contested case hearing in South Carolina

2017Co. v. Smith , 327 S.C. 528 , 534, 489 S.E.2d 674 , 677 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). **79 When conflicting evidence on an issue exists, the appellate court defers to the findings of the fact-finder in accordance with the substantial evidence standard of review.

2017Co. v. Smith , 327 S.C. 528 , 534, 489 S.E.2d 674 , 677 (Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted). **79 When conflicting evidence on an issue exists, the appellate court defers to the findings of the fact-finder in accordance with the substantial evidence standard of review.

2020See Fore v. Griffco of Wampee, Inc., 409 S.C. 360, 373 , 762 S.E.2d 37, 44 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding an amendment to a Form 58 should be allowed if the amendment is made as promptly as possible even if the amendment is made within ten days of the contested-case hearing); Lizee v. S.C.

2020See Fore v. Griffco of Wampee, Inc., 409 S.C. 360, 373 , 762 S.E.2d 37, 44 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding an amendment to a Form 58 should be allowed if the amendment is made as promptly as possible even if the amendment is made within ten days of the contested-case hearing); Lizee v. S.C.

2020See Morgan v. JPS Automotives, 321 S.C. 201, 203 , 467 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that when claimant entered the contested- case hearing understanding the only the issue to be determined was eligibility for temporary benefits, but the issue of disability compensation was raised, claimant's oral motion for an adjournment to retrieve additional proof of disability should have been granted).

2020See Morgan v. JPS Automotives, 321 S.C. 201, 203 , 467 S.E.2d 457, 459 (Ct. App. 1996) (finding that when claimant entered the contested- case hearing understanding the only the issue to be determined was eligibility for temporary benefits, but the issue of disability compensation was raised, claimant's oral motion for an adjournment to retrieve additional proof of disability should have been granted).

2017Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) ("The requirements of procedural due process, usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest, generally include adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way, the right to introduce evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses whose testimony is used to establish facts, and the right to meaningful judicial review."), overruled on other grounds by Joseph v. S.C.

2017Bd. of Physical Therapy Exam'rs, 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) ("The requirements of procedural due process, usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest, generally include adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful way, the right to introduce evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses whose testimony is used to establish facts, and the right to meaningful judicial review."), overruled on other grounds by Joseph v. S.C.

2023See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court need not review the remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

2023See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613 , 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court need not review the remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).

2020Control, 402 S.C. 358, 364 , 742 S.E.2d 2, 5 (2013) ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); Amisub, 403 S.C. at 585 , 743 S.E.2d at 791 ("By statute, the General Assembly has authorized the ALC to preside over 'contested case' proceedings." (citing S.C.

2020Ct. App. 1980))); Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry County, 426 S.C. 175, 190 , 826 S.E.2d 585, 593 (2019) (indicating that Spence found "an appellate court must find the dismissal was without prejudice and remand for the filing of an amended complaint unless the court concludes any amendment would be clearly futile" (citing Spence, 368 S.C. at 130 , 628 S.E.2d at 881–82)); Berry, 402 S.C. at 364 , 742 S.E.2d at 5 ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); id. ("The ALC sits as t

2020Control, 402 S.C. 358, 364 , 742 S.E.2d 2, 5 (2013) ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); Amisub, 403 S.C. at 585 , 743 S.E.2d at 791 ("By statute, the General Assembly has authorized the ALC to preside over 'contested case' proceedings." (citing S.C.

2020Ct. App. 1980))); Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry County, 426 S.C. 175, 190 , 826 S.E.2d 585, 593 (2019) (indicating that Spence found "an appellate court must find the dismissal was without prejudice and remand for the filing of an amended complaint unless the court concludes any amendment would be clearly futile" (citing Spence, 368 S.C. at 130 , 628 S.E.2d at 881–82)); Berry, 402 S.C. at 364 , 742 S.E.2d at 5 ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); id. ("The ALC sits as t

2020Control, 402 S.C. 358, 364 , 742 S.E.2d 2, 5 (2013) ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); Amisub, 403 S.C. at 585 , 743 S.E.2d at 791 ("By statute, the General Assembly has authorized the ALC to preside over 'contested case' proceedings." (citing S.C.

2020Control, 402 S.C. 358, 364 , 742 S.E.2d 2, 5 (2013) ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); Amisub, 403 S.C. at 585 , 743 S.E.2d at 791 ("By statute, the General Assembly has authorized the ALC to preside over 'contested case' proceedings." (citing S.C.

2020Dep't. of Mental Health, 314 S.C. 207, 208 , 442 S.E.2d 582 , 582–83 (1994) ("Whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is a matter within the [ALC's] sound discretion and [its] decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse thereof."); id. at 208 , 442 S.E.2d at 583 ("The general rule is that administrative remedies must be exhausted absent circumstances supporting an exception to application of the general rule."); S.C.

2020Dep't. of Mental Health, 314 S.C. 207, 208 , 442 S.E.2d 582 , 582–83 (1994) ("Whether administrative remedies must be exhausted is a matter within the [ALC's] sound discretion and [its] decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse thereof."); id. at 208 , 442 S.E.2d at 583 ("The general rule is that administrative remedies must be exhausted absent circumstances supporting an exception to application of the general rule."); S.C.

2020Ct. App. 1980))); Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry County, 426 S.C. 175, 190 , 826 S.E.2d 585, 593 (2019) (indicating that Spence found "an appellate court must find the dismissal was without prejudice and remand for the filing of an amended complaint unless the court concludes any amendment would be clearly futile" (citing Spence, 368 S.C. at 130 , 628 S.E.2d at 881–82)); Berry, 402 S.C. at 364 , 742 S.E.2d at 5 ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); id. ("The ALC sits as t

2020Ct. App. 1980))); Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. v. Horry County, 426 S.C. 175, 190 , 826 S.E.2d 585, 593 (2019) (indicating that Spence found "an appellate court must find the dismissal was without prejudice and remand for the filing of an amended complaint unless the court concludes any amendment would be clearly futile" (citing Spence, 368 S.C. at 130 , 628 S.E.2d at 881–82)); Berry, 402 S.C. at 364 , 742 S.E.2d at 5 ("Under the APA, persons aggrieved by an agency decision are entitled to seek review of the decision by means of a contested case hearing before the ALC."); id. ("The ALC sits as t

2015Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (B) (Supp. 2014) ("All requests for a hearing before the [ALC] must be filed in accordance with the [ALC's] rules of procedure."); Rule 11(C), SCALCR (stating a request for a contested case hearing before the ALC "must be filed and served within thirty (30) days after actual or constructive notice of the agency's determination"); Botany Bay Marina, Inc. v. Townsend, 296 S.C. 330, 334 , 372 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (1988) (finding the failure to appeal the Board of Adjustment's zoning decision within the fifteen days allowed for filing an appeal divested the Board of Adjustment o

2015Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (B) (Supp. 2014) ("All requests for a hearing before the [ALC] must be filed in accordance with the [ALC's] rules of procedure."); Rule 11(C), SCALCR (stating a request for a contested case hearing before the ALC "must be filed and served within thirty (30) days after actual or constructive notice of the agency's determination"); Botany Bay Marina, Inc. v. Townsend, 296 S.C. 330, 334 , 372 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (1988) (finding the failure to appeal the Board of Adjustment's zoning decision within the fifteen days allowed for filing an appeal divested the Board of Adjustment o

2015Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (B) (Supp. 2014) ("All requests for a hearing before the [ALC] must be filed in accordance with the [ALC's] rules of procedure."); Rule 11(C), SCALCR (stating a request for a contested case hearing before the ALC "must be filed and served within thirty (30) days after actual or constructive notice of the agency's determination"); Botany Bay Marina, Inc. v. Townsend, 296 S.C. 330, 334 , 372 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (1988) (finding the failure to appeal the Board of Adjustment's zoning decision within the fifteen days allowed for filing an appeal divested the Board of Adjustment o

2015Code Ann. § 1-23-600 (B) (Supp. 2014) ("All requests for a hearing before the [ALC] must be filed in accordance with the [ALC's] rules of procedure."); Rule 11(C), SCALCR (stating a request for a contested case hearing before the ALC "must be filed and served within thirty (30) days after actual or constructive notice of the agency's determination"); Botany Bay Marina, Inc. v. Townsend, 296 S.C. 330, 334 , 372 S.E.2d 584, 585-86 (1988) (finding the failure to appeal the Board of Adjustment's zoning decision within the fifteen days allowed for filing an appeal divested the Board of Adjustment o

2013Coastal Conservation League v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, 390 S.C. 418, 428 , 702 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2010), the supreme court held that "DHEC … took an informal approach in deciding which parties it notified of its decisions." Also in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, the League was deemed to be an affected person for purposes of notification.

2013Coastal Conservation League v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, 390 S.C. 418, 428 , 702 S.E.2d 246, 252 (2010), the supreme court held that "DHEC … took an informal approach in deciding which parties it notified of its decisions." Also in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, the League was deemed to be an affected person for purposes of notification.

2013Dep’t of Rev. v. Club Rio, 392 S.C. 636, 642 , 709 S.E.2d 690, 694 (Ct.App.2011) (“The statutory scheme confers on the ALC subject matter jurisdiction over [DHEC’s] contested cases.”).

2013Dep’t of Rev. v. Club Rio, 392 S.C. 636, 642 , 709 S.E.2d 690, 694 (Ct.App.2011) (“The statutory scheme confers on the ALC subject matter jurisdiction over [DHEC’s] contested cases.”).

2012However, as a general rule, “agencies charged with enforcing statutes ... receive deference from the courts as to their interpretation of those laws.” State v. Sweat, 379 S.C. 367, 385 , 665 S.E.2d 645, 655 (Ct.App.2008) (citation omitted).

2012However, as a general rule, “agencies charged with enforcing statutes ... receive deference from the courts as to their interpretation of those laws.” State v. Sweat, 379 S.C. 367, 385 , 665 S.E.2d 645, 655 (Ct.App.2008) (citation omitted).

2012Control, 348 S.C. 507, 512 , 560 S.E.2d 410, 413 (2002) (finding the ALC sits de novo in a contested case hearing).

2012Control, 348 S.C. 507, 512 , 560 S.E.2d 410, 413 (2002) (finding the ALC sits de novo in a contested case hearing).

2011Exam'rs , 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental fairness are "usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration requirement (citation omitted)). 3.

2011Exam'rs , 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental fairness are "usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration requirement (citation omitted)). 3.

2011As to whether the doctrine of laches estopped SLED from enforcing the registration requirement against Squires: Rule 210(h), SCACR ("The appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."); Whitehead v. State , 352 S.C. 215, 219 , 574 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (providing that laches is not available as a defense where the party asserting the defense fails to establish "the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage" against her) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2011As to whether the doctrine of laches estopped SLED from enforcing the registration requirement against Squires: Rule 210(h), SCACR ("The appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."); Whitehead v. State , 352 S.C. 215, 219 , 574 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (providing that laches is not available as a defense where the party asserting the defense fails to establish "the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage" against her) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2006In re Vora, 354 S.C. 590 , 595, 582 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2003); S.C.

2006In re Vora, 354 S.C. 590 , 595, 582 S.E.2d 413, 416 (2003); S.C.

2004Code Ann. § 44-7-210 (E), the Board stated that “parties are not allowed to submit new or additional facts for consideration at the contested case hearing which were not part of the administrative record at the time of the [DHEC Staff Review Hearing.]” [3] We find the DHEC Board’s interpretation of Section 44-7-210(E) erroneous. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible.” Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n , 332 S.C. 54, 62 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1998). “All rules of statutory construction are subservient to

2004Code Ann. § 44-7-210 (E), the Board stated that “parties are not allowed to submit new or additional facts for consideration at the contested case hearing which were not part of the administrative record at the time of the [DHEC Staff Review Hearing.]” [3] We find the DHEC Board’s interpretation of Section 44-7-210(E) erroneous. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible.” Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n , 332 S.C. 54, 62 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1998). “All rules of statutory construction are subservient to

2004Code Ann. § 44-7-210 (E), the Board stated that “parties are not allowed to submit new or additional facts for consideration at the contested case hearing which were not part of the administrative record at the time of the [DHEC Staff Review Hearing.]” [3] We find the DHEC Board’s interpretation of Section 44-7-210(E) erroneous. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible.” Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n , 332 S.C. 54, 62 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1998). “All rules of statutory construction are subservient to

2004Code Ann. § 44-7-210 (E), the Board stated that “parties are not allowed to submit new or additional facts for consideration at the contested case hearing which were not part of the administrative record at the time of the [DHEC Staff Review Hearing.]” [3] We find the DHEC Board’s interpretation of Section 44-7-210(E) erroneous. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible.” Strother v. Lexington County Recreation Comm’n , 332 S.C. 54, 62 , 504 S.E.2d 117, 121 (1998). “All rules of statutory construction are subservient to

1998Lennon’s' motion to intervene indicated that he was intervening “on behalf of four affected parties” and that he represented “Mr. and Mrs. Charles Newmwn [sic], Ms. Bonnie Zanetti, 1 Mr. John Ungaro, and Dr. John Logothetis, each property owners adjacent to the two lots at issue.” Although an organization may represent the interests of its members if its members “have alleged an individual injury in the adverse effect of a specific decision of the Coastal Council,” South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 296 S.C. 187, 190 , 371 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1988); see also Energy R

1998Lennon’s' motion to intervene indicated that he was intervening “on behalf of four affected parties” and that he represented “Mr. and Mrs. Charles Newmwn [sic], Ms. Bonnie Zanetti, 1 Mr. John Ungaro, and Dr. John Logothetis, each property owners adjacent to the two lots at issue.” Although an organization may represent the interests of its members if its members “have alleged an individual injury in the adverse effect of a specific decision of the Coastal Council,” South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 296 S.C. 187, 190 , 371 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1988); see also Energy R

1998Lennon’s' motion to intervene indicated that he was intervening “on behalf of four affected parties” and that he represented “Mr. and Mrs. Charles Newmwn [sic], Ms. Bonnie Zanetti, 1 Mr. John Ungaro, and Dr. John Logothetis, each property owners adjacent to the two lots at issue.” Although an organization may represent the interests of its members if its members “have alleged an individual injury in the adverse effect of a specific decision of the Coastal Council,” South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 296 S.C. 187, 190 , 371 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1988); see also Energy R

1998Lennon’s' motion to intervene indicated that he was intervening “on behalf of four affected parties” and that he represented “Mr. and Mrs. Charles Newmwn [sic], Ms. Bonnie Zanetti, 1 Mr. John Ungaro, and Dr. John Logothetis, each property owners adjacent to the two lots at issue.” Although an organization may represent the interests of its members if its members “have alleged an individual injury in the adverse effect of a specific decision of the Coastal Council,” South Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 296 S.C. 187, 190 , 371 S.E.2d 521, 523 (1988); see also Energy R

1997See, e.g., Grayson v. Carter Rhoad Furniture, 317 S.C. 306 , 454 S.E.2d 320 (1995) (Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion reached by the fact-finder.); accord Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130 , 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981); O’Banner v. Westinghouse Elec.

1997See, e.g., Grayson v. Carter Rhoad Furniture, 317 S.C. 306 , 454 S.E.2d 320 (1995) (Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion reached by the fact-finder.); accord Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130 , 276 S.E.2d 304 (1981); O’Banner v. Westinghouse Elec.