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13 California opinions name it 2 courts 2004–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Celisgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential 5. substantial-evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. 2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 ] [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) “A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. [Citations.]” (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 ].) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a sus | 6 | 11 |
People v. Wernergreen2 sentences2016(People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1203 .) Our review defers to the trial court’s factual findings and independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. 2015(People v. Werner (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1203 (Werner).) Thus, we must defer to the trial court’s factual findings and independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Ayalagreen2 sentences2004When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we independently apply *95 the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 1 P.3d 3 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d 365 .) Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego. 2004When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we independently apply *95 the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 1 P.3d 3 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d 365 .) Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Alvarezgreen2 sentences2004When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we independently apply *95 the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 1 P.3d 3 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d 365 .) Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego. 2004When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, but we independently apply *95 the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682 , 1 P.3d 3 ; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 182 , 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385 , 926 P.2d 365 .) Officer Strain testified that the officers had on April 26 and 27, 2000 conducted a surveillance of defendant's house on A Street in San Diego. | 1 | 2 |
People v. McDonaldgreen1 sentence2021(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 (Celis); People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 ; People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529 [“We judge the legality of the search by ‘measur[ing] the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness’ ”].) “We may sustain the trial court’s decision without embracing its reasoning.” (McDonald, at p. 529, original italics.) Thus, we may affirm the ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress if it is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the ruling is based on an incorrect reas | 1 | 1 |
People v. Cartergreen1 sentence2015(People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171 ; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 ; see also California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, 38 .)” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141 .) “When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but we independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. | 1 | 1 |
California v. Greenwoodgreen1 sentence2015(People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171 ; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 ; see also California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, 38 .)” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141 .) “When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but we independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. | 1 | 1 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp 2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Floresgreen2 sentences2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 ] [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) “A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. [Citations.]” (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 ].) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a sus 2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 [ 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 ] [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) “A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer’s duties. [Citations.]” (People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 ].) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a sus | 1 | 1 |
Kodani v. Snydergreen2 sentences2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp 2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jacksongreen2 sentences2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp 2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp | 1 | 1 |
People v. Souzagreen2 sentences2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp 2005(See People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 85 , 93 P.3d 1027 [a reviewing court independently applies the requisite legal standard to the facts presented].) "A police officer may stop and question persons on public streets, including those in vehicles, when the circumstances indicate to a reasonable man in a like position that such a course of action is called for in the proper discharge of the officer's duties. [Citations.]" ( People v. Flores (1974) 12 Cal.3d 85, 91 , 115 Cal. Rptr. 225 , 524 P.2d 353 .) Under this standard, an officer may stop and briefly detain a susp | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Saunders
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential 5. substantial-evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. 2016Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested 3. with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial- evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. | 4 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Woods
green
2 sentences2016Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the 3 testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial- evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. 2016Code, § 1538.5), the superior court is vested 3. with the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences in deciding whether a search is constitutionally unreasonable.” (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673 .) “We review the court’s resolution of the factual inquiry under the deferential substantial- evidence standard.” (People v. Saunders (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1129, 1134 .) We then independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Snead
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 .) “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘“[t]he power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s findings.’ [Citation.] ‘An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to [the prevailing party] and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances might al 2016(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 (Celis).) “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘ “[t]he power of the appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s findings.’ [Citations.] ‘An appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to [the prevailing party] and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘Reversal is not warranted merely because the circumstances | 3 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Miranda
green
1 sentence2021(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 679 (Celis); People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 922 ; People v. McDonald (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 521, 529 [“We judge the legality of the search by ‘measur[ing] the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness’ ”].) “We may sustain the trial court’s decision without embracing its reasoning.” (McDonald, at p. 529, original italics.) Thus, we may affirm the ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress if it is correct on any theory of the law applicable to the case, even if the ruling is based on an incorrect reas | 1 | 2021–2021 |
People v. McPeters
red
1 sentence2015(People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171 ; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 ; see also California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, 38 .)” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141 .) “When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but we independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Lance W.
green
1 sentence2015(People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171 ; In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 879 ; see also California v. Greenwood (1988) 486 U.S. 35, 38 .)” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141 .) “When, as here, we review a ruling on a defense motion to suppress evidence, we defer to the trial court’s factual findings, but we independently apply the requisite legal standard to the facts presented. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Parson
green
1 sentence2014(People v. Parson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 332, 345 .) 1. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Wells
green
1 sentence2013(United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1 , 7–8.) "The officer's subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, and 'an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]' [Citation.] But where a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 3 exists, 'the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances "in the proper exercise of the officer's duties." ' " (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083 .) In reviewing a ruling on a defense motion to | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Sokolow
green
1 sentence2013(United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1 , 7–8.) "The officer's subjective suspicion must be objectively reasonable, and 'an investigative stop or detention predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch is unlawful, even though the officer may be acting in complete good faith. [Citation.]' [Citation.] But where a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 3 exists, 'the public rightfully expects a police officer to inquire into such circumstances "in the proper exercise of the officer's duties." ' " (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083 .) In reviewing a ruling on a defense motion to | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.