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9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Auger v. D.C. Board of Appeals & Reviewgreen2 sentences2002This court has jurisdiction to determine whether the public charter schools were improperly denied a contested case hearing. 8 See Timus v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 757 (D.C.1993) (en banc); Auger v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 477 A.2d 196, 205-06 (D.C.1984). 2001By incorporating these requirements of D.C.Code § 1-1509, M.O. 96-27 entitled petitioner to a trial-type hearing in its appeal from the denial of its application for a demolition permit. 6 Accord, Auger v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 477 A.2d 196, 206 (D.C.1984) (petitioner challenging revocation of a permit “had a right” to a contested case hearing before the BAR). 7 We therefore hold that *306 petitioner’s hearing before the BAR was a trial-type hearing required “by law” within the meaning of the definition of a “contested case” set forth in D.C.Code § 1-1502(8). | 3 | 3 |
Donnelly Associates, Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Boardgreen2 sentences2025Burkhardt, 198 A.3d at 188; see also Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 277 (noting that a statute’s “grant of discretionary authority” to an agency to hold a hearing does not satisfy the contested case requirement). 2002See United States v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 644 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C.1994); Donnelly Assocs., supra, 520 A.2d at 277 . | 2 | 2 |
Richard Milburn Public Charter Alternative High School v. Cafritzgreen2 sentences2025V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). “[T]o determine whether a contested case hearing is constitutionally mandated” involves “a two-part inquiry.” Richard Milburn, 798 A.2d at 541 . 2004Charter Alternative High School v. Cafritz, 798 A.2d 531, 541 (D.C.2002) (stating that a two-part inquiry must be conducted in order to determine whether a contested case hearing is constitutionally mandated before the government revokes a charter); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. | 1 | 3 |
Christine Burkhardt v. D.C. Rental Housing Commissiongreen1 sentence2025Burkhardt, 198 A.3d at 188; see also Donnelly, 520 A.2d at 277 (noting that a statute’s “grant of discretionary authority” to an agency to hold a hearing does not satisfy the contested case requirement). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Boardgreen1 sentence2007Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 621 A.2d 385, 386 (D.C.1993) (a contested case hearing “must be adjudicatory as opposed to legislative in nature.”) (quoting W.C. & A.N. | 1 | 1 |
Chevy Chase Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Councilgreen1 sentence2002The DCAPA defines a “contested case” as “a proceeding before the Mayor or any agency in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by any law (other than this subchapter), or by constitutional right, to be determined after a hearing before the Mayor or before an agency.” D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (1999). 6 A “contested case” 7 hearing is understood to mean “a trial-type hearing,” which is “implicitly required by either the organic act or constitutional right.” Chevy Chase Citizens Ass’n v. District of Columbia Council, 327 A.2d 310, 314 (D.C.1974) (en banc). | 1 | 1 |
Angell v. Henneberrygreen2 sentences2002Instead, the DCAPA provides that contested case proceedings must be “required by a law (other than this subchapter).” D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (emphasis added); see also Angell v. Henneberry, 92 Md.App. 279 , 607 A.2d 590, 601 (Md.1992) (“the APA itself does not grant a right to a hearing”). 2002Instead, the DCAPA provides that contested case proceedings must be “required by a law (other than this subchapter).” D.C.Code § 1-1502(8) (emphasis added); see also Angell v. Henneberry, 92 Md.App. 279 , 607 A.2d 590, 601 (Md.1992) (“the APA itself does not grant a right to a hearing”). | 1 | 1 |
Fuentes v. Shevingreen2 sentences2002See Fuentes, supra note at 9, 407 U.S. at 94-95 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 . 2002See Fuentes, supra note at 9, 407 U.S. at 94-95 , 92 S.Ct. 1983 . | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2002Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); see also District of Columbia v. Jones, 442 A.2d 512, 516-17 (D.C.1982). | 1 | 1 |
Timus v. District of Columbia Department of Human Rightsgreen2 sentences2002This court has jurisdiction to determine whether the public charter schools were improperly denied a contested case hearing. 8 See Timus v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 757 (D.C.1993) (en banc); Auger v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 477 A.2d 196, 205-06 (D.C.1984). 2002Timus, supra, 633 A.2d at 757 ; but see note 18, infra. In deciding whether the charter schools are entitled to a contested case hearing, we may make “[s]ueh merits rulings on issues inherent in a jurisdictional analysis” since issues of jurisdiction and the merits may “turn out to be coextensive.” Id. at 757-58 . | 1 | 1 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2002See id. at 334 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . 2002Although the record before us does not provide any indication of what the additional costs of a contested case hearing would be, the Supreme Court has indicated that their “experience with the constitutionalizing of government procedures suggests that the ultimate additional costs in terms of money and administrative burden would not be insubstantial.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustmentgreen1 sentence2002See United States v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 644 A.2d 995, 998 (D.C.1994); Donnelly Assocs., supra, 520 A.2d at 277 . | 1 | 1 |
Lucas v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2001See Lucas v. United States, 602 A.2d 1107, 1110 (D.C.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Jones & Artis Construction Co. v. District of Columbia Contract Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1993See Jones & Artis, 549 A.2d at 317-18, 327 . 7 In short, we have exercised jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction, and we have made all rulings necessary to that determination. 1993See Jones & Artis, 549 A.2d at 317-18, 327 . [7] In short, we have exercised jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction, and we have made all rulings necessary to that determination. | 1 | 1 |
No. 76-1922green1 sentence1987Because a “contested case” is a trial-type hearing where such is implicitly required by either the organic act or by constitutional right, we think that the D.C.A.P.A., like the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982), exempts from the contested case requirement “hearings” which administrative agencies may hold “by regulation, rule, custom, or special dispensation.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 , 70 S.Ct. 445, 454 , 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950); Taylor v. District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Fla., 567 F.2d 1332, 1336, 1338 (5th Cir.197 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Timus v. District of Columbia Department of Human Rightsgreen2 sentences2002This court has jurisdiction to determine whether the public charter schools were improperly denied a contested case hearing. 8 See Timus v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Human Rights, 633 A.2d 751, 757 (D.C.1993) (en banc); Auger v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 477 A.2d 196, 205-06 (D.C.1984). 2002Timus, supra, 633 A.2d at 757 ; but see note 18, infra. In deciding whether the charter schools are entitled to a contested case hearing, we may make “[s]ueh merits rulings on issues inherent in a jurisdictional analysis” since issues of jurisdiction and the merits may “turn out to be coextensive.” Id. at 757-58 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Powell v. District of Columbia Housing Authority
green
1 sentence2025Powell, 818 A.2d at 192-93 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
ROSANNE L. WOODROOF v. JOSEPH F. CUNNINGHAM
green
1 sentence2018Woodroof v. Cunningham , 147 A.3d 777 , 784 (D.C. 2016). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
J.C. & Associates v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review
green
1 sentence2018As we have previously held, the "provision of ... a hearing does not satisfy the contested case requirement if it is merely discretionary with the agency; the hearing ... must be compelled." J.C. & Assocs. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review , 778 A.2d 296 , 301 (D.C. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Woods v. District of Columbia Nurses' Examining Board
green
2 sentences2002Both Woods v. District of Columbia Nurses’ Examining Bd., 436 A.2d 369 (D.C.1981) and District of Columbia v. Douglass, 452 A.2d 329 (D.C.1982), were cases in which the relevant statutes made no allowance for any type of hearing before the deprivation of the protected interests, a nursing license and a license to practice naturopathic medicine, respectively. 2002Woods, supra, 436 A.2d at 373 ; Douglass, supra, 452 A.2d at 332 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ingraham v. Wright
green
2 sentences2002Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); see also District of Columbia v. Jones, 442 A.2d 512, 516-17 (D.C.1982). 2002Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672 , 97 S.Ct. 1401 , 51 L.Ed.2d 711 (1977); see also District of Columbia v. Jones, 442 A.2d 512, 516-17 (D.C.1982). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Goldberg v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2002What process is due In order to satisfy constitutional due process requirements, the hearing must take place “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (citations omitted). 2002What process is due In order to satisfy constitutional due process requirements, the hearing must take place “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (citations omitted). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
District of Columbia v. Douglass
green
2 sentences2002Both Woods v. District of Columbia Nurses’ Examining Bd., 436 A.2d 369 (D.C.1981) and District of Columbia v. Douglass, 452 A.2d 329 (D.C.1982), were cases in which the relevant statutes made no allowance for any type of hearing before the deprivation of the protected interests, a nursing license and a license to practice naturopathic medicine, respectively. 2002Woods, supra, 436 A.2d at 373 ; Douglass, supra, 452 A.2d at 332 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.
green
1 sentence2002In applying the Mathews balancing test, we conclude that due process does not require that the Board conduct a contested case hearing before deciding to revoke a public school charter. (a) Private Interest In determining the nature of the loss, we must consider the “importance of the private interest and the length or finality of the deprivation.” Logan, supra note 9, 455 U.S. at 434, 102 S.Ct. 1148 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Brown v. Capitol Hill Club
green
2 sentences1993Brown v. Capitol Hill Club, supra. In other words, OHR’s adoption of § 716.9 is a valid exercise of its delegated authority only if the regulation is properly classified as a dismissal for administrative convenience, a question whose answer is not "a given” (as Judge Ferren opines) but one we must decide before we know whether petitioner was wrongly denied a contested case hearing. 1993We therefore have jurisdiction, as discussed in part III, supra, to decide the proper characterization of § 716.9, but once we have concluded that dismissal of petitioner's complaint was pursuant to § 1-2556(a) (leaving her free to pursue a trial de novo in court), § 1-1502(8)(A) compels us to stop. [14] The fact that, as Judge Ferren points out, if the complainant pursues judicial review in Superior Court and loses, she will have lost her right to file a suit de novo, Brown, supra, does not lead to the conclusion he urgesinapplicability of § 1-1502(8)(A)because upon dismissal by OHR under § | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath
red
2 sentences1987Because a “contested case” is a trial-type hearing where such is implicitly required by either the organic act or by constitutional right, we think that the D.C.A.P.A., like the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982), exempts from the contested case requirement “hearings” which administrative agencies may hold “by regulation, rule, custom, or special dispensation.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 , 70 S.Ct. 445, 454 , 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950); Taylor v. District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Fla., 567 F.2d 1332, 1336, 1338 (5th Cir.197 1987Because a “contested case” is a trial-type hearing where such is implicitly required by either the organic act or by constitutional right, we think that the D.C.A.P.A., like the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1982), exempts from the contested case requirement “hearings” which administrative agencies may hold “by regulation, rule, custom, or special dispensation.” Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 , 70 S.Ct. 445, 454 , 94 L.Ed. 616 (1950); Taylor v. District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Jacksonville, Fla., 567 F.2d 1332, 1336, 1338 (5th Cir.197 | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.