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20 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gregg County Appraisal District v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc.green2 sentences1996See City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.1985) (upon finding that trial court lacked jurisdiction, appellate court can take no other action than to reverse the trial court judgment and dismiss the cause); Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Syst., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 12, 21-22 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1995, writ denied) (trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from appraisal review board also deprived it of jurisdiction to assess sanctions against county appraisal district for alleged discovery abuses); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 786 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.App.— San A 1996See City of Garland v. Louton , 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985) (upon finding that trial court lacked jurisdiction, appellate court can take no other action than to reverse the trial court judgment and dismiss the cause); Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Syst., Inc. , 907 S.W.2d 12, 21-22 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1995, writ denied) (trial court's lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from appraisal review board also deprived it of jurisdiction to assess sanctions against county appraisal district for alleged discovery abuses); see also Anderson v. Anderson , 786 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. App.-- | 2 | 2 |
City of Garland v. Loutongreen2 sentences1996See City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.1985) (upon finding that trial court lacked jurisdiction, appellate court can take no other action than to reverse the trial court judgment and dismiss the cause); Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Syst., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 12, 21-22 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1995, writ denied) (trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from appraisal review board also deprived it of jurisdiction to assess sanctions against county appraisal district for alleged discovery abuses); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 786 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.App.— San A 1996See City of Garland v. Louton , 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985) (upon finding that trial court lacked jurisdiction, appellate court can take no other action than to reverse the trial court judgment and dismiss the cause); Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Syst., Inc. , 907 S.W.2d 12, 21-22 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1995, writ denied) (trial court's lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from appraisal review board also deprived it of jurisdiction to assess sanctions against county appraisal district for alleged discovery abuses); see also Anderson v. Anderson , 786 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. App.-- | 2 | 2 |
Anderson v. Andersongreen2 sentences1996See City of Garland v. Louton, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.1985) (upon finding that trial court lacked jurisdiction, appellate court can take no other action than to reverse the trial court judgment and dismiss the cause); Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Syst., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 12, 21-22 (Tex.App. — Tyler 1995, writ denied) (trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from appraisal review board also deprived it of jurisdiction to assess sanctions against county appraisal district for alleged discovery abuses); see also Anderson v. Anderson, 786 S.W.2d 79, 81 (Tex.App.— San A 1996See City of Garland v. Louton , 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985) (upon finding that trial court lacked jurisdiction, appellate court can take no other action than to reverse the trial court judgment and dismiss the cause); Gregg County Appraisal Dist. v. Laidlaw Waste Syst., Inc. , 907 S.W.2d 12, 21-22 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1995, writ denied) (trial court's lack of jurisdiction to hear appeals from appraisal review board also deprived it of jurisdiction to assess sanctions against county appraisal district for alleged discovery abuses); see also Anderson v. Anderson , 786 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. App.-- | 2 | 2 |
Hunter v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Prosecutor’s Comment Regarding Parole Eligibility In his fifth point of error, the appellant claims that the prosecutor reversibly erred to suggest to the jury, during his examination of a State’s witness, that the law might change at some future date to provide that a capital defendant, sentenced to life without parole, 31 Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664, 672 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Curry v. Stategreen1 sentence2010Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Jaffrion v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Jefferson v. State, 501 S.W.2d 322, 326 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Virginiared1 sentence2003Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Clewis v. State , 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Clewis v. Statered1 sentence2003Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Clewis v. State , 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Bell v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Divisiongreen1 sentence1999See id. | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of G. M.green1 sentence1993In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); Neal v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (function of standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence society thinks it should have in correctness of factual conclusions). | 1 | 1 |
Neal v. Texas Department of Human Servicesgreen1 sentence1993In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); Neal v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (function of standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence society thinks it should have in correctness of factual conclusions). | 1 | 1 |
Addington v. Texasgreen2 sentences1993In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); Neal v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (function of standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence society thinks it should have in correctness of factual conclusions). 1993In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex.1980); Neal v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 814 S.W.2d 216, 222 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied); see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 , 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979) (function of standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence society thinks it should have in correctness of factual conclusions). | 1 | 1 |
Pitts v. Stategreen1 sentence1987Appellant concedes that Pitts v. State, 569 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), resolves this issue against her, but seeks to preserve it for further appellate review. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission
green
2 sentences2015Page 17 881 S.W.2d 387 (Cite as: 881 S.W.2d 387 ) [8] We sustain the seventh point of error complaining though it had received any tax benefits a consolidated of the Commission's use of the hypothetical tax method. return would provide. 2015Page 17 881 S.W.2d 387 (Cite as: 881 S.W.2d 387 ) [8] We sustain the seventh point of error complaining though it had received any tax benefits a consolidated of the Commission's use of the hypothetical tax method. return would provide. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Dowthitt v. State
green
1 sentence1996Ante, 931 S.W.2d at 261 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Penry v. Lynaugh
red
2 sentences1995Punishment In the seventh point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to give a requested mitigation issue pursuant to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). 1995Punishment In the seventh point of error, appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to give a requested mitigation issue pursuant to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 , 109 S.Ct. 2934 , 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences1994VOIR DIRE In the seventh point of error, appellant contends that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and article 35.261 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. 1994VOIR DIRE In the seventh point of error, appellant contends that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and article 35.261 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Geesa v. State
red
1 sentence1994NOTES [1] Appellant's trial occurred prior to our decision in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Tatum v. State
green
1 sentence1993Tatum v. State, 798 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1992Arnold, 725 S.W.2d at 167 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
United States v. Eddie Hodge and Nathaniel Robertson
green
1 sentence1988However, several courts in other jurisdictions have refused to follow the holding in Simpson , while other courts have followed it. 7 Forsythe further contends in his brief that “an exception to [the] Federal Wiretap Statute is the consent to such recording by one party to the conversation.” 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d); U.S. v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1091 , 97 S.Ct. 1100 , 51 L.Ed.2d 536 (1977). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Doerfler v. Espensen Co.
green
1 sentence1988Doerfler v. Espensen Co., 659 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.App.— Corpus Christi 1985, no writ). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Robertson v. United States
green
2 sentences1988However, several courts in other jurisdictions have refused to follow the holding in Simpson , while other courts have followed it. 7 Forsythe further contends in his brief that “an exception to [the] Federal Wiretap Statute is the consent to such recording by one party to the conversation.” 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d); U.S. v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1091 , 97 S.Ct. 1100 , 51 L.Ed.2d 536 (1977). 1988However, several courts in other jurisdictions have refused to follow the holding in Simpson , while other courts have followed it. 7 Forsythe further contends in his brief that “an exception to [the] Federal Wiretap Statute is the consent to such recording by one party to the conversation.” 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d); U.S. v. Hodge, 539 F.2d 898 (6th Cir.1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1091 , 97 S.Ct. 1100 , 51 L.Ed.2d 536 (1977). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Riverside National Bank v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1982In his fifth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in awarding both treble damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and punitive damages, citing Riverside National Bank v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978) rev’d and rend’d in part on other grounds, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Riverside National Bank v. Lewis
green
1 sentence1982In his fifth point of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in awarding both treble damages under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act and punitive damages, citing Riverside National Bank v. Lewis, 572 S.W.2d 553 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1978) rev’d and rend’d in part on other grounds, 603 S.W.2d 169 (Tex.1980). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.