requisite legal standard in Ohio

2009Id., citing State v. Fanning (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 19 . *Page 15 Thereafter, the appellate court must independently determine whether those factual findings meet the requisite legal standard.

2007"Thereafter, the appellate court must independently determine whether those factual findings meet the requisite legal standard." Id. citing Burnside at ¶ 8.

2016Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997). {¶10} In this case, Lewis filed a suppression motion seeking to suppress evidence of 135 heroin bindles that were found after Lewis was arrested following -4- Case No. 3-16-02 a traffic stop on October 29, 2015.

2007"Thereafter, the appellate court must independently determine whether those factual findings meet the requisite legal standard." Id., citing Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 13} Appellant argues that that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress or dismiss since there was no probable cause to arrest appellant for an OVI.

2020Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0044, 2007-Ohio-6557, ¶12 , citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶8.

2020Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0044, 2007-Ohio-6557 , ¶12, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶8.

2017“The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an individual’s freedom of movement].’” State v. Shaffer, 2013- Ohio-3581, 4 N.E.3d 400 , ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2017“The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an individual’s freedom of movement].’” State v. Shaffer, 2013- Ohio-3581, 4 N.E.3d 400 , ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2020Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0044, 2007-Ohio-6557, ¶12 , citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶8.

2020Ashtabula No. 2007-A-0044, 2007-Ohio-6557 , ¶12, citing State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶8.

2017“The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an individual’s freedom of movement].’” State v. Shaffer, 2013- Ohio-3581, 4 N.E.3d 400 , ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2017“The Supreme Court of Ohio has defined ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’ as ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion [upon an individual’s freedom of movement].’” State v. Shaffer, 2013- Ohio-3581, 4 N.E.3d 400 , ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 178 , 524 N.E.2d 489 (1988), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2017State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶15} Next, the court must determine whether law enforcement’s actions conformed with the requisite legal standard.

2017State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86 , 565 N.E.2d 1271 (1991). {¶15} Next, the court must determine whether law enforcement’s actions conformed with the requisite legal standard.

2011Id.

2011Id.

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 38} The right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution only applies to "the `critical stages' of the criminal proceedings." Dobbins v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 533 , 537 , citing United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180 , 189 ; United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300 , 310-311 ; and United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 224 . {¶ 39} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "the right to counsel associated with the protection against self-incrimination contained in

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 21} Mansfield argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress since he did not have the mental capacity to waive his Miranda rights. {¶ 22} "A court, in determining whether a pretrial statement is involuntary, `should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.'" State v. Mason (1998), 8

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 20} Smith contends the initial identifications of himself by Learn and Alicea were unduly suggestive. {¶ 21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that if "`"a witness has been confronted with a suspect before trial, due process requires a court to suppress her identification of the suspect if the confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of the suspect's guilt and the identification was unreliable under all the circumstances."'" State v. Gross , 97 Ohio St.3d 121 , 2002-Ohio-5524 , at ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio S

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 38} The right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution only applies to "the `critical stages' of the criminal proceedings." Dobbins v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 533 , 537 , citing United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180 , 189 ; United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300 , 310-311 ; and United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 224 . {¶ 39} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "the right to counsel associated with the protection against self-incrimination contained in

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 38} The right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution only applies to "the `critical stages' of the criminal proceedings." Dobbins v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 533 , 537 , citing United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180 , 189 ; United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300 , 310-311 ; and United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 224 . {¶ 39} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "the right to counsel associated with the protection against self-incrimination contained in

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 38} The right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution only applies to "the `critical stages' of the criminal proceedings." Dobbins v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 533 , 537 , citing United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180 , 189 ; United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300 , 310-311 ; and United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 224 . {¶ 39} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "the right to counsel associated with the protection against self-incrimination contained in

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 38} The right to counsel provided by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution only applies to "the `critical stages' of the criminal proceedings." Dobbins v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 533 , 537 , citing United States v. Gouveia (1984), 467 U.S. 180 , 189 ; United States v. Ash (1973), 413 U.S. 300 , 310-311 ; and United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218 , 224 . {¶ 39} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that "the right to counsel associated with the protection against self-incrimination contained in

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 21} Mansfield argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress since he did not have the mental capacity to waive his Miranda rights. {¶ 22} "A court, in determining whether a pretrial statement is involuntary, `should consider the totality of the circumstances, including the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length, intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.'" State v. Mason (1998), 8

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 15} In his motion to suppress, Sutcliffe argued that the search by Sergeant Carrozzi violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it was conducted without a warrant. {¶ 16} "The Fourth Amendment safeguards: `(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be se

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 15} In his motion to suppress, Sutcliffe argued that the search by Sergeant Carrozzi violated his Fourth Amendment rights because it was conducted without a warrant. {¶ 16} "The Fourth Amendment safeguards: `(t)he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be se

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 20} Smith contends the initial identifications of himself by Learn and Alicea were unduly suggestive. {¶ 21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that if "`"a witness has been confronted with a suspect before trial, due process requires a court to suppress her identification of the suspect if the confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of the suspect's guilt and the identification was unreliable under all the circumstances."'" State v. Gross , 97 Ohio St.3d 121 , 2002-Ohio-5524 , at ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio S

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 20} Smith contends the initial identifications of himself by Learn and Alicea were unduly suggestive. {¶ 21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that if "`"a witness has been confronted with a suspect before trial, due process requires a court to suppress her identification of the suspect if the confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of the suspect's guilt and the identification was unreliable under all the circumstances."'" State v. Gross , 97 Ohio St.3d 121 , 2002-Ohio-5524 , at ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio S

2008Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 . {¶ 20} Smith contends the initial identifications of himself by Learn and Alicea were unduly suggestive. {¶ 21} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that if "`"a witness has been confronted with a suspect before trial, due process requires a court to suppress her identification of the suspect if the confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive of the suspect's guilt and the identification was unreliable under all the circumstances."'" State v. Gross , 97 Ohio St.3d 121 , 2002-Ohio-5524 , at ¶ 19 , quoting State v. Murphy (2001), 91 Ohio S

2004Id., citing State v. McNamara (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 706 , 707 . {¶ 11} "The investigative stop exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement allows a police officer to stop an individual if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon specific and articulable facts, that criminal behavior has occurred or is imminent." State v. Gedeon (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 617 , 618 , citing Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1 .

2001Those exceptions are ‘(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; * * * (f) the plain-view doctrine,’ or (g) an ‘administrative search.’ Although there is no precise list of all the exigent circumstances that might justify a warrantless search, exigent circumstances generally must include the necessity for immediate action that will ‘protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury,’ or will protect a governmental int

2001Those exceptions are ‘(a) [a] search incident to a lawful arrest; (b) consent signifying waiver of constitutional rights; (c) the stop-and-frisk doctrine; (d) hot pursuit; (e) probable cause to search, and the presence of exigent circumstances; * * * (f) the plain-view doctrine,’ or (g) an ‘administrative search.’ Although there is no precise list of all the exigent circumstances that might justify a warrantless search, exigent circumstances generally must include the necessity for immediate action that will ‘protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury,’ or will protect a governmental int

1998State v. Klein (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 486 , 488 .

1998Id.