Knight rule in California

2007In the words of the Knight plurality: "[A] participant in an active sport breaches a legal duty of care to other participants ... only if the participant intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport." ( Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 320 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 , italics added.} The plurality further observed: "[W]e have no occasion to decide whether a comparable limited duty of care appropriately should be applied to other less active sports, such as archery or golf."

2007In the words of the Knight plurality: "[A] participant in an active sport breaches a legal duty of care to other participants ... only if the participant intentionally injures another player or engages in conduct that is so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport." ( Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 320 , 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 , italics added.} The plurality further observed: "[W]e have no occasion to decide whether a comparable limited duty of care appropriately should be applied to other less active sports, such as archery or golf."

2003The court said that "a number of the justices who have signed this majority opinion" in Cheong questioned the conclusion of four justices in Ford that if the elements of Evidence Code section 669 were satisfied, a "statute creates tort liability between coparticipants in an active sport despite the Knight doctrine of primary assumption of risk." ( Id. at p. 1071, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 , 946 P.2d 817 .) The court added that the point need not be resolved because the elements of Evidence Code section 669 had not been met-the plaintiff had "not demonstrated that he is one of the class of persons the

2003The court said that "a number of the justices who have signed this majority opinion" in Cheong questioned the conclusion of four justices in Ford that if the elements of Evidence Code section 669 were satisfied, a "statute creates tort liability between coparticipants in an active sport despite the Knight doctrine of primary assumption of risk." ( Id. at p. 1071, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 859 , 946 P.2d 817 .) The court added that the point need not be resolved because the elements of Evidence Code section 669 had not been met-the plaintiff had "not demonstrated that he is one of the class of persons the

2006(See Campbell, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 .) Huff does not raise a negligence per se argument, and thus we are not required to determine whether Evidence Code section 669 in conjunction with Vehicle Code section 38503 or the BLM safety rule establishes an independent standard of care that overrides the primary assumption of risk doctrine.

2006(See Campbell, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 .) Huff does not raise a negligence per se argument, and thus we are not required to determine whether Evidence Code section 669 in conjunction with Vehicle Code section 38503 or the BLM safety rule establishes an independent standard of care that overrides the primary assumption of risk doctrine.

2006Code, § 452.) [4] In Distefano , this court held the defendant's alleged violation of Vehicle Code sections 38305 (basic speed law provision applicable to ATV operation) and 38316 (reckless driving of ATV), read in conjunction with Evidence Code section 669, did not modify the Knight rule even if the elements of negligence per se were established. ( Distefano, supra, 85 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1272-1277, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 813 .) We explained that "fast and aggressive driving is inevitable in the sport of off-roading, and imposition on Forester of tort liability on the facts of the instant case would

2006Code, § 452.) [4] In Distefano , this court held the defendant's alleged violation of Vehicle Code sections 38305 (basic speed law provision applicable to ATV operation) and 38316 (reckless driving of ATV), read in conjunction with Evidence Code section 669, did not modify the Knight rule even if the elements of negligence per se were established. ( Distefano, supra, 85 Cal. App.4th at pp. 1272-1277, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 813 .) We explained that "fast and aggressive driving is inevitable in the sport of off-roading, and imposition on Forester of tort liability on the facts of the instant case would

2014(See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area[, supra,] 39 Cal.App.4th 8, 12 [defendant ski resort operator did not increase risk of injury by failing to pad ski lift towers; although the injury would have been less 5 severe if there had been pads ‘there was no evidence [the ski area] did or failed to do anything that caused [the plaintiff] to collide with the tower’].) [Plaintiff]’s focus on the fact that he was unaware of the pipe is misplaced.

2014(See Connelly v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area[, supra,] 39 Cal.App.4th 8, 12 [defendant ski resort operator did not increase risk of injury by failing to pad ski lift towers; although the injury would have been less 5 severe if there had been pads ‘there was no evidence [the ski area] did or failed to do anything that caused [the plaintiff] to collide with the tower’].) [Plaintiff]’s focus on the fact that he was unaware of the pipe is misplaced.

2001Distefano brought a negligence action against Forester, who moved for summary judgment on the ground the action was barred under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk considered in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ] (Knight) and Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 834 P.2d 724 , 34 A.L.R.5th 769 ] (Ford) (hereafter also referred to as the Knight primary assumption of the risk doctrine or the Knight rule). 1 The court granted the motion and entered judgment in Forester’s favor, and Distefano appealed.

2001Distefano brought a negligence action against Forester, who moved for summary judgment on the ground the action was barred under the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk considered in Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 , 834 P.2d 696 ] (Knight) and Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 30 , 834 P.2d 724 , 34 A.L.R.5th 769 ] (Ford) (hereafter also referred to as the Knight primary assumption of the risk doctrine or the Knight rule). 1 The court granted the motion and entered judgment in Forester’s favor, and Distefano appealed.

2025(Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 190, 200 [“the clear gravamen of [the complaint] is Knight’s objection to the third party content on the pages and Facebook’s editorial decisions to not remove them”]; Sikhs for Justice, supra, 144 F.Supp.3d at p. 1095 .) But Six4Three offers no basis for us to disregard the general language of section 230 and its broad interpretation by courts, and instead adopt some narrower rule that section 230 is inapplicable to claims by a developer challenging a publisher’s decision to block access to certain user content.

2023(See Medak v. Cox, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 74 [“Although there is no explicit statement to the effect, it is clear that the trial court was proceeding under the authority granted it under Code of Civil Procedure section 662.”].) As Rosanta argues, “Knight’s claim that the trial 8 Code of Civil Procedure section 662 provides in relevant part that in ruling on a motion for new trial “in a cause tried without a jury, the court may, on such terms as may be just, change or add to the statement of decision, modify the judgment, in whole or in part, vacate the judgment, in whole or in part, and gr

2023In ruling on Rosanta’s motion for a new trial, “the trial court was authorized to review its previous findings, conclusions and judgment and to vacate them and to make new findings, conclusions and judgment.” (Turner v. Citizens Nat’l Bank (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 193, 199 ; Warren Southwest, Inc. v. Wicks (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 152, 155 [trial court can reweigh evidence, make new findings, and reconsider prior legal rulings under Code of Civil Procedure section 662].) Inherent in the court’s order striking the easement is a finding that plaintiff did not meet its burden of establishing the existe

2014(See Idaho Maryland Mines Corp. v. Industrial Accident Commission (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 693, 695-696 .) Citing Plunkett v. Spaulding (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 114 (Plunkett) (overruled in Schreiber v. Estate of Kiser (1999) 22 Cal.4th 31, 40 (Schreiber)), Soto argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to submit a tardy designation and granting Knight’s motion in limine to exclude Soto’s experts.

2008(Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 319.) Stimson v. Carlson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1205 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 ] applied primary assumption of risk to sailing where the plaintiff was one of the crew operating the boat; the court noted that sailing involves swinging booms and physical participation of crew.

2008(Knight v. Jewett, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 319.) Stimson v. Carlson (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1205 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 ] applied primary assumption of risk to sailing where the plaintiff was one of the crew operating the boat; the court noted that sailing involves swinging booms and physical participation of crew.

2001(See Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1368-1372 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 813 ] [pointing out that Knight analysis is more complex than summarily concluding that “ ‘primary assumption of the risk’ applies only and always when (i.e., because) the defendant is a coparticipant in a sports activity”].) Thus, the question of whether Petrick owed Mastro a duty of care does not necessarily turn on *90 whether or not snowboarding and skiing are the same “sport” (a question which, though the author may have a strong personal opinion about, need not be decided here), but instead depends mor

2001(See Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1368-1372 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 813 ] [pointing out that Knight analysis is more complex than summarily concluding that “ ‘primary assumption of the risk’ applies only and always when (i.e., because) the defendant is a coparticipant in a sports activity”].) Thus, the question of whether Petrick owed Mastro a duty of care does not necessarily turn on *90 whether or not snowboarding and skiing are the same “sport” (a question which, though the author may have a strong personal opinion about, need not be decided here), but instead depends mor

2001The Supreme Court has stated that ‘. . . it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport.’ {[ Knight, supra,] 3 Cal.4th at pp. 315-316, italics added.) Thus, even though ‘defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself,’ they may not increase the likelihood of injury above that which is inherent. {Id. at p. 315.)” {Campbell v. Derylo (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 823 , 827 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 ] {Campbell).) In Fr

2001The Supreme Court has stated that ‘. . . it is well established that defendants generally do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the sport.’ {[ Knight, supra,] 3 Cal.4th at pp. 315-316, italics added.) Thus, even though ‘defendants generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a plaintiff against) risks inherent in the sport itself,’ they may not increase the likelihood of injury above that which is inherent. {Id. at p. 315.)” {Campbell v. Derylo (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 823 , 827 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 519 ] {Campbell).) In Fr

2001Rather, it merely ‘codifie[s]’ the rule that ‘a presumption of negligence arises from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm which the plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation of the statute.’ ” (Cheong, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1078 (cone, opn. of Chin, J.), original italics, quoting Vesely v. Sager, supra, Cal.3d at p. 164, and also citing Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 547.) He reasoned that Evidence Code section 669(a) thus states only a rule of evidence, not a rule of tor

2001This is made clear by the Knight court’s self-described “duty approach to the doctrine of assumption of risk.” (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 313 .) Under the duty approach, a defendant’s participation in a sport does not merely preclude liability as to other “coparticipants,” but rather his duty to others is determined by “the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity.” 2 (Knight, supra, at p. 313 , italics added; see also Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 541 [“We . . . keep in mind . . . the nature of th

2001This is made clear by the Knight court’s self-described “duty approach to the doctrine of assumption of risk.” (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 313 .) Under the duty approach, a defendant’s participation in a sport does not merely preclude liability as to other “coparticipants,” but rather his duty to others is determined by “the nature of the sport or activity in question and on the parties’ general relationship to the activity.” 2 (Knight, supra, at p. 313 , italics added; see also Neighbarger v. Irwin Industries, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 541 [“We . . . keep in mind . . . the nature of th