1113 , 114 S.Ct. 1057 , 127 L.Ed.2d 378 (1994), that the application of Section 402(d) in unemployment proceedings is not preempted by federal labor law, and an award of unemployment benefits to loeked-out employees is not an impermissible encroachment upon the NLRB’s regulation of collective bargaining.

1995Gingold, supra at 346-47 , 567 A.2d at 322 (citing Silkwood, supra at 263-64, 104 S.Ct. at 629-30 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

1994Noting that the pre-emption clause of Section 514(a) is conspicuously broad, the Court stated that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan,” id. at 139 , 111 S.Ct. at 483 [quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 , 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)].

1994Noting that the pre-emption clause of Section 514(a) is conspicuously broad, the Court stated that “[a] law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan,” id. at 139 , 111 S.Ct. at 483 [quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 , 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2900 , 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983)].

1984We also have refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine "where the particular rule of law sought to be invoked before another tribunal is so structured and administered that in virtually all instances, it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the interests promoted by the federal labor statutes." Id. 430 U.S. at 296-97, 97 S.Ct. at 1061. ( quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47 , 79 S.Ct. 773, 780 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959); and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-98 , 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1923 , 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971).

1984We also have refused to apply the pre-emption doctrine "where the particular rule of law sought to be invoked before another tribunal is so structured and administered that in virtually all instances, it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the interests promoted by the federal labor statutes." Id. 430 U.S. at 296-97, 97 S.Ct. at 1061. ( quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47 , 79 S.Ct. 773, 780 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959); and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-98 , 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1923 , 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971).

1981Id. at 180-81 , 87 S.Ct. at 911-12 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 852 .

1981Id. at 180-81 , 87 S.Ct. at 911-12 , 17 L.Ed.2d at 852 .

1975United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Const. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).