felony preliminary hearing in California

2022I, § 14; § 739.) “A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is ‘sufficient cause’ to believe [the] defendant guilty of the charged offense. (§§ 871, 872, subd. (a).) ‘Sufficient cause’ means ‘ “reasonable and probable cause” ’ or ‘a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v. Abelino (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 563 , 573 (Abelino).) “ ‘Within the framework of [the magistrate’s] limited role, . . . the magistrate may weigh the e

2022I, § 14; § 739.) “A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is ‘sufficient cause’ to believe [the] defendant guilty of the charged offense. (§§ 871, 872, subd. (a).) ‘Sufficient cause’ means ‘ “reasonable and probable cause” ’ or ‘a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” (People v. Abelino (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 563 , 573 (Abelino).) “ ‘Within the framework of [the magistrate’s] limited role, . . . the magistrate may weigh the e

2021A. Standard of Review A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is “sufficient cause” to believe defendant guilty of the charged offense. (§§ 871, 872, subd. (a).) “Sufficient cause” means “ ‘reasonable and probable cause’ ” or “a state of facts as would 11 lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 ; People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 636 (Slaughter).) It is “a level of proof below that of proof beyond a

2021A. Standard of Review A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is “sufficient cause” to believe defendant guilty of the charged offense. (§§ 871, 872, subd. (a).) “Sufficient cause” means “ ‘reasonable and probable cause’ ” or “a state of facts as would 11 lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 ; People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 636 (Slaughter).) It is “a level of proof below that of proof beyond a

2021“A magistrate’s powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory.” (People v. Superior Court (Feinstein) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 .) “‘[O]nce a felony complaint has been filed and the defendant arraigned thereon, a magistrate’s options are limited by the Penal Code.” (Ibid.) The reduction from a felony to a misdemeanor “is permitted only because the Legislature specifically empowered 11 The magistrate and the trial judge were different as well: Judge John Adams heard the preliminary hearing, and Judge Gary Paer was the trial judge.

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2021(People v. Massey (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 204, 210 .) Our Supreme Court in Slaughter set forth the standard of review of the magistrate’s ruling.

2021(People v. Massey (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 204, 210 .) Our Supreme Court in Slaughter set forth the standard of review of the magistrate’s ruling.

2021(People v. Scott (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 411 , 415-416.) “A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is ‘sufficient cause’ to believe defendant guilty of the charged offense.” (People v. Abelino (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 563 , 573 (Abelino).) This is a level of proof below even preponderance of the evidence.

2019(People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718 .) “ ‘[E]very legitimate factual inference must be drawn to uphold the magistrate’s decision.’ ” [Citations.] If there is some evidence to support the magistrate’s order, the reviewing court will not inquire into its sufficiency.” (People v. Scott (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 411, 416 .) B.

2021A. Standard of Review A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is “sufficient cause” to believe defendant guilty of the charged offense. (§§ 871, 872, subd. (a).) “Sufficient cause” means “ ‘reasonable and probable cause’ ” or “a state of facts as would 11 lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 ; People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 636 (Slaughter).) It is “a level of proof below that of proof beyond a

2021A. Standard of Review A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is “sufficient cause” to believe defendant guilty of the charged offense. (§§ 871, 872, subd. (a).) “Sufficient cause” means “ ‘reasonable and probable cause’ ” or “a state of facts as would 11 lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” (People v. Uhlemann (1973) 9 Cal.3d 662, 667 ; People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 636 (Slaughter).) It is “a level of proof below that of proof beyond a

2025(People v. Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 318- 319.) A determination of probable cause by the trial court under the SVPA “ ‘entails a decision whether a reasonable person could entertain a strong suspicion that the offender is [a sexually violent predator].’ ” (Id. at p. 319, quoting Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 252 , italics omitted.) The SVPA standard of probable cause, and thus the Mentally Disordered Offenders Act’s standard of reasonable cause, are derived from the felony preliminary hearing context.

2025(Cooley v. Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 251 .) In that context, “ ‘ “ ‘[p]robable cause is shown if a man of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citations.] In making the determination of probable cause, the magistrates do not themselves decide whether the defendant is guilty. [Citations.] Rather, they simply decide whether a reasonable person could harbor a strong suspicion of the 26 defendant’s guilt.

2025(People v. Gregerson, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 318- 319.) A determination of probable cause by the trial court under the SVPA “ ‘entails a decision whether a reasonable person could entertain a strong suspicion that the offender is [a sexually violent predator].’ ” (Id. at p. 319, quoting Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 252 , italics omitted.) The SVPA standard of probable cause, and thus the Mentally Disordered Offenders Act’s standard of reasonable cause, are derived from the felony preliminary hearing context.

2019While magistrates are undoubtedly “creature[s] of statute” (People v. Shrier (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 400, 419 ; see §§ 807, 808), we reject the suggestion that magistral authority is limited to acts expressly conferred by statute or that must be construed as statutory.

2019(People v. Laiwa (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711, 718 .) “ ‘[E]very legitimate factual inference must be drawn to uphold the magistrate’s decision.’ ” [Citations.] If there is some evidence to support the magistrate’s order, the reviewing court will not inquire into its sufficiency.” (People v. Scott (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 411, 416 .) B.

2019DISCUSSION The People appeal only the trial court’s dismissal of count 1, sexual penetration by a foreign object by means of force or violence. 4 A. Standard of Review “A magistrate’s function at a felony preliminary hearing is to determine whether or not there is ‘sufficient cause’ to believe defendant guilty of the charged offense. [Citations.] The term ‘sufficient cause’ means ‘ “reasonable and probable cause” ’ or ‘a state of facts as would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.’ [Citations.]

2013(People v. Kowalski (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 174, 176-177 .) But, as noted by respondent, Penal Code section 859b, subdivision (a) requires that a defendant “personally” waive the right to a speedy preliminary hearing, or the “right to preliminary examination within the 10 court days,” not the right to a preliminary hearing itself.

2009Yet, even denial of that right is subject to harmless error review. ( Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1 , 10-11 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1999 ]; People v. Johnson (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 1 , 4-5 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 203 ].) Here, the 2008 Office of Administrative Law determination did not suggest the Department of Mental Health's protocol was deficient or unreliable as an instrument for assessing a person's status as a potential SVP.

2009Yet, even denial of that right is subject to harmless error review. ( Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1 , 10-11 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1999 ]; People v. Johnson (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 1 , 4-5 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 203 ].) Here, the 2008 Office of Administrative Law determination did not suggest the Department of Mental Health's protocol was deficient or unreliable as an instrument for assessing a person's status as a potential SVP.

2009Yet, even denial of that right is subject to harmless error review. ( Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1 , 10-11 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1999 ]; People v. Johnson (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 1 , 4-5 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 203 ].) Here, the 2008 Office of Administrative Law determination did not suggest the Department of Mental Health's protocol was deficient or unreliable as an instrument for assessing a person's status as a potential SVP.

2009Yet, even denial of that right is subject to harmless error review. ( Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1 , 10-11 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 387 , 90 S.Ct. 1999 ]; People v. Johnson (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 1 , 4-5 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 203 ].) Here, the 2008 Office of Administrative Law determination did not suggest the Department of Mental Health's protocol was deficient or unreliable as an instrument for assessing a person's status as a potential SVP.

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2003"A magistrate's powers at a felony preliminary hearing are purely statutory." ( People v. Superior Court (Feinstein ) (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323, 328 , 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 503 .) Section 1385 encompasses review of constitutional grounds in that the "amorphous concept" of "`in furtherance of justice' requires consideration of both the constitutional rights of the defendant ] and the interests of society represented by the People." ( People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 945 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 , italics added, original italics omitted.) In cases where magistrates dismissed complaints on

2000In U.S. v. Springer (9th Cir.1995) 51 F.3d 861 , the court held that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel carried over from a first trial, which ended in a mistrial, to a retrial of the same matter. ( Id. at pp. 864-865.) "The retrial was obviously a continuation of the criminal prosecution, and the waiver was obviously intended to stand absent an attempt to withdraw it.

1977The defendant further argues that since a felony preliminary hearing may serve as an equivalent to the probable cause hearing in a parole revocation proceeding (In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ]), it should be similarly equivalent to a probation revocation hearing.

1977The defendant further argues that since a felony preliminary hearing may serve as an equivalent to the probable cause hearing in a parole revocation proceeding (In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ]), it should be similarly equivalent to a probation revocation hearing.

1974Although we do not reach the issue whether representation by counsel is. constitutionally compelled at probation revocation proceedings of the type involved in the instant case, we are of the view, for the reasons which follow, that the efficient administration of justice requires that the defendant be assisted by retained or appointed counsel at all revocation proceedings other than at summary proceedings had while the probationer remains at liberty after absconding.” (People v. Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 461 .) 8 Since a standard condition in California both for parole and for probation