contested case hearing in Wyoming

2000Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo.1997), we summarized the appropriate approach to judicial review in an instance in which an agency declares that the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden: A claimant for worker’s compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing.

2000Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo.1997), we summarized the appropriate approach to judicial review in an instance in which an agency declares that the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden: A claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing.

2021Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (c) (LexisNexis 2019). [¶16] “When, as here, both parties submitted evidence at the contested case hearing and an agency’s factual findings are involved, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” Exaro Energy III, LLC v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2020 WY 8, ¶ 10 , 455 P.3d 1243, 1248 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 10 , 188 P.3d 554, 558 (Wyo. 2008)).

2021Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114 (c) (LexisNexis 2019). [¶16] “When, as here, both parties submitted evidence at the contested case hearing and an agency’s factual findings are involved, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.” Exaro Energy III, LLC v. Wyoming Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 2020 WY 8, ¶ 10 , 455 P.3d 1243, 1248 (Wyo. 2020) (citing Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 10 , 188 P.3d 554, 558 (Wyo. 2008)).

2006Salas v. General Chemical, 2003 WY 79, ¶ 9 , 71 P.3d 708, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2003) (citations omitted). * * * A claimant for worker’s compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing.

2006Salas v. General Chemical, 2003 WY 79, ¶ 9 , 71 P.3d 708, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2003) (citations omitted). * * * A claimant for worker’s compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing.

2008Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7 , 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo.2002), quoting French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1998) (citation omitted). [¶ 8] When both parties presented evidence at the contested case hearing, we apply the substantial evidence standard to review the agency’s findings of fact.

2007Div., 2002 WY 91, 17 , 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo.2002) quoting French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1998) (citation omitted). [110] Upon appeal from a contested case hearing where both parties have presented evidence, we apply the substantial evidence standard to review the agency's findings of fact.

2021Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2012 WY 163, ¶ 18 , 292 P.3d 855, 861 (Wyo. 2012). 6 Wyo.

2021Wilson Advisory Comm. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 2012 WY 163, ¶ 18 , 292 P.3d 855, 861 (Wyo. 2012). 6 Wyo.

2024Scarlett, 463 P.2d at 27 .

2024Id. at 29 (quoting Stilz v. City of Indianapolis, 55 Ind. 515, 519 (1877) and citing Wyo.

2012However, "the arbitrary and capricious standard is more lenient and deferential to the agency than the substantial evidence standard because 'it requires only that there be a rational basis for the agency's decision.' " Id. [¶18] Our primary focus in Dale was on determining the appropriate standard for reviewing an agency's factual findings after a contested case hearing.

2008Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 7 , 49 P.3d 163, 166 (Wyo.2002), quoting French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo.1998) (citation omitted). [¶ 8] When both parties presented evidence at the contested case hearing, we apply the substantial evidence standard to review the agency’s findings of fact.

1998The Department’s Final Decision In JM v. Department of Family Services, 922 P.2d 219, 224 (Wyo.1996), we held that the Department acted contrary to law when it limited the issues for resolution in a contested case hearing, when it determined the substantial evidence standard applied in the contested cáse hearing, and when it placed the burden of proof on the person contesting the Department’s substantiation of child abuse charges.

1998The Department's Final Decision In JM v. Department of Family Services, 922 P.2d 219, 224 (Wyo.1996), we held that the Department acted contrary to law when it limited the issues for resolution in a contested case hearing, when it determined the substantial evidence standard applied in the contested case hearing, and when it placed the burden of proof on the person contesting the Department's substantiation of child abuse charges.

2024Div., 2013 WY 96, ¶ 16 , 307 P.3d 843, 849 (Wyo. 2013) (“When conflicting medical opinions are presented at the contested case hearing, the agency has the responsibility, as the trier of fact, to determine relevancy, assign probative value, and ascribe the relevant weight given to the evidence presented.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2024Div., 2013 WY 96, ¶ 16 , 307 P.3d 843, 849 (Wyo. 2013) (“When conflicting medical opinions are presented at the contested case hearing, the agency has the responsibility, as the trier of fact, to determine relevancy, assign probative value, and ascribe the relevant weight given to the evidence presented.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

2023See generally W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Davenport, 2012 WY 6, ¶ 20 , 268 P.3d at 1043 (reviewing an issue raised during a closing argument at the contested case hearing). 4 [¶13] The Department of Revenue’s applicable regulation provides: County Assessors shall physically inspect all real properties within their jurisdiction at least once every six years in order to assure the property characteristic data are correct.

2023See generally W.R.A.P. 12.09(a); Davenport, 2012 WY 6, ¶ 20 , 268 P.3d at 1043 (reviewing an issue raised during a closing argument at the contested case hearing). 4 [¶13] The Department of Revenue’s applicable regulation provides: County Assessors shall physically inspect all real properties within their jurisdiction at least once every six years in order to assure the property characteristic data are correct.

2022Mr. Genner asserted at the hearing that he was entitled to PTD benefits under the “odd lot” doctrine, which applies to injured workers who are not “‘altogether incapacitated for work [but are] so handicapped they will not be employed regularly in any well[-]known branch of the labor market.’” In re Pickens, 2006 WY 54 , 2 ¶ 13, 134 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo. 1983)) (other citations omitted).

2022Mr. Genner asserted at the hearing that he was entitled to PTD benefits under the “odd lot” doctrine, which applies to injured workers who are not “‘altogether incapacitated for work [but are] so handicapped they will not be employed regularly in any well[-]known branch of the labor market.’” In re Pickens, 2006 WY 54 , 2 ¶ 13, 134 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo. 1983)) (other citations omitted).

2022Mr. Genner asserted at the hearing that he was entitled to PTD benefits under the “odd lot” doctrine, which applies to injured workers who are not “‘altogether incapacitated for work [but are] so handicapped they will not be employed regularly in any well[-]known branch of the labor market.’” In re Pickens, 2006 WY 54 , 2 ¶ 13, 134 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo. 1983)) (other citations omitted).

2022Mr. Genner asserted at the hearing that he was entitled to PTD benefits under the “odd lot” doctrine, which applies to injured workers who are not “‘altogether incapacitated for work [but are] so handicapped they will not be employed regularly in any well[-]known branch of the labor market.’” In re Pickens, 2006 WY 54 , 2 ¶ 13, 134 P.3d 1231, 1235 (Wyo. 2006) (quoting Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo. 1983)) (other citations omitted).

2022Dep’t of Rev. v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1182, 1185 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Antelope Valley Improvement v. State Bd. of Equalization, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 1999), opinion clarified at 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo. 2000)). [¶10] When an employee disagrees with the Division’s determination of his worker’s compensation claim, he may object and request a contested case hearing.

2022Dep’t of Rev. v. Buggy Bath Unlimited, Inc., 2001 WY 27, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1182, 1185 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Antelope Valley Improvement v. State Bd. of Equalization, 992 P.2d 563, 566 (Wyo. 1999), opinion clarified at 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo. 2000)). [¶10] When an employee disagrees with the Division’s determination of his worker’s compensation claim, he may object and request a contested case hearing.

2019However, even if Mr. Sweetalla had to file a claim for benefits within a reasonable time, we conclude that the Division’s conduct and actions in response to the filing of Mr. Sweetalla’s injury report independently estop the Division from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense. [¶26] “For equitable estoppel to apply, the appellant must show that he relied, to his detriment, upon some action of the Division.” Schwab v. JTL Grp., Inc., 2013 WY 138, ¶ 15 , 312 P.3d 790, 795 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting Picozzi, supra note 4 , at ¶ 13, 304 P.3d at 981 ).

2019Labor Standards, 2017 WY 143 , ¶ 14 n.3, 406 P.3d 312 , 315 n.3 (Wyo. 2017). 3 matter to the agency for reconsideration of all of the issues under the second compensable injury rule was a substantive remand and therefore the order was not a final appealable order); Schwab, ¶ 13, 312 P.3d at 794 (order was not an appealable order because it remanded the matter to the agency for a contested case hearing, which was not a mere ministerial matter); Martin, ¶¶ 7, 16, 60 P.3d at 1275, 1277 (order remanding the matter to the agency to allow the employee to provide additional evidence to defend against

2013See eg., Jacobs, ¶ 11, 301 P.3d at 141 (citation omitted); Anastos v. Gen.

2013See, e.g., Jacobs, ¶ 11, 301 P.3d at 141 (citation omitted); Anastos v. Gen.

2013Citing Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park County, 2010 WY 41, ¶ 51 , 228 P.3d 838, 855 (Wyo.2010) and Carlson v. Bratton, 681 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wyo.1984), the PSC argues that since § 37-15-501 does not mandate a contested case hearing in WUSF proceedings, no such hearing is required. [125] Again, the difficulty with the PSC's arguments is that they do not take into account § 37-15-40l(a)(v) which expressly states that the PSC's power to hold hearings is "subject to the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act." The argument also does not accou

2013Citing Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Park County, 2010 WY 41, ¶ 51 , 228 P.3d 838, 855 (Wyo. 2010) and Carlson v. Bratton, 681 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wyo. 1984), the PSC argues that since § 37-15- 501 does not mandate a contested case hearing in WUSF proceedings, no such hearing is required. [¶25] Again, the difficulty with the PSC’s arguments is that they do not take into account § 37-15-401(a)(v) which expressly states that the PSC’s power to hold hearings is “subject to the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.” The argument also does not ac

2013Citing Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park County, 2010 WY 41, ¶ 51 , 228 P.3d 838, 855 (Wyo.2010) and Carlson v. Bratton, 681 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wyo.1984), the PSC argues that since § 37-15-501 does not mandate a contested case hearing in WUSF proceedings, no such hearing is required. [125] Again, the difficulty with the PSC's arguments is that they do not take into account § 37-15-40l(a)(v) which expressly states that the PSC's power to hold hearings is "subject to the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act." The argument also does not accou

2013Citing Northfork Citizens for Responsible Dev. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park County, 2010 WY 41, ¶ 51 , 228 P.3d 838, 855 (Wyo.2010) and Carlson v. Bratton, 681 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wyo.1984), the PSC argues that since § 37-15-501 does not mandate a contested case hearing in WUSF proceedings, no such hearing is required. [125] Again, the difficulty with the PSC's arguments is that they do not take into account § 37-15-40l(a)(v) which expressly states that the PSC's power to hold hearings is "subject to the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act." The argument also does not accou

2006See KG Constr., Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 116, ¶ 9 , 120 P.3d 145, 147-48 (Wyo.2005); Robbins v. State ex rel.

2006See KG Constr., Inc. v. Sherman, 2005 WY 116, ¶ 9 , 120 P.3d 145, 147-48 (Wyo.2005); Robbins v. State ex rel.

2005Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Division, 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998), that a hearing examiner has jurisdiction to appoint counsel for an employee when the Division issues a final determination regarding compensability of an injury and further to award fees to the appointed attorney at the conclusion of the proceedings, regardless of whether a full contested case hearing is held.

2001Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998), that a hearing examiner has jurisdiction to appoint counsel for an employee when the Division issues a final determination regarding com-pensability of an injury and further to award fees to the appointed attorney at the conclusion of the proceedings, regardless of whether a full contested case hearing is held. [117] This Court has the authority to adjust factual findings based on the overwhelming evidence in the record and to correct errors of law.

2005Wyoming Worker’s Compensation Division, 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998), that a hearing examiner has jurisdiction to appoint counsel for an employee when the Division issues a final determination regarding compensability of an injury and further to award fees to the appointed attorney at the conclusion of the proceedings, regardless of whether a full contested case hearing is held.

2001Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 931 P.2d 953, 955 (Wyo.1997), abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo.1998), that a hearing examiner has jurisdiction to appoint counsel for an employee when the Division issues a final determination regarding com-pensability of an injury and further to award fees to the appointed attorney at the conclusion of the proceedings, regardless of whether a full contested case hearing is held. [117] This Court has the authority to adjust factual findings based on the overwhelming evidence in the record and to correct errors of law.

2005And finally, agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it is "willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances." Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo.1996). [¶ 13] In reviewing administrative agency action, we are also mindful of the allocation of the burden of proof at the contested case hearing: "Allocation of the burden of proof is a matter of law." Corman v. State ex rel.

2005And finally, ageney action is arbitrary and capricious if it is "willful and unreasonable, without consideration and in disregard of the facts and cireamstances." Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo.1996). [113] In reviewing administrative ageney action, we are also mindful of the allocation of the burden of proof at the contested case hearing: "Allocation of the burden of proof is a matter of law." Corman v. State ex rel.

1997Cf. Little America Refining Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 55-56 (Wyo.1993).

1997Cf. Little America Refining Co. v. Witt, 854 P.2d 51, 55-56 (Wyo.1993).

1990Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Wyo.1986).

1990Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 715 P.2d 553, 556-57 (Wyo. 1986).

2024Comm’n, 2011 WY 49, ¶ 22 , 250 P.3d 1082, 1089 (Wyo. 2011) (finding the Medical Commission did not abuse its discretion in admitting an independent medical examination, but noting the issue was raised for the first time on appeal because the claimant did not object during the contested case hearing). [¶30] The Medical Commission, acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, is “not bound by technical rules of evidence that govern trials by courts or juries.” Gray v. State ex rel.

2024Comm’n, 2011 WY 49, ¶ 22 , 250 P.3d 1082, 1089 (Wyo. 2011) (finding the Medical Commission did not abuse its discretion in admitting an independent medical examination, but noting the issue was raised for the first time on appeal because the claimant did not object during the contested case hearing). [¶30] The Medical Commission, acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity, is “not bound by technical rules of evidence that govern trials by courts or juries.” Gray v. State ex rel.

2002Bauer, 695 P.2d at 1050-53 ; Wyo.

2002The hearing examiner cited Bauer v. Workers' Compensation Div., 695 P2d 1048, 1053 (Wyo.1985), as authority for this conclusion. [¶ 8] The Director reversed and issued a final order that made eredibility determinations and concluded that equitable estoppel principles did not apply to the particular facts of the case. ' The Director ruled that Appleby's request for a contested case hearing on the final determination must be denied as untimely.

1998See Fallon v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 441 P.2d 322, 327 (Wyo.1968); Devous v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 417-18 (Wyo.1993).

1995Devous, 845 P.2d at 416 .