contested case hearing in Texas

2025“Although the [Administrative Procedure Act] defines ‘contested case’ and sets the procedural framework, the agency’s enabling act here sets out whether rights are to be determined after an opportunity for adjudicative hearing, and agency rules may decide whether that opportunity may include a contested case hearing.” Tex. Comm’n on Envt’l Quality v. City of Waco, 413 S.W.3d 409, 423 (Tex. 2013).

2019Quality v. City of Waco , 413 S.W.3d 409 , 423-25 (Tex. 2013) (applying abuse of discretion standard in reviewing Commission's decision to deny a contested case hearing, where the decision was not itself the product of a contested case hearing and the relevant statutes did not specify a standard of review).

2025Comm’n, No. 03-13- BRIEF OF APPELLEES Case No. 15-24-00116-CV Page 10 of 29 00526-CV, 2015 WL 1612006 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin April 9, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); Tex. Logos, L.P. v. Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105, 123 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.) (The right to a contested case hearing comes from “express statutory authority, the APA does not independently provide a right to a contested case hearing.”).

2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 Texas Logos, L.P. v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 241 S.W.3d 105 (2007) independently provide a right to a contested case hearing.

2015Barring any, we overrule Texas Logos’s first issue. 20 See, e.g., Eldercare Props., Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied), overruled on other grounds by Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 173 ; Best & Co. v. State Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs, 927 S.W.2d 306 , 309–310 (Tex.App.-Austin1996, writ denied); H.

2012Id. at 196 .

2015Barring any, we overrule Texas Logos’s first issue. 20 See, e.g., Eldercare Props., Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied), overruled on other grounds by Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 173 ; Best & Co. v. State Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs, 927 S.W.2d 306 , 309–310 (Tex.App.-Austin1996, writ denied); H.

2008“In order to be a contested case under the APA definition, an administrative proceeding must be one in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party ‘are to be determined by a state agency after an opporiunity for adjudicative hearing ’ “[b]y ‘adjudicative hearing,’ we think the legislature meant a hearing at which the decision-making agency hears evidence and, based on that evidence and acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, determines the rights, duties, or privileges of parties before it.” Best & Co. v. Texas State Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs, 927 S.W.2d 306 , 309 & n. 1 (T

2025TCEQ PAGE10F 2 Page 211 APPENDIX 2 - 002 show that Plaintiffs would not be affected to a sufficient degree “confuse[] the preliminary question of whether an individual has standing as an affected person to request a contested-case hearing with the ultimate question of whether that person will prevail in a contested-case hearing on the merits.” See Grissom, 17 S.W.3d at 803 . 5.

2010Conservation Comm'n , 124 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.--Austin 2003, pet. denied) (affording public notice in Commission water permit application context "affords individuals who may be affected by the grant or denial of the permit a meaningful opportunity to voice their concerns and participate in the permitting process by requesting a contested-case hearing on the permit application") (citing United Copper Indus., Inc. v. Grissom , 17 S.W.3d 797, 802 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, pet. dism'd as moot)); see also Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.051 (West 2008).

2026Tex. Workers' Compensation Com'n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 514 (Tex. 1995); see TEX.

2008CODE § 130.1(c); and Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 526 ).7 Following the Lumbermens decision, the Division issued a bulletin which 6 In his decision on the contested case hearing, the hearing officer noted that it was not shown that each of the required preoperative x-rays of W eeks had been taken, nor is this clear from the record.

2015Barring any, we overrule Texas Logos’s first issue. 20 See, e.g., Eldercare Props., Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Human Servs., 63 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied), overruled on other grounds by Mega Child Care, Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 173 ; Best & Co. v. State Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs, 927 S.W.2d 306 , 309–310 (Tex.App.-Austin1996, writ denied); H.

2014Id.

2023Exam’rs, 172 S.W.3d 761, 778-79 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (quoting S. Union Gas Co. v. R.R.

2022Exam’rs, 172 S.W.3d 761, 777 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (rejecting argument that due process requires medical board to apply clear and convincing standard of proof in medical disciplinary actions and noting caselaw holding similarly in context of professional license revocation proceedings).

2014See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 , 372–73 (Tex. 2009) (ultra vires claims properly brought against individual state officers in their official capacity). 9 record to demonstrate that proper notice regarding the hearing was given to affected persons” and that “the commission may not proceed with receipt of testimony in a contested case hearing until there is compliance with this subsection.”5 The use of the words “must” and “may not” supports that the requirements in subsection 27.018(c) are mandatory.

2010See Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d at 372 ; McLane Co. v. Strayhorn , 148 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, pet. denied).

2015The court of appeals agreed that the city was an affected person and held that the Commission abused its discretion in denying the city's request for a contested case hearing. 346 S.W.3d 781, 827 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011).

2015Page 15 413 S.W.3d 409 , 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 931 (Cite as: 413 S.W.3d 409 ) might be considered relevant to the City's standing, the court concluded that the Commis- sion nevertheless abused its discretion in not referring the issue for a contested case hearing because of the overlap of disputed fact issues on standing and the merits of the permit application. 346 S.W.3d at 823 .

2006Co., 851 S.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ denied). 2 After a contested-case hearing in which the eligibility and the reasonableness of portions of CPL’s and WTU’s expenses were questioned, the Commission approved the disputed expenses and included them in the fuel factor component of the PTB.

2006Co. , 851 S.W.2d 896, 897-98 (Tex. App.--Austin 1993, writ denied). (2) After a contested-case hearing in which the eligibility and the reasonableness of portions of CPL's and WTU's expenses were questioned, the Commission approved the disputed expenses and included them in the fuel factor component of the PTB.

2022In a contested-case hearing, the ALJ is the sole judge of witness credibility and is free to accept or reject the testimony of one witness or even accept “part of the testimony of one witness and disregard the remainder.” Southern Union Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 692 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.).

2005In a contested case hearing, the ALJ is the sole judge of witness credibility and is free to accept or reject the testimony of any witness or even accept "part of the testimony of one witness and disregard the remainder." Southern Union Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n , 692 S.W.2d 137, 141-42 (Tex. App.--Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

2011The CCA urges us to revisit this Court’s precedents holding that the APA does not independently create a right to such a hearing in a "contested case." See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of ins. v. State Farm Lloyds, 260 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tex.App.-Austin 2008, no pet.) (observing that ”[t]his Court has long held that, absent express statutory authority, the APA does not independently provide a right to a contested case hearing,” and citing several of our precedents).

2011The CCA urges us to revisit this Court's precedents holding that the APA does not independently create a right to such a hearing in a "contested case." See, e.g. , Texas Dep't of Ins. v. State Farm Lloyds , 260 S.W.3d 233, 244 (Tex. App.--Austin 2008, no pet.) (observing that "[t]his Court has long held that, absent express statutory authority, the APA does not independently provide a right to a contested case hearing," and citing several of our precedents).

2012Further, pursuant to the statutory scheme, the Commission hearing officer makes "the initial decision in a workers' compensation dispute and . . . all subsequent proceedings are limited to a review of that decision." See Texas Dep't of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp. v. Jackson , 225 S.W.3d 734, 736-37 (Tex. App.--Eastland 2007, no pet.); see id . at 737 (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider claimant's eligibility for lifetime income benefits "beyond the date of" the contested case hearing because eligibility after date of contested case hearing not considered by hearing offic

2012Further, pursuant to the statutory scheme, the Commission hearing officer makes “the initial decision in a workers’ compensation dispute and . . . all subsequent proceedings are limited to a review of that decision.” See Texas Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp. v. Jackson, 225 S.W.3d 734 , 736–37 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.); see id. at 737 (holding that trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider claimant’s eligibility for lifetime income benefits “beyond the date of” the contested case hearing because eligibility after date of contested case hearing not considered by hearing officer

2010See Heinrich , 284 S.W.3d at 372 ; McLane Co. v. Strayhorn , 148 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, pet. denied).

2010See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372 ; McLane Co. v. Strayhorn, 148 S.W.3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied).

2008Comm’n, 572 S.W.2d 290, 299-300 (Tex. 1978) (op. on reh’g) (recognizing “[c]oncern for efficient administrative procedure requires consideration of the validity of interim orders only upon appeal from final orders”).

2008Comm'n , 572 S.W.2d 290, 299-300 (Tex. 1978) (op. on reh'g) (recognizing "[c]oncern for efficient administrative procedure requires consideration of the validity of interim orders only upon appeal from final orders").

2003See id. at 875 .

2003See id. at 875 .

2025See Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. 2006) (concluding that when “an administrative body has exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial determination in a dispute, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the decision,” so “[u]ntil the party has satisfied this exhaustion requirement, the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”).

2025See Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 340 (Tex. 2006) (when an administrative body has exclusive jurisdiction to make the initial determination in a dispute, a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the decision).

2022See, e.g., Sierra Club, 455 S.W.3d at 223 n.9 (applying substantial-evidence test to Commission’s decision to deny contested case hearing request, which was not itself a contested-case hearing); Tex. Comm’n on Envtl.

2014Gardner and Williams are the same members Sierra Club relied on in connection with the contested-case hearing request at issue in Sierra Club, No. 03-11-00102-CV, 455 S.W.3d at 220 , 2014 WL 7463875 (affirming denial of hearing request in by-product licensing matter at same disposal site). 6 .

2025Comm’n, No. 01-20-00076-CV, 2021 WL 5904337 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 14, 9 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]hether [appellee’s] officials had a ministerial duty to provide [appellant] with a contested case hearing, however, goes to the merits of the mandamus claim; it does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the claim.”); McAllen Hosps., L.P. v. Suehs, 426 S.W.3d 304, 318 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2014, no pet.) (concluding the trial court had jurisdiction over appellants’ mandamus claim against government officials without considering the merits of the claim).3 “A writ

2015McAllen Hosps., 426 S.W.3d at 314 ; Texas Comm’n on Envtl.

2022Ctr., 623 S.W.3d at 343, our inquiry on this issue under the substantial evidence rule is whether “some reasonable basis exists in the record,” see Maverick County, 642 S.W.3d at 544 (quoting Charter Med.–Dall., 665 S.W.2d at 452 ), for the ALJ to impliedly conclude that the Carrier did not meet its burden to demonstrate that any alleged notice provided to the Provider satisfied Rule 133.4 such that the Aetna Contract applied. 11 The Carrier argues that the rules “only required the contract be supplied to the [Division], and that Aetna provide documentation of the website where the [Provider]

2002See Texas Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc ., 665 S.W.2d 446, 450-51 (Tex. 1984) (underlying findings only required when ultimate finding is mandatory because set forth in relevant enabling act).

2017Qual. v. Bosque River Coal. , 413 S.W.3d 403 , 404 (Tex. 2013) (describing its decision in City of Waco , as concluding that TCEQ "did not abuse its discretion in denying a contested case hearing to an interested party"); Sierra Club v. Texas Comm'n on Envtl.

2014Quality v. Bosque River Coal., 413 S.W.3d 403, 404 (Tex.2013) (describing its decision in City of Waco as concluding that TCEQ “did not abuse its discretion in denying a contested case hearing to an interested party, who claimed a right to such a hearing under the Texas Water Code”). 9 TCEQ’s discretion in this matter arises generally from TCEQ’s statutorily granted exclusive jurisdiction over certain types of permits for regulated activities — here the exclusive jurisdiction to issue by-product disposal licenses, see Tex. Health & Safety Code § 401.2625 — and more specifically from its author