Utah rule in Utah

2015See Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 , 118 S.Ct. 1952 , 141 LEd.2d 215 (1998) (holding that a prison ran afoul of ADA by failing to provide a disabled prisoner access to a boot camp program that could have led to his early release; explaining that "[flhe text of the ADA provides no basis for distinguishing" this program from other "programs, services, and activities" covered by the ADA). .

2015See Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 , 118 S.Ct. 1952 , 141 LEd.2d 215 (1998) (holding that a prison ran afoul of ADA by failing to provide a disabled prisoner access to a boot camp program that could have led to his early release; explaining that "[flhe text of the ADA provides no basis for distinguishing" this program from other "programs, services, and activities" covered by the ADA). .

2018In support of this assertion, she cites Spencer v. Utah State Bar , 2012 UT 92 , 293 P.3d 360 , in which the Utah Supreme Court enforced the Utah State Bar's requirement that an out-of-state applicant to the Utah Bar have practiced for three out of the preceding five years in order to be admitted without taking the Utah bar examination.

2018In support of this assertion, she cites Spencer v. Utah State Bar , 2012 UT 92 , 293 P.3d 360 , in which the Utah Supreme Court enforced the Utah State Bar's requirement that an out-of-state applicant to the Utah Bar have practiced for three out of the preceding five years in order to be admitted without taking the Utah bar examination.

2022Id. ¶ 45 (cleaned up); see also State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶¶ 1, 16 , 18 P.3d 1123 (identifying self-defense as an affirmative defense); State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15 , 233 P.3d 476 (“The Utah rule requires that the prosecution disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has produced some evidence of the defense.” (cleaned up)). ¶15 Cabututan contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome his assertion of perfect self-defense and that, accordingly, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdi

2022Id. ¶ 45 (cleaned up); see also State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ¶¶ 1, 16 , 18 P.3d 1123 (identifying self-defense as an affirmative defense); State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 15 , 233 P.3d 476 (“The Utah rule requires that the prosecution disprove the existence of affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has produced some evidence of the defense.” (cleaned up)). ¶15 Cabututan contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to overcome his assertion of perfect self-defense and that, accordingly, the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdi

1997As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995), "Utah's privilege against self-incrimination does not exceed that of the federal constitution." Id. at 371 ; accord American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1985) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that "the framers intended the privilege [against self-incrimination] to have the same scope that it had under similar constitutional provisions, which was the scope it had at common law.").

1997As the Utah Supreme Court stated in State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995), “Utah’s privilege against self-incrimination does not exceed that of the federal constitution.” Id. at 371 ; accord American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Utah 1985) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that “the framers intended the privilege [against self-incrimination] to have the same scope that it had under similar constitutional provisions, which was the scope it had at common law.”).

2026Rental & Sales, Inc., 53 F.3d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up) (applying rule 25(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is substantively similar to Utah’s rule).

2020Rental & Sales, Inc., 53 F.3d 186, 191 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(c), which is substantively similar to Utah’s rule 25). ¶44 Rule 25’s requirements promote order and help avoid confusion by requiring the court to direct that the transferee of a real party in interest’s right be substituted into the action.

2022See State v. Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62, ¶ 22 , 273 P.3d 417 (noting that “Utah’s rule 702 differs from its current federal counterpart by requiring ‘only a “threshold” showing’” (quoting Utah R.

2022See State v. Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62, ¶ 22 , 273 P.3d 417 (noting that “Utah’s rule 702 differs from its current federal counterpart by requiring ‘only a “threshold” showing’” (quoting Utah R.

2017Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 , 149 n.3, 104 S.Ct. 1723 , 80 L.Ed.2d 196 (1984) (“The rationale of [Federal] Rule 15(c) is that a party who has been notified of litigation concerning a particular occurrence has been given all the notice that statutes of limitations were intended to provide.”). ¶ 19 The then-applicable version of Utah’s rule 15(e) did not expressly contemplate the substitution of parties. 5 In interpreting that version' of the rule, we noted that “[r]ule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds new parties *318 for those brought before the court by t

2004P. 15(c); see also, Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). 1838 In Doxzey-Layton, the first Utah case interpreting Utah's rule 15(c), the Utah Supreme Court held that an amendment substituting heirs for a husband and wife who had recently died, where the heirs had been informally involved in the litigation from the start, related back to the original pleading, and thus the statute of limitations did not bar the claim.

2009See Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 991-92 (Utah 1998) (discussing strict compliance and concluding "a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a defendant's rights under either the Utah or the United States Constitution"). 2 "[The substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their decision to plead guilty.

2004However, in post-conviction relief cases, “a failure to comply with Utah’s rule 11 in taking a guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a defendant’s rights under either the Utah or the United States Constitution.” Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993).

1999See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 , 947 n. 5 (Utah 1996); see also Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983) (stating identity in language in Utah and federal statutes presumes identity of construction so Utah courts look to federal case law for guidance).

1999See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 , 947 n. 5 (Utah 1996); see also Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983) (stating identity in language in Utah and federal statutes presumes identity of construction so Utah courts look to federal case law for guidance).

1999See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 , 947 n. 5 (Utah 1996); see also Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983) (stating identity in language in Utah and federal statutes presumes identity of construction so Utah courts look to federal case law for guidance).

1999See Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941 , 947 n. 5 (Utah 1996); see also Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n Management Comm. v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah 1983) (stating identity in language in Utah and federal statutes presumes identity of construction so Utah courts look to federal case law for guidance).

1997Similarly, in construing other procedural rules, Utah courts have recognized that when the Utah rule “is essentially similar” to the federal rule of procedure, “in addition to applicable Utah cases, we look to the abundant federal experience in the area for guidance.” Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990); see also Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (recognizing when a federal and state rule of procedure “are substantively identical, *we freely refer to authorities which have interpreted the federal rule’ ” (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. American

1997Similarly, in construing other procedural rules, Utah courts have recognized that when the Utah rule “is essentially similar” to the federal rule of procedure, “in addition to applicable Utah cases, we look to the abundant federal experience in the area for guidance.” Landes v. Capital City Bank, 795 P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990); see also Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (recognizing when a federal and state rule of procedure “are substantively identical, *we freely refer to authorities which have interpreted the federal rule’ ” (quoting Gold Standard, Inc. v. American

1993See infra note 11. *1042 PREJUDGMENT INTEREST Associates appeals the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest and cites the longstanding Utah rule that prejudgment interest is awarded "where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures." Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 , 97 S.Ct. 2634 , 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977).

1993See infra note 11. *1042 PREJUDGMENT INTEREST Associates appeals the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest and cites the longstanding Utah rule that prejudgment interest is awarded "where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures." Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 , 97 S.Ct. 2634 , 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977).

2018LLC , 2017 UT App 55 , ¶ 4, 397 P.3d 724 ("Courts are, in short, bound by the text of the rule."); State v. Quinonez-Gaiton , 2002 UT App 273 , ¶ 11, 54 P.3d 139 ("We interpret a rule by examining the rule's plain language ...." (cleaned up) ); State v. Parker , 936 P.2d 1118 , 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (declining to adopt a United States Supreme Court interpretation of a rule because the interpretation was "not consistent with the plain language" of the Utah rule).

2018LLC , 2017 UT App 55 , ¶ 4, 397 P.3d 724 ("Courts are, in short, bound by the text of the rule."); State v. Quinonez-Gaiton , 2002 UT App 273 , ¶ 11, 54 P.3d 139 ("We interpret a rule by examining the rule's plain language ...." (cleaned up) ); State v. Parker , 936 P.2d 1118 , 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (declining to adopt a United States Supreme Court interpretation of a rule because the interpretation was "not consistent with the plain language" of the Utah rule).

2014Pate, 692 P.2d at 767 ; see also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra § 2656 (explaining that federal rule 54(b) sets forth the same three “basic conditions on its applicabil- ity”). ¶26 The second rule 54(b) prerequisite—that the judgment be entered on an otherwise appealable order—is most relevant to our resolution of this case.

2014Pate, 692 P.2d at 767 ; see also WricHt, & Kank, suproe § 2656 (explaining that federal rule 54(b) sets forth the same three "basic conditions on its applicability"). {26 The second rule 54(b) prerequisite-that the judgment be entered on an otherwise appealable order-is most relevant to our resolution of. this case.

2007See Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 , 112 n. 1, 104 P.3d 1226 ("When, as here, there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah rule and the Utah and federal rules are identical, we 'freely resort to federal law as a useful guide." (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 , 741 n. 9 (Utah 1990))). $42 Federal courts interpreting rule 26(b)(4) are split on whether the rule allows for parties to recoup fees from opposing parties for time spent preparing for the opposition's depositions.

2007See Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 , 112 n. 1, 104 P.3d 1226 ("When, as here, there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah rule and the Utah and federal rules are identical, we 'freely resort to federal law as a useful guide." (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 , 741 n. 9 (Utah 1990))). $42 Federal courts interpreting rule 26(b)(4) are split on whether the rule allows for parties to recoup fees from opposing parties for time spent preparing for the opposition's depositions.

2007See Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 , 112 n. 1, 104 P.3d 1226 ("When, as here, there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah rule and the Utah and federal rules are identical, we 'freely resort to federal law as a useful guide." (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 , 741 n. 9 (Utah 1990))). $42 Federal courts interpreting rule 26(b)(4) are split on whether the rule allows for parties to recoup fees from opposing parties for time spent preparing for the opposition's depositions.

2007See Oakwood Vill., L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101 , 112 n. 1, 104 P.3d 1226 ("When, as here, there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah rule and the Utah and federal rules are identical, we 'freely resort to federal law as a useful guide." (quoting Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734 , 741 n. 9 (Utah 1990))). $42 Federal courts interpreting rule 26(b)(4) are split on whether the rule allows for parties to recoup fees from opposing parties for time spent preparing for the opposition's depositions.

1999State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979) (equating Utah’s standard of “legal necessity” with federal “manifest necessity” standard). 1 Most recently, this court held that [w]hen ordering a mistrial, the trial court . must support its ruling by showing that legal necessity required the mistrial in the interests of justice.

1983The Utah rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is impaneled and sworn, State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d at 358 ; Boyer v. Larson, 20 Utah 2d 121, 122 , 433 P.2d 1015, 1016 (1967); State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 559 , 74 P.2d 696, 697 (1937), is the same as the rule now binding on the states as a matter of federal constitutional law.

1993See infra note 11. *1042 PREJUDGMENT INTEREST Associates appeals the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest and cites the longstanding Utah rule that prejudgment interest is awarded "where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures." Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 , 97 S.Ct. 2634 , 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977).

1993See infra note 11. *1042 PREJUDGMENT INTEREST Associates appeals the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest and cites the longstanding Utah rule that prejudgment interest is awarded "where the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by facts and figures." Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 , 97 S.Ct. 2634 , 53 L.Ed.2d 245 (1977).

2026These same principles are reflected in rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which dictates that “[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” The purpose of this requirement “is to allow defendants the right to have a cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest in order for the judgment to preclude any action on the same demand by another.” Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 43 , 29 P.3d 638 (cleaned up); see also 6A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 1541 (3d ed. 2026 update) (stating that rule 17 of the Federal Rules of Civ

2026See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Luening, 985 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Wis. 2023) (per curiam); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Tatung, 258 A.3d 234 , 261 (Md. 2021).

2026See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Luening, 985 N.W.2d 773, 778 (Wis. 2023) (per curiam); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Tatung, 258 A.3d 234, 261 (Md. 2021).

2026If a party needs to be substituted for any reason other than death, the procedure prescribed in [the death of a party subsection] applies.”); see also Jenco, LC v. Valderra Land Holdings, LLC, 2025 UT 20, ¶ 26 , 572 P.3d 381 (explaining that “to the extent Utah’s rules and the federal rules are similarly worded, we at times turn to the federal rules and cases interpreting them for guidance,” but noting that “where Utah’s rule is materially different from the analogous federal rule, federal caselaw offers limited guidance” (cleaned up)). ¶31 We also note that, while the other subsections of app

2026If a party needs to be substituted for any reason other than death, the procedure prescribed in [the death of a party subsection] applies.”); see also Jenco, LC v. Valderra Land Holdings, LLC, 2025 UT 20, ¶ 26 , 572 P.3d 381 (explaining that “to the extent Utah’s rules and the federal rules are similarly worded, we at times turn to the federal rules and cases interpreting them for guidance,” but noting that “where Utah’s rule is materially different from the analogous federal rule, federal caselaw offers limited guidance” (cleaned up)). ¶31 We also note that, while the other subsections of app