shield immunity in Florida

2010Moreover, as recently observed by Judge Shepherd, "[i]t makes little sense to afford a shield of immunity from suit ... and then fail to enforce it at the earliest moment when enforcement is appropriate." Brown v. McKinnon, 964 So.2d 173, 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (Shepherd, J., dissenting).

2010Moreover, as recently observed by Judge Shepherd, "[i]t makes little sense to afford a shield of immunity from suit . . . and then fail to enforce it at the earliest moment when enforcement is appropriate." Brown v. McKinnon, 964 So.2d 173, 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (Shepherd, J., dissenting).

2022It is well-settled under Florida law that homestead protections “cannot be employed as a shield and defense after fraudulently imposing on others.” Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127, 130 (Fla. 1925).

1985Olesky v. Nicholas, supra. But see , Jones v. Carpenter, 106 So. 127 (Fla. 1925), holding that the homestead exemption cannot be employed as a shield and defense after fraudulently imposing on others where the facts showed embezzled funds were used to make improvements to the embezzler's homestead property.

2016Recruiters Enters., 922 So.2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)); Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 968 So.2d 658, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding that when a judgment is void, “it is deemed never to have had legal force and effect”); Shields v. Flinn, 528 So.2d 967, 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (holding that, because Shields did not receive notice of the trial, the judgment was void, and thus, the trial court erred by denying Shield’s motion to vacate the dismissal, which was filed approximately two years after the entry of the judgment under rule 1.540(b)(4)); Falkner, 489 So.2d at 758

2016Recruiters Enters., 922 So.2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)); Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 968 So.2d 658, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding that when a judgment is void, “it is deemed never to have had legal force and effect”); Shields v. Flinn, 528 So.2d 967, 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (holding that, because Shields did not receive notice of the trial, the judgment was void, and thus, the trial court erred by denying Shield’s motion to vacate the dismissal, which was filed approximately two years after the entry of the judgment under rule 1.540(b)(4)); Falkner, 489 So.2d at 758

2016Recruiters Enters., 922 So.2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)); Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 968 So.2d 658, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding that when a judgment is void, “it is deemed never to have had legal force and effect”); Shields v. Flinn, 528 So.2d 967, 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (holding that, because Shields did not receive notice of the trial, the judgment was void, and thus, the trial court erred by denying Shield’s motion to vacate the dismissal, which was filed approximately two years after the entry of the judgment under rule 1.540(b)(4)); Falkner, 489 So.2d at 758

2016Recruiters Enters., 922 So.2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)); Sterling Factors Corp. v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 968 So.2d 658, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (finding that when a judgment is void, “it is deemed never to have had legal force and effect”); Shields v. Flinn, 528 So.2d 967, 968 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (holding that, because Shields did not receive notice of the trial, the judgment was void, and thus, the trial court erred by denying Shield’s motion to vacate the dismissal, which was filed approximately two years after the entry of the judgment under rule 1.540(b)(4)); Falkner, 489 So.2d at 758

2012See, e.g., Aguilera v. Inservices, Inc., 905 So.2d 84 (Fla.2005) (holding that while generally workers’ compensation legislation immunizes an insurance carrier for simple bad faith claims, the carrier is not cloaked with a shield of immunity if it engages in outrageous actions and conduct that constitute an intentional tortious act while processing the compensation claim). .

2008See Concha, 62 F.3d at 1505 (noting that ERISA was designed to protect employee pension rights but has stripped employees of most of the protection they enjoyed under state law); Miara, 379 F.Supp.2d at 29 (noting that ERISA has evolved into a shield of immunity against legitimate claims of the very people it was designed to protect).

2008See Concha, 62 F.3d at 1505 (noting that ERISA was designed to protect employee pension rights but has stripped employees of most of the protection they enjoyed under state law); Miara, 379 F.Supp.2d at 29 (noting that ERISA has evolved into a shield of immunity against legitimate claims of the very people it was designed to protect).

2006See Sykes, 619 So.2d at 469 .

1996See also Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir.1990); Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990).

1996See also Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir.1990); Von Stein v. Brescher, 904 F.2d 572, 578 (11th Cir.1990).

1993Co., 527 So.2d 279, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 534 So.2d 400 (Fla. 1988) ( Mann II ).

1988Cir.1971); see United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 575-577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 137 , 98 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987); see also United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C.

1988Cir.1971); see United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 575-577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 137 , 98 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987); see also United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C.

1988The doctrine of curative admissibility "rests upon the necessity of removing prejudice in the interest of fairness.... and [i]ntroduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence under the shield of this doctrine is permitted only to the extent necessary to remove any unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence." United States v. Winston, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240 (D.C.

1988Cir.1971); see United States v. Castro, 813 F.2d 571, 575-577 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 137 , 98 L.Ed.2d 94 (1987); see also United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C.