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20 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stahl v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Cumulative Error In the ninth point of error, appellant urges that the " cumulative effect of the errors alleged denied appellant due process. " He cites Stahl v. State , 749 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Tex. Crim. 2006Cumulative Error In the ninth point of error, appellant urges that the “cumulative effect of the errors alleged denied appellant due process.” He cites Stahl v. State, 749 S.W.2d 826, 832 (Tex.Crim.App.1988). | 3 | 3 |
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2004Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). 2004Wright v. State , 28 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Rankin v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Lack of Relevancy Analysis In the eighth point of error, appellant claims that the “trial court erred in failing to conduct a complete relevancy analysis upon 404(b) objection by the defense.” Appellant does not claim that he made a relevancy objection, but contends that when a Rule 404(b) objection is made it is inclusive of “a Rule 402 objection.” See Rankin v. State, 974 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Crim. 2001Lack of Relevancy Analysis In the eighth point of error, appellant claims that the "trial court erred in failing to conduct a complete relevancy analysis upon 404(b) objection by the defense." Appellant does not claim that he made a relevancy objection, but contends that when a Rule 404(b) objection is made it is inclusive of "a Rule 402 objection." See Rankin v. State , 974 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Chamberlain v. Stategreen1 sentence2004Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1995A virtually identical definition was approved in Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). 1995A virtually identical definition was approved in Williams v. State, 674 S.W.2d 315, 322 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). | 1 | 1 |
Matson v. Stategreen2 sentences1995While this Court has held that appellant cannot be prevented from presenting this testimony to the jury, Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 850-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), without instruction on the applicable parole eligibility law, it is my opinion that appellant’s Eighth Amendment rights cannot be fully realized. 1995While this Court has held that appellant cannot be prevented from presenting this testimony to the jury, Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 850-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), without instruction on the applicable parole eligibility law, it is my opinion that appellant's Eighth Amendment rights cannot be fully realized. | 1 | 1 |
Aetna Insurance Company v. Paddockgreen1 sentence1992The contention here is that since the jury was asked and answered, “[w]hat sum of money, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate Kim ... for her injuries, ...,” she was not entitled to prejudgment interest, citing Aetna Insurance Company v. Paddock, 301 F.2d 807, 812 (5th Cir.1962) in support of that assertion. | 1 | 1 |
Duncan v. Poguegreen1 sentence1989Duncan v. Pogue, 759 S.W.2d at 435. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lucero v. State
green
1 sentence2011As a corollary to his eighth point of error, the appellant argues in his ninth point of error that the trial court erred in refusing to submit a jury instruction that he requested at the close of the punishment phase that would have expressly informed the jury that its consideration of mitigating evidence was not limited to that evidence which directly reduces his “moral blameworthiness”;44 they could also, according to this proposed instruction, “consider any other evidence that would justify a sentence of life without parole.” The trial court’s refusal to submit this requested instruction, t | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Tollett v. State
green
1 sentence2006Neither Judge Baird nor Judge Clinton expressed any view of the factual-sufficiency issue, although their views might be considered evident from the fact that they both later joined Judge Maloney's opinion for the Court in Clewis . [14] See note 6, ante; Bigby v. State, supra, at 874-75 n. 5. [15] 44 Tex. 95 (1875). [16] 1 Tex.Ct.App. 488 (1877). [17] Clewis v. State, supra, at 138 (Clinton, J., concurring). [18] See March v. State, 3 Tex.Ct.App. 335, 336 (1877); Lockhart v. State, 3 Tex.Ct.App. 567, 570 (1878); Blake v. State, 3 Tex.Ct.App. 581, 587 (1878). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pelzig v. Berkebile
green
1 sentence1997Pelzig v. Berkebile, supra; Zieba v. Martin, supra. The eighth point of error is overruled. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Zieba v. Martin
green
1 sentence1997Pelzig v. Berkebile, supra; Zieba v. Martin, supra. The eighth point of error is overruled. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Smith v. Texas
green
2 sentences1995Reaffirming the reasoning in my dissenting opinion in Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Maloney, J., dissenting), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 131 , 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995), I dissent to the majority’s eighth point of error. 1 In his eighth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding the statutory minimum incarceration period that he would be required to serve before becoming eligible for parole violated the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment applicable to the states through the Due Process Clau 1995Reaffirming the reasoning in my dissenting opinion in Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Maloney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 131 , 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995), I dissent to the majority's eighth point of error. [1] In his eighth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding the statutory minimum incarceration period that he would be required to serve before becoming eligible for parole violated the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment applicable to the states through the Due Proces | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences1995Reaffirming the reasoning in my dissenting opinion in Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Maloney, J., dissenting), ce rt. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 131 , 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995), I dissent to the majority’s eighth point of error. 1 In his eighth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury regarding the statutory minimum incarceration period that he would be required to serve before becoming eligible for parole violated the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment applicable to the states through the Due Process Clau 1995Reaffirming the reasoning in my dissenting opinion in Smith v. State, 898 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (Maloney, J., dissenting), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 131 , 133 L.Ed.2d 80 (1995), I dissent to the majority's eighth point of error. [1] In his eighth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury regarding the statutory minimum incarceration period that he would be required to serve before becoming eligible for parole violated the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth Amendment applicable to the states through the Due Proces | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Producers Chemical Company v. McKay
green
2 sentences1990As was stated in McKay, 348 S.W.2d at 96 : "We realize the evidence is never the same in any two cases and that each case stands on its own...." Having found some evidence to support the finding, the "no evidence" challenge under the eighth point of error is overruled. 1990As was stated in McKay, 348 S.W.2d at 96 : “We realize the evidence is never the same in any two cases and that each case stands on its own....” Having found some evidence to support the finding, the “no evidence” challenge under the eighth point of error is overruled. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Beets v. State
green
2 sentences1989That drafters of the committee substitute the Senate sent to conference drew heavily on related provisions of the Model Penal Code written by the American Law Institute, just as legislators in Florida obviously, and in Georgia to some degree, had done in enacting statutes then extant, has been chronicled in, e.g., Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). 1989That drafters of the committee substitute the Senate sent to conference drew heavily on related provisions of the Model Penal Code written by the American Law Institute, just as legislators in Florida obviously, and in Georgia to some degree, had done in enacting statutes then extant, has been chronicled in, e.g., Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
McAllen State Bank v. Linbeck Construction Corp.
green
1 sentence1985App. — El Paso 1981, no writ). [2] This case is distinguishable from the recent case decided by this Court, McAllen State Bank v. Linbeck Construction Corp., No. 84-085, 695 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi, 1985, writ ref'd.n.r.e.) wherein we held that a cause of action arose under the 1977 amendment because, although the contract was written before the 1977 law was in effect, the construction work, which was the basis of the cause of action in that case, was performed subsequent to the effective date of the 1977 amendment and prior to the 1979 amendment. [3] It should be pointed out | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Dunn v. Dunn
green
1 sentence1983Dunn v. Dunn, supra. The appellant’s eighth point of error is overruled. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
First State Bank, Morton v. Chesshir
green
2 sentences1982Rule 274. [1] In our original consideration of the appeal, we overruled the bank's eighth point of error by which it contended the trial court erred in not disregarding the jury's answer to issue no. 1(a) because the same is so against the great weight and overwhelming preponderance of the evidence as to be unjust. 613 S.W.2d at 63 . 1982Rule 274. 1 In our original consideration of the appeal, we overruled the bank’s eighth point of error by which it contended the trial court erred in not disregarding the jury’s answer to issue no. 1(a) because the same is so against the great weight and overwhelming preponderance of the evidence as to be unjust. 613 S.W.2d at 63 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Jones v. McCoy
green
1 sentence1980Jones v. McCoy, 466 S.W.2d 667 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1971, no writ). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.