Jimenez rule (California) · Go Syfert
← California issues

Jimenez rule in California

19 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2025 5 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
Ramona R. v. Superior Courtgreen
cal · 1985 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
2 sentences

1986Evidence Code section 940 provides that “7b the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” (Italics added; see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) The crucial question, then, is whether the Jimenez rule is required by the state constitutional privilege so that the rule exists “under ... the Constitution of . . . the State of California.” (Evid.

1986Evidence Code section 940 provides that “7b the extent that such privilege exists under the Constitution of the United States or the State of California, a person has a privilege to refuse to disclose any matter that may tend to incriminate him.” (Italics added; see Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 808 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ].) The crucial question, then, is whether the Jimenez rule is required by the state constitutional privilege so that the rule exists “under ... the Constitution of . . . the State of California.” (Evid.

13
Everts v. Mattesongreen
calctapp · 1945 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025(See Smith v. Shasta Electric Co. (1961) 190 Cal.App.2d 729 , 736-737 [“Appellants assign as error the refusal of the trial court to allow in evidence the tax assessment sheets of the county assessor as affirmative evidence of value of the destroyed property. ‘The valuation placed on 10 Evidence Code section 813, subdivision (a), provides, “The value of property may be shown only by the opinions of any of the following: [¶] (1) Witnesses qualified to express such opinions. [¶] (2) The owner or the spouse of the owner of the property or property interest being valued. [¶] (3) An officer, regula

11
People v. Mathewsgreen
calctapp · 1980 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016DISCUSSION The People concede that the period of confinement for Jimenez’s PRCS violation is not a new sentence. (§ 669, subd. (a) [authority to run sentences concurrent or consecutive when a defendant is convicted of two or more crimes]; see People v. Mathews (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 704, 713 [defendant returned to prison on a parole violation is not serving a sentence for purposes of consecutive sentencing provisions].) DISPOSITION The portion of the judgment imposing a consecutive sentence is stricken.

11
Lego v. Twomeygreen
scotus · 1972 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1989–1989
11
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harborred
scotus · 1964 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1986–1986
11
People v. Durengreen
cal · 1973 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1979–1979
11
People v. Watsongreen
cal · 1956 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (36)

CaseCitedYears
People v. Romanowski green
cal · 2017
2 sentences

2020It concluded that between Gonzales and our earlier opinion in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski), its “ ‘hands ha[d] been somewhat tied.’ ” (Jimenez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286 .) What we held in Romanowski is that theft of access card information could be reduced to a misdemeanor under another provision of Proposition 47, codified at Penal Code section 490.2. ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 905–906.) Romanowski and Gonzales, the court said, mandated reduction of “ ‘conduct that has been described in Proposition 47 as a shoplifting type of offense.’ ” (Jimenez,

2020It concluded that between Gonzales and our earlier opinion in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski), its “ ‘hands ha[d] been somewhat tied.’ ” (Jimenez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286 .) What we held in Romanowski is that theft of access card information could be reduced to a misdemeanor under another provision of Proposition 47, codified at Penal Code section 490.2. ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 905–906.) Romanowski and Gonzales, the court said, mandated reduction of “ ‘conduct that has been described in Proposition 47 as a shoplifting type of offense.’ ” (Jimenez,

32018–2020
People v. Jimenez yellow
cal · 1978
2 sentences

1989The rule established in that case was purely procedural, not substantive, and we expressly acknowledged as much: “Although the defendant urges that the privilege against self-incrimination contained in article I, section 15 of the state Constitution requires application of the reasonable doubt standard in order to fully protect the important values embodied therein, we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question as we conclude for the reasons set forth below that the reasonable doubt standard is required as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [Citation.]” (Jimenez, s

1989The rule established in that case was purely procedural, not substantive, and we expressly acknowledged as much: “Although the defendant urges that the privilege against self-incrimination contained in article I, section 15 of the state Constitution requires application of the reasonable doubt standard in order to fully protect the important values embodied therein, we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question as we conclude for the reasons set forth below that the reasonable doubt standard is required as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [Citation.]” (Jimenez, s

31979–1989
People v. Weaver green
cal · 1985
2 sentences

1986(See People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 605-606.) We conclude the Jimenez rule, as the Coleman rule, is a "`statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege'" within the meaning of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the state Constitution. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 659 .) The rule is therefore expressly exempted from the effects of Proposition 8 by the proposition's own terms.

1986(See People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 605-606.) We conclude the Jimenez rule, as the Coleman rule, is a "`statutory rule of evidence relating to privilege'" within the meaning of article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the state Constitution. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 659 .) The rule is therefore expressly exempted from the effects of Proposition 8 by the proposition's own terms.

31986–1986
People v. Curiel green
cal · 2023
2 sentences

2025Jimenez is correct that an aider and abettor to an attempted murder must harbor a specific intent to kill. “ ‘[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea’—which here includes knowledge that the direct perpetrator intends to commit the crime . . . , ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 467 .) As attempted mu

2025Jimenez is correct that an aider and abettor to an attempted murder must harbor a specific intent to kill. “ ‘[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea’—which here includes knowledge that the direct perpetrator intends to commit the crime . . . , ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 467 .) As attempted mu

22025–2025
People v. Posey green
cal · 2004
2 sentences

2025Reviewing de novo Jimenez’s claim that the instructions incorrectly state the law (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ), we find no error.

2025Reviewing de novo Jimenez’s claim that the instructions incorrectly state the law (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 ), we find no error.

22025–2025
People v. Lam Thanh Nguyen green
cal · 2015
2 sentences

2025Jimenez is correct that an aider and abettor to an attempted murder must harbor a specific intent to kill. “ ‘[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea’—which here includes knowledge that the direct perpetrator intends to commit the crime . . . , ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 467 .) As attempted mu

2025Jimenez is correct that an aider and abettor to an attempted murder must harbor a specific intent to kill. “ ‘[P]roof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea’—which here includes knowledge that the direct perpetrator intends to commit the crime . . . , ‘and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 467 .) As attempted mu

22025–2025
People v. Gonzales green
cal · 2017
2 sentences

2018It stated that it had reviewed Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th 858 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285 , 392 P.3d 437 , and People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ), and concluded that under the reasoning and holding of those two cases, the "[c]ourt's hands have been somewhat tied." The court explained: "It appears indicated that when there's conduct that results in the theft, which was here theft of property when it was used to derive on two separate instances money less than $950, the Court is mandated to reduce those to misdemeanors.

2018It stated that it had reviewed Gonzales , supra , 2 Cal.5th 858 , 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 285 , 392 P.3d 437 , and People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 , 215 Cal.Rptr.3d 758 , 391 P.3d 633 ( Romanowski ), and concluded that under the reasoning and holding of those two cases, the "[c]ourt's hands have been somewhat tied." The court explained: "It appears indicated that when there's conduct that results in the theft, which was here theft of property when it was used to derive on two separate instances money less than $950, the Court is mandated to reduce those to misdemeanors.

22018–2018
People v. Jacobs green
calctapp · 1984
2 sentences

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

21986–1986
People v. Barrios green
calctapp · 1985
2 sentences

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

21986–1986
People v. Givans green
calctapp · 1985
2 sentences

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

21986–1986
People v. Navarez green
calctapp · 1985
2 sentences

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

21986–1986
People v. Clark green
calctapp · 1985
2 sentences

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

21986–1986
People v. Azure neutral
calctapp · 1986
2 sentences

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

21986–1986
People v. Marzett green
calctapp · 1985
2 sentences

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

1986(See, e.g., People v. Azure (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 591 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 158 ]; People v. Molina (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 429 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 894 ]; People v. Marzett (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 610 [220 Cal.Rptr.217]; People v. Clark (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 889 [ 217 Cal.Rptr. 819 ]; People v. Navarez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 936 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 519 ]; People v. Givans (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 793 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 762 ]; People v. Barrios (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 732 [ 212 Cal.Rptr. 644 ]; People v. Jacobs (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 740 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 849 ].) Others say Lego v. Twomey embodies the appropriate standard i

21986–1986
Miller v. Alabama green
scotus · 2012
1 sentence

2025He argued he is entitled to sentencing as a youthful offender under the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 , and Franklin, supra. In ruling on Jimenez’s motion, the trial court found he was entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051, and that he was entitled to make a record consistent with section 1203.01 and Franklin, supra, but the court ruled that the request for a hearing was premature.

12025–2025
People v. Franklin green
cal · 2016
2 sentences

2025He argued he is entitled to sentencing as a youthful offender under the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 , and Franklin, supra. In ruling on Jimenez’s motion, the trial court found he was entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051, and that he was entitled to make a record consistent with section 1203.01 and Franklin, supra, but the court ruled that the request for a hearing was premature.

2025He argued he is entitled to sentencing as a youthful offender under the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 , and Franklin, supra. In ruling on Jimenez’s motion, the trial court found he was entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051, and that he was entitled to make a record consistent with section 1203.01 and Franklin, supra, but the court ruled that the request for a hearing was premature.

12025–2025
Graham v. Florida green
scotus · 2010
1 sentence

2025He argued he is entitled to sentencing as a youthful offender under the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460 (Miller), Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48 , and Franklin, supra. In ruling on Jimenez’s motion, the trial court found he was entitled to a youthful offender parole hearing under section 3051, and that he was entitled to make a record consistent with section 1203.01 and Franklin, supra, but the court ruled that the request for a hearing was premature.

12025–2025
People v. Superior Court (Romero) green
cal · 1996
1 sentence

2021At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant Jimenez’s motion to strike the strike allegation (see People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 ) and, pursuant to the Three Strikes law, doubled the 16-month low term for the violation of section 29800 to 32 months.

12021–2021
People v. Nguyen green
cal · 2009
1 sentence

2021(See § 667, subd. (e)(1).) Defendant Jimenez contends that “using a juvenile adjudication procured without jury trial to increase punishment in a later proceeding violated [his] Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt” and that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the use of a prior juvenile adjudication to subsequently enhance an adult sentence.” 22 Defendant Jimenez acknowledges that in People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007 (Nguyen), the California Supreme Court held that juvenile adjudications may be used as strikes.

12021–2021
People v. Jimenez green
calctapp · 2018
2 sentences

2020It concluded that between Gonzales and our earlier opinion in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski), its “ ‘hands ha[d] been somewhat tied.’ ” (Jimenez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286 .) What we held in Romanowski is that theft of access card information could be reduced to a misdemeanor under another provision of Proposition 47, codified at Penal Code section 490.2. ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 905–906.) Romanowski and Gonzales, the court said, mandated reduction of “ ‘conduct that has been described in Proposition 47 as a shoplifting type of offense.’ ” (Jimenez,

2020It concluded that between Gonzales and our earlier opinion in People v. Romanowski (2017) 2 Cal.5th 903 (Romanowski), its “ ‘hands ha[d] been somewhat tied.’ ” (Jimenez, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 1286 .) What we held in Romanowski is that theft of access card information could be reduced to a misdemeanor under another provision of Proposition 47, codified at Penal Code section 490.2. ( Romanowski, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 905–906.) Romanowski and Gonzales, the court said, mandated reduction of “ ‘conduct that has been described in Proposition 47 as a shoplifting type of offense.’ ” (Jimenez,

12020–2020
Estelle v. McGuire green
scotus · 1991
1 sentence

2016(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 71–75; People v. Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905 ; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393 ; People v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1300 .) Defendant argues the failure to instruct with CALCRIM No. 302 allowed the jury “to evaluate three areas of conflicting evidence with prejudice and favoritism instead of reason”: the differing statements concerning Mr. Jimenez and Mr. Martinez heard just prior to the shooting; Mr. Jimenez’s claim alleging disclosing to authorities about prior physical al

12016–2016
People v. Alvarez green
calctapp · 2002
1 sentence

2016(Cf. People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403 [defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and battery with serious bodily injury as an aider and abettor of the direct attacker; held, trial court erred in finding defendant was statutorily ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivision (e)(2), because that statute applied only to person who personally used the deadly weapon]); People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422 [aider and abettor convicted of assault with a deadly weapon without being shooter].) We reject Jimenez's claim of instructional error, both on forfei

12016–2016
People v. Dickey green
cal · 2005
1 sentence

2016(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 71–75; People v. Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905 ; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393 ; People v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1300 .) Defendant argues the failure to instruct with CALCRIM No. 302 allowed the jury “to evaluate three areas of conflicting evidence with prejudice and favoritism instead of reason”: the differing statements concerning Mr. Jimenez and Mr. Martinez heard just prior to the shooting; Mr. Jimenez’s claim alleging disclosing to authorities about prior physical al

12016–2016
People v. Chagolla green
calctapp · 1983
1 sentence

2016(Cf. People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403 [defendant pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon and battery with serious bodily injury as an aider and abettor of the direct attacker; held, trial court erred in finding defendant was statutorily ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivision (e)(2), because that statute applied only to person who personally used the deadly weapon]); People v. Chagolla (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 422 [aider and abettor convicted of assault with a deadly weapon without being shooter].) We reject Jimenez's claim of instructional error, both on forfei

12016–2016
People v. Diaz green
cal · 2015
1 sentence

2016(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 71–75; People v. Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905 ; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393 ; People v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1300 .) Defendant argues the failure to instruct with CALCRIM No. 302 allowed the jury “to evaluate three areas of conflicting evidence with prejudice and favoritism instead of reason”: the differing statements concerning Mr. Jimenez and Mr. Martinez heard just prior to the shooting; Mr. Jimenez’s claim alleging disclosing to authorities about prior physical al

12016–2016
People v. Andrade green
calctapp · 2015
1 sentence

2016(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 71–75; People v. Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905 ; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393 ; People v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1300 .) Defendant argues the failure to instruct with CALCRIM No. 302 allowed the jury “to evaluate three areas of conflicting evidence with prejudice and favoritism instead of reason”: the differing statements concerning Mr. Jimenez and Mr. Martinez heard just prior to the shooting; Mr. Jimenez’s claim alleging disclosing to authorities about prior physical al

12016–2016
People v. Carpenter yellow
cal · 1997
1 sentence

2016(Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62 , 71–75; People v. Diaz, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1195 ; People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 905 ; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 393 ; People v. Andrade (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1300 .) Defendant argues the failure to instruct with CALCRIM No. 302 allowed the jury “to evaluate three areas of conflicting evidence with prejudice and favoritism instead of reason”: the differing statements concerning Mr. Jimenez and Mr. Martinez heard just prior to the shooting; Mr. Jimenez’s claim alleging disclosing to authorities about prior physical al

12016–2016
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. green
calctapp · 1969
12006–2006
Jimenez v. Superior Court green
cal · 2002
12006–2006
People v. Lance W. red
cal · 1985
11989–1989
People v. May green
cal · 1988
11989–1989
People v. Coleman green
cal · 1975
11986–1986
Quinn v. United States green
scotus · 1955
11986–1986
In Re WINSHIP green
scotus · 1970
11986–1986
People v. McClary red
cal · 1977
11978–1978
People v. Burton red
cal · 1971
11978–1978

Where else courts name it

CA 19 (1978–2025) TX 8 (1999–2016) FL 5 (1987–2018) OR 3 (2019–2022) MI 2 (2023–2023) DC 2 (1997–2003)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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