contested case hearing in Oregon

2021That is, OAR 345-027-0371 does not entitle peti- tioners to a contested case proceeding to demonstrate that their request for a contested case proceeding actually “raises a significant issue of fact or law that is reasonably likely to affect the Council’s determination whether the facility, with the change proposed by the amendment, meets the applica- ble laws and Council standards.” Corey, 210 Or App at 545 n 3 (“[W]hether an order should be reviewed by this court as an order in a contested case depends on whether petitioners were entitled to a contested case hearing * * *.”).

2008And, the Court of Appeals concluded, because DLCD should have employed contested case procedures, judicial review was available in the Court of Appeals under the provision of the Administrative Procedures Act pertaining to review of orders in contested cases (ORS 183.482). 210 Or App at 549-52 . 4 DLCD sought review of that decision in this court, challenging the ultimate jurisdictional holding and the underlying proposition that a contested case hearing is required to determine the scope of compensation (or waiver) whenever a public agency accepts a Measure 37 claim as *463 valid.

2012After balancing the factors that the United States Supreme Court described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), we conclude that the benefit to petitioner of a contested case hearing would be limited and that the state’s interests outweigh his interest in such a hearing.” Id. at 590-91.

2012After balancing the factors that the United States Supreme Court described in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319 , 96 S Ct 893 , 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), we conclude that the benefit to petitioner of a contested case hearing would be limited and that the state’s interests outweigh his interest in such a hearing.” Id. at 590-91.

2005Bd. Higher Ed., 293 Or 363 , 647 P2d 931 (1982) (Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of petition for review under ORS 183.482 if proceeding meets the statutory definition of a contested case whether or not petitioner actually received a contested case hearing); Berger v. SOSCF (A117291), 195 Or App 587 , 98 P3d 1127 (2004) (trial court had jurisdiction when petitioner was neither entitled to nor received a contested case hearing); see also Berger v. SOSCF (A117292), 195 Or App 732 , 98 P3d 1173 (2004) (dismissing petition for review under ORS 183.482 because petitioner was not entitled to contes

2005Bd. Higher Ed., 293 Or 363 , 647 P2d 931 (1982) (Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of petition for review under ORS 183.482 if proceeding meets the statutory definition of a contested case whether or not petitioner actually received a contested case hearing); Berger v. SOSCF (A117291), 195 Or App 587 , 98 P3d 1127 (2004) (trial court had jurisdiction when petitioner was neither entitled to nor received a contested case hearing); see also Berger v. SOSCF (A117292), 195 Or App 732 , 98 P3d 1173 (2004) (dismissing petition for review under ORS 183.482 because petitioner was not entitled to contes

2023Prior to the hearing, the board filed an amended notice detailing the allegations against petitioner for practicing psychology and represent- ing himself to be a psychologist in the state without a license Cite as 327 Or App 48 (2023) 51 in violation of ORS 675.020(1)(a), (b).

2023Prior to the hearing, the board filed an amended notice detailing the allegations against petitioner for practicing psychology and represent- ing himself to be a psychologist in the state without a license Cite as 327 Or App 48 (2023) 51 in violation of ORS 675.020(1)(a), (b).

2021Petitioners cite no regula- tion, statute, or case law in support of their argument, but contend that, “[g]iven the uniqueness of the circumstance, there is no applicable regulation, statute or case law to cite.” In response, DHS contends that substantial evidence in the record supports DHS’s determination that the notice did not waive its suspension rights, because “there was no evidence in the record suggesting that by agreeing to delay the sus- pension, the department intended to waive it.” Waiver is “ ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ” Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134,

2021Petitioners cite no regula- tion, statute, or case law in support of their argument, but contend that, “[g]iven the uniqueness of the circumstance, there is no applicable regulation, statute or case law to cite.” In response, DHS contends that substantial evidence in the record supports DHS’s determination that the notice did not waive its suspension rights, because “there was no evidence in the record suggesting that by agreeing to delay the sus- pension, the department intended to waive it.” Waiver is “ ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ” Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134,

2018Pursuant to ORS 183.650(3), an "agency conducting a contested case hearing may modify a finding of historical fact made by the administrative law judge assigned from the Office of Administrative Hearings only if the agency determines that there is clear and convincing evidence in the record that the finding was wrong." An ALJ "makes a finding of historical fact if the administrative law judge determines that an event did or did not occur in the past *376 or that a circumstance or status did or did not exist *643 either before the hearing or at the time of the hearing." Id.

1993Llewellyn v. Board of Chiropractic Examiners, supra, 119 Or App at 402 .

2005Bd. Higher Ed., 293 Or 363 , 647 P2d 931 (1982) (Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of petition for review under ORS 183.482 if proceeding meets the statutory definition of a contested case whether or not petitioner actually received a contested case hearing); Berger v. SOSCF (A117291), 195 Or App 587 , 98 P3d 1127 (2004) (trial court had jurisdiction when petitioner was neither entitled to nor received a contested case hearing); see also Berger v. SOSCF (A117292), 195 Or App 732 , 98 P3d 1173 (2004) (dismissing petition for review under ORS 183.482 because petitioner was not entitled to contes

2005Bd. Higher Ed., 293 Or 363 , 647 P2d 931 (1982) (Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of petition for review under ORS 183.482 if proceeding meets the statutory definition of a contested case whether or not petitioner actually received a contested case hearing); Berger v. SOSCF (A117291), 195 Or App 587 , 98 P3d 1127 (2004) (trial court had jurisdiction when petitioner was neither entitled to nor received a contested case hearing); see also Berger v. SOSCF (A117292), 195 Or App 732 , 98 P3d 1173 (2004) (dismissing petition for review under ORS 183.482 because petitioner was not entitled to contes

2012After stating the question in that case — whether the “record on judicial review in other than a contested case hearing is * * * limited to the information that the agency had before it when it issued its order” — the court noted that “[t]o answer that question, we must construe ORS 183.484.” 329 Or at 645 .

2005Second, we hold that the trial court’s failure to provide an evidentiary hearing that meets the requirements described in Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641 , 996 P2d 958 (2000) (Norden ID, requires us to remand this case to the trial court.

2008Id. at 189-93 , 108 P.3d 95 .

2008Id. at 189-93 .

2007Said differently, nothing in ORS 14.165 permits us to substitute a circuit court proceeding— especially one resolved on summary judgment — for a contested case hearing held by the administrative agency charged with providing one.” *187 209 Or App at 370 .

2007Id. at 370-71 .

1997On the other hand if, as a matter of the substantive law and regulations governing the EFSC, it has a mandatory duty to hold such a hearing, then the circuit court could order it to do so pursuant to ORS 183.490." Wyers, 42 Or.App. at 804 , 601 P.2d 1268 .

1997On the other hand if, as a matter of the substantive law and regulations governing the EFSC, it has a mandatory duty to hold such a hearing, then the circuit court could order it to do so pursuant to ORS 183.490.” Wyers, 42 Or App at 804 .

2025(See Def’s Resp Court Questions at 16 (although Defendant “does not have to follow the Administrative Procedures Act contested case processes,” “DOR is not explicitly exempted from either ORS 183.482 (governing appeals from contested case orders) or 183.484 (governing appeals from orders in other than a contested case”).) To the extent Defendant posits such a path, this court finds it unlikely that the Court of Appeals would have jurisdiction, based on Portland Mailing Services, Inc. v. SAIF, 84 Or App 558, 561 , 734 P2d 898 (1987).

2025(See Def’s Resp Court Questions at 16 (although Defendant “does not have to follow the Administrative Procedures Act contested case processes,” “DOR is not explicitly exempted from either ORS 183.482 (governing appeals from contested case orders) or 183.484 (governing appeals from orders in other than a contested case”).) To the extent Defendant posits such a path, this court finds it unlikely that the Court of Appeals would have jurisdiction, based on Portland Mailing Services, Inc. v. SAIF, 84 Or App 558, 561 , 734 P2d 898 (1987).

2023Id. at 541-42 .

2022Quality Comm., 26 Or App 717, 721-22 , 554 P2d 620 (1976) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 US 185 , 89 S Ct 1657 , 23 L Ed 2d 194 (1969)); see also Ashland Drilling, Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or App 624, 630 , 4 P3d 748 , rev den, 331 Or 429 (2000) (recognizing that APA exclusivity serves the same purposes as the exhaustion requirement, because “the APA establishes a comprehensive pattern for the judicial review of administrative decisions” (internal citation omitted)).1 1 We express no opinion on the propriety of the board’s apparent practice of informing license applicants that pursuin

2022Quality Comm., 26 Or App 717, 721-22 , 554 P2d 620 (1976) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 US 185 , 89 S Ct 1657 , 23 L Ed 2d 194 (1969)); see also Ashland Drilling, Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or App 624, 630 , 4 P3d 748 , rev den, 331 Or 429 (2000) (recognizing that APA exclusivity serves the same purposes as the exhaustion requirement, because “the APA establishes a comprehensive pattern for the judicial review of administrative decisions” (internal citation omitted)).1 1 We express no opinion on the propriety of the board’s apparent practice of informing license applicants that pursuin

2022As we recited in our first opinion, although the parties pre- sented conflicting testimony in the contested case hearing as to whether they ultimately reached an agreement as a result of the meetings, “ERB found that, in the third meeting, the mayor’s liaison and Ferschweiler reached an oral agreement as to how the cuts would be implemented and that Ferschweiler agreed not to contest the changes through grievance.” Portland Fire Fighters’ Assn., 302 Or App at 398 .1 The oral agreement that ERB found the union and the city had reached provided that, in exchange for the city’s agreement to prese

2022Cite as 322 Or App 491 (2022) 495 Thus, we agree with the trial court that plaintiff’s remedy, if any, was through the administrative process rather than through a declaratory judgment action.

2021Cite as 312 Or App 424 (2021) 431 At the conclusion of the contested case hearing, the ALJ vacated the citation, based on two of UPS’s arguments.

2021Petitioners cite no regula- tion, statute, or case law in support of their argument, but contend that, “[g]iven the uniqueness of the circumstance, there is no applicable regulation, statute or case law to cite.” In response, DHS contends that substantial evidence in the record supports DHS’s determination that the notice did not waive its suspension rights, because “there was no evidence in the record suggesting that by agreeing to delay the sus- pension, the department intended to waive it.” Waiver is “ ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ” Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134,

2021Petitioners cite no regula- tion, statute, or case law in support of their argument, but contend that, “[g]iven the uniqueness of the circumstance, there is no applicable regulation, statute or case law to cite.” In response, DHS contends that substantial evidence in the record supports DHS’s determination that the notice did not waive its suspension rights, because “there was no evidence in the record suggesting that by agreeing to delay the sus- pension, the department intended to waive it.” Waiver is “ ‘the intentional relinquishment of a known right.’ ” Drews v. EBI Companies, 310 Or 134,

2018Petitioner moved for summary determination in its favor, contending that the wetland fill and removal permit statute, ORS 196.825, as construed by the Oregon Supreme Court *313 in Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands , 285 Or. 197 , 590 P.2d 709 (1979), required DSL to make an affirmative finding that the project would serve a public need for DSL to be authorized to issue the permit.

2018Petitioner moved for summary determination in its favor, contending that the wetland fill and removal permit statute, ORS 196.825, as construed by the Oregon Supreme Court *313 in Morse v. Oregon Division of State Lands , 285 Or. 197 , 590 P.2d 709 (1979), required DSL to make an affirmative finding that the project would serve a public need for DSL to be authorized to issue the permit.