equally well settled rule in California

1969They should be so framed that the defeated party can specify intelligibly the particulars in which they are not supported by the evidence, where such point is made. ’ (24 Cal.Jur. 963-964.) [3] So ‘ [w]here there are contradictory findings about matters material to the merits of a case, and the determination of them ... is essential to the correctness of the judgment, the judgment cannot stand.’ (24 Cal.Jur. 965-967.) [4] Finally ‘ (t)he parties “are entitled to special findings upon the issues thus presented in order that they may point out the precise errors of the trial court upon motion fo

1969They should be so framed that the defeated party can specify intelligibly the particulars in which they are not supported by the evidence, where such point is made. ’ (24 Cal.Jur. 963-964.) [3] So ‘ [w]here there are contradictory findings about matters material to the merits of a case, and the determination of them ... is essential to the correctness of the judgment, the judgment cannot stand.’ (24 Cal.Jur. 965-967.) [4] Finally ‘ (t)he parties “are entitled to special findings upon the issues thus presented in order that they may point out the precise errors of the trial court upon motion fo

1969(See Branche v. Hetzel, supra, at p. 811 .) In Andrews v. Cunningham, 105 Cal.App.2d 525 , the court says at pages 528-529 [ 233 P.2d 563 ]: “ [1] It is elementary law, recently reiterated in Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 830 [ 151 P.2d 260 ] that: ‘Ever since the adoption of the codes, it has been the rule that findings are required on all material issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, unless they are waived, and if the court renders .judgment without making findings on all material issues, the ease must be reversed.’ [2] It is the equally well settled rule that ‘findings of fact

1969(See Branche v. Hetzel, supra, at p. 811 .) In Andrews v. Cunningham, 105 Cal.App.2d 525 , the court says at pages 528-529 [ 233 P.2d 563 ]: “ [1] It is elementary law, recently reiterated in Fairchild v. Raines, 24 Cal.2d 818, 830 [ 151 P.2d 260 ] that: ‘Ever since the adoption of the codes, it has been the rule that findings are required on all material issues raised by the pleadings and evidence, unless they are waived, and if the court renders .judgment without making findings on all material issues, the ease must be reversed.’ [2] It is the equally well settled rule that ‘findings of fact

1969They should be so framed that the defeated party can specify intelligibly the particulars in which they are not supported by the evidence, where such point is made. ’ (24 Cal.Jur. 963-964.) [3] So ‘ [w]here there are contradictory findings about matters material to the merits of a case, and the determination of them ... is essential to the correctness of the judgment, the judgment cannot stand.’ (24 Cal.Jur. 965-967.) [4] Finally ‘ (t)he parties “are entitled to special findings upon the issues thus presented in order that they may point out the precise errors of the trial court upon motion fo

1969They should be so framed that the defeated party can specify intelligibly the particulars in which they are not supported by the evidence, where such point is made. ’ (24 Cal.Jur. 963-964.) [3] So ‘ [w]here there are contradictory findings about matters material to the merits of a case, and the determination of them ... is essential to the correctness of the judgment, the judgment cannot stand.’ (24 Cal.Jur. 965-967.) [4] Finally ‘ (t)he parties “are entitled to special findings upon the issues thus presented in order that they may point out the precise errors of the trial court upon motion fo

1967The standard by which the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is tested is stated in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, at p. 522 [ 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 , 370 P.2d 342 ], as follows: “As a corollary to this recognized principle of the capacity of the police power to meet the reasonable current requirements of time and place and period in history is the equally well settled rule that the determination of the necessity and form of such regulations, as is true with all exercises of the police power, is primarily a legislative and not a judicial function, and is to

1967The standard by which the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is tested is stated in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, at p. 522 [ 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 , 370 P.2d 342 ], as follows: “As a corollary to this recognized principle of the capacity of the police power to meet the reasonable current requirements of time and place and period in history is the equally well settled rule that the determination of the necessity and form of such regulations, as is true with all exercises of the police power, is primarily a legislative and not a judicial function, and is to

1967The standard by which the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is tested is stated in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, at p. 522 [ 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 , 370 P.2d 342 ], as follows: “As a corollary to this recognized principle of the capacity of the police power to meet the reasonable current requirements of time and place and period in history is the equally well settled rule that the determination of the necessity and form of such regulations, as is true with all exercises of the police power, is primarily a legislative and not a judicial function, and is to

1967The standard by which the reasonableness of a zoning ordinance is tested is stated in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, at p. 522 [ 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 , 370 P.2d 342 ], as follows: “As a corollary to this recognized principle of the capacity of the police power to meet the reasonable current requirements of time and place and period in history is the equally well settled rule that the determination of the necessity and form of such regulations, as is true with all exercises of the police power, is primarily a legislative and not a judicial function, and is to

1984(E.g., Palo Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v. BBTC Company (1974) 11 Cal.3d 494, 502-503 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 521 P.2d 1097 ]; Dawson v. Goff (1954) 43 Cal.2d 310 , 315 et seq. [ 273 P.2d 1 ]; Warner Bros.

1984(E.g., Palo Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v. BBTC Company (1974) 11 Cal.3d 494, 502-503 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 705 , 521 P.2d 1097 ]; Dawson v. Goff (1954) 43 Cal.2d 310 , 315 et seq. [ 273 P.2d 1 ]; Warner Bros.

1984(Thomas v. Birch (1918) 178 Cal. 483, 489 [ 173 P. 1102 ]; Bellasi v. Shackelford (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 265, 267 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 925 ]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, § 122, p. 122.) However, there is an equally well-settled exception to the general rule for options for consideration.

1984(Thomas v. Birch (1918) 178 Cal. 483, 489 [ 173 P. 1102 ]; Bellasi v. Shackelford (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 265, 267 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 925 ]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, § 122, p. 122.) However, there is an equally well-settled exception to the general rule for options for consideration.

1984(Thomas v. Birch (1918) 178 Cal. 483, 489 [ 173 P. 1102 ]; Bellasi v. Shackelford (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 265, 267 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 925 ]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, § 122, p. 122.) However, there is an equally well-settled exception to the general rule for options for consideration.

1984(Thomas v. Birch (1918) 178 Cal. 483, 489 [ 173 P. 1102 ]; Bellasi v. Shackelford (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 265, 267 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 925 ]; 1 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1973) Contracts, § 122, p. 122.) However, there is an equally well-settled exception to the general rule for options for consideration.

1982(See Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 327 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 556 P.2d 729 ].) Yet, it is apparent that this word has a number of “ordinary” meanings, not only the one designated by LACTC; and among these are “extra” and “additional.” Under such circumstance an equally well settled rule would appear to be of greater assistance to our interpretive efforts.

1982(See Fields v. Eu (1976) 18 Cal.3d 322, 327 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 367 , 556 P.2d 729 ].) Yet, it is apparent that this word has a number of “ordinary” meanings, not only the one designated by LACTC; and among these are “extra” and “additional.” Under such circumstance an equally well settled rule would appear to be of greater assistance to our interpretive efforts.

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1980It is an equally well settled principle of the law of taxation that the tax must be determined in accordance with the law in effect when the right to the tax vested. ( Texas Co. v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 52 Cal.2d 55, 66 ; Estate of Skinker (1956) 47 Cal.2d 290, 296 [ 303 P.2d 745 , 62 A.L.R.2d 1137 ]; Estate of Potter (1922) 188 Cal. 55, 66 [ 204 P. 826 ]; Estate of Martin (1908) 153 Cal. 225, 229 [ 94 P. 1053 ]; Trippet v. State (1906) 149 Cal. 521, 528 [ 86 P. 1084 ]; Estate of Cooke (1976) 57 Cal. App.3d 595, 602-603 [ 129 Cal. Rptr. 354 ]; Doctors Hospital v. County of Santa Clara,

1966This exception is to the effect that if in the prior verified complaint there are allegations destructive of the cause of action, the defect cannot be remedied by simply omitting, in subsequently filed pleadings, without proper explanation, such allegations.” (Owens *321 v. Traverso, 125 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [ 271 P.2d 164 ]; Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 716 [ 128 P.2d 522 , 141 A.L.R. 1358 ].) In the only cause of action alleged against Rexford (third cause of action), plaintiff’s recovery is predicated specifically on the “agreement between plaintiff an

1966This exception is to the effect that if in the prior verified complaint there are allegations destructive of the cause of action, the defect cannot be remedied by simply omitting, in subsequently filed pleadings, without proper explanation, such allegations.” (Owens *321 v. Traverso, 125 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [ 271 P.2d 164 ]; Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 716 [ 128 P.2d 522 , 141 A.L.R. 1358 ].) In the only cause of action alleged against Rexford (third cause of action), plaintiff’s recovery is predicated specifically on the “agreement between plaintiff an

1966This exception is to the effect that if in the prior verified complaint there are allegations destructive of the cause of action, the defect cannot be remedied by simply omitting, in subsequently filed pleadings, without proper explanation, such allegations.” (Owens *321 v. Traverso, 125 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [ 271 P.2d 164 ]; Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 716 [ 128 P.2d 522 , 141 A.L.R. 1358 ].) In the only cause of action alleged against Rexford (third cause of action), plaintiff’s recovery is predicated specifically on the “agreement between plaintiff an

1966This exception is to the effect that if in the prior verified complaint there are allegations destructive of the cause of action, the defect cannot be remedied by simply omitting, in subsequently filed pleadings, without proper explanation, such allegations.” (Owens *321 v. Traverso, 125 Cal.App.2d 803, 808 [ 271 P.2d 164 ]; Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal.2d 713, 716 [ 128 P.2d 522 , 141 A.L.R. 1358 ].) In the only cause of action alleged against Rexford (third cause of action), plaintiff’s recovery is predicated specifically on the “agreement between plaintiff an

1962(See e.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ]; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 339 [ 175 P.2d 542 ]; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344 [ 115 P.2d 435 ]; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal.2d 87, 93-94 [ 33 P.2d 672 ].) It was in clear recognition of this principle of the division of functions between the legislative and judicial branches that the trial judge in effect concluded that although his own determination, if the questions presented had been his to decide, would have been to the contrary, since under th

1962(See e.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ]; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 339 [ 175 P.2d 542 ]; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344 [ 115 P.2d 435 ]; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal.2d 87, 93-94 [ 33 P.2d 672 ].) It was in clear recognition of this principle of the division of functions between the legislative and judicial branches that the trial judge in effect concluded that although his own determination, if the questions presented had been his to decide, would have been to the contrary, since under th

1962(See e.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ]; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 339 [ 175 P.2d 542 ]; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344 [ 115 P.2d 435 ]; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal.2d 87, 93-94 [ 33 P.2d 672 ].) It was in clear recognition of this principle of the division of functions between the legislative and judicial branches that the trial judge in effect concluded that although his own determination, if the questions presented had been his to decide, would have been to the contrary, since under th

1962(See e.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ]; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 339 [ 175 P.2d 542 ]; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344 [ 115 P.2d 435 ]; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal.2d 87, 93-94 [ 33 P.2d 672 ].) It was in clear recognition of this principle of the division of functions between the legislative and judicial branches that the trial judge in effect concluded that although his own determination, if the questions presented had been his to decide, would have been to the contrary, since under th

1962(See e.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.2d 453, 461 [ 202 P.2d 38 , 7 A.L.R.2d 990 ]; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.2d 332, 339 [ 175 P.2d 542 ]; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.2d 341, 344 [ 115 P.2d 435 ]; Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal.2d 87, 93-94 [ 33 P.2d 672 ].) It was in clear recognition of this principle of the division of functions between the legislative and judicial branches that the trial judge in effect concluded that although his own determination, if the questions presented had been his to decide, would have been to the contrary, since under th

1955This exception is to the effect that if in the prior verified complaint there are allegations destructive of the cause of action, the defect cannot be remedied by simply omitting, in subsequently filed pleadings, without proper explanation, such allegations.” (And see Lee v. Hensley, 103 Cal.App.2d 697, 709 [ 230 P.2d 159 ].) Since appellant has omitted from the third amended complaint all of the dates and many other important facts alleged in the prior complaint, the second amended complaint *524 may be referred to, to determine whether the statute of limitations has barred the causes of acti

1955This exception is to the effect that if in the prior verified complaint there are allegations destructive of the cause of action, the defect cannot be remedied by simply omitting, in subsequently filed pleadings, without proper explanation, such allegations.” (And see Lee v. Hensley, 103 Cal.App.2d 697, 709 [ 230 P.2d 159 ].) Since appellant has omitted from the third amended complaint all of the dates and many other important facts alleged in the prior complaint, the second amended complaint *524 may be referred to, to determine whether the statute of limitations has barred the causes of acti