shield immunity in Connecticut

2019The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has evolved from this general principle, as it is well established that "[c]ourts will ... disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor," in the "exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote in

2019The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has evolved from this general principle, as it is well established that "[c]ourts will ... disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor," in the "exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote in

2012"Courts will, however, disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor." Id.

1995CT Page 13499 "Courts will . . . disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor." Saphir v. Neustadt, 177 Conn. 191 , 209 , 413 A.2d 843 (1979).

2019The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has evolved from this general principle, as it is well established that "[c]ourts will ... disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor," in the "exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote in

2019A court’s determination is clearly errone- ous only in cases in which the record contains no evi- dence to support it, or in cases in which there is evidence, but the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Environmental Protection v. State Five Industrial Park, Inc., 304 Conn. 128, 138 , 37 A.3d 724 (2012). ‘‘Courts will . . . disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the

2019The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has evolved from this general principle, as it is well established that "[c]ourts will ... disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor," in the "exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote in

2019The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has evolved from this general principle, as it is well established that "[c]ourts will ... disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor," in the "exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote in

2019That the legislature has, to this point, taken no action applicable to this case in response to this deeply established body of case law, **470 which exists in concert with our various business entity statutes, suggests to me that we do not overstep our institutional bounds by incrementally extending the doctrine, in its "reverse" form, only to those corporate entities that amount to mere shells in abuse of the privileges extended by our business entity statutes. 5 See *69 Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. , 327 Conn. 540 , 574, 175 A.3d 1 (2018) ( Robinson, J. , concurri

2019That the legislature has, to this point, taken no action applicable to this case in response to this deeply established body of case law, **470 which exists in concert with our various business entity statutes, suggests to me that we do not overstep our institutional bounds by incrementally extending the doctrine, in its "reverse" form, only to those corporate entities that amount to mere shells in abuse of the privileges extended by our business entity statutes. 5 See *69 Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. , 327 Conn. 540 , 574, 175 A.3d 1 (2018) ( Robinson, J. , concurri

2019The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has evolved from this general principle, as it is well established that "[c]ourts will ... disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor," in the "exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote in

2019The equitable doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has evolved from this general principle, as it is well established that "[c]ourts will ... disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity to pierce the shield of immunity afforded by the corporate structure in a situation in which the corporate entity has been so controlled and dominated that justice requires liability to be imposed on the real actor," in the "exceptional circumstances, for example, where the corporation is a mere shell, serving no legitimate purpose, and used primarily as an intermediary to perpetuate fraud or promote in

2021We have affirmed judgments disregarding the corporate entity and imposing individual stock- holder liability when a corporation is a mere instrumen- tality or agent of another corporation or individual own- ing all or most of its stock.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Atelier Constantin Popescu, LLC v. JC Corp., 134 Conn. App. 731, 759 , 49 A.3d 1003 (2012). ‘‘The concept of piercing the corporate veil is equitable in nature. . . .

2021We have affirmed judgments disregarding the corporate entity and imposing individual stock- holder liability when a corporation is a mere instrumen- tality or agent of another corporation or individual own- ing all or most of its stock.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Atelier Constantin Popescu, LLC v. JC Corp., 134 Conn. App. 731, 759 , 49 A.3d 1003 (2012). ‘‘The concept of piercing the corporate veil is equitable in nature. . . .

2003Additionally, the court has affirmed judgments disregarding the corporate entity and imposing individual stockholder liability when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or agent of another coiporation or individual owning all or most of its stock.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 73 Conn. App. 267, 283-84 , 812 A.2d 1 , cert. granted on other grounds, 262 Conn. 925 , 814 A.2d 378 (2002).

2003Additionally, the court has affirmed judgments disregarding the corporate entity and imposing individual stockholder liability when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or agent of another coiporation or individual owning all or most of its stock.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 73 Conn. App. 267, 283-84 , 812 A.2d 1 , cert. granted on other grounds, 262 Conn. 925 , 814 A.2d 378 (2002).

2003Additionally, the court has affirmed judgments disregarding the corporate entity and imposing individual stockholder liability when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or agent of another coiporation or individual owning all or most of its stock.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 73 Conn. App. 267, 283-84 , 812 A.2d 1 , cert. granted on other grounds, 262 Conn. 925 , 814 A.2d 378 (2002).

2003Additionally, the court has affirmed judgments disregarding the corporate entity and imposing individual stockholder liability when a corporation is a mere instrumentality or agent of another coiporation or individual owning all or most of its stock.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cahaly v. Benistar Property Exchange Trust Co., 73 Conn. App. 267, 283-84 , 812 A.2d 1 , cert. granted on other grounds, 262 Conn. 925 , 814 A.2d 378 (2002).

2001Saphir v. Neustadt , 177 Conn. 191 , 209 (1979); Falcone v. Night Watchman, Inc ., 11 Conn. App. 218 , 220 (1987).

1999The court overruled the magistrate's order because there was "no indication at all of a calculated plan to exploit the work product in a significant way for preparing the experts while planning to erect the shield of privilege against discovery." Id. , 617.

1999Such use of the work product doctrine as both a sword and a shield was the compelling basis for the district court's finding of waiver in Boring v. Keller , 97 F.R.D. 404 (D.

1998Desantis v. Piccadilly Land Corporation , 3 Conn. App. 310 , 314 .

1997Ed. 1963 Rev.) § 43; Ballantine, Corporations (Rev.Ed.) § 136; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 14; see Vogel v. New Milford, 161 Conn. 490 , 494 , 290 A.2d 231 (1971); Tishman Equipment CT Page 10422 Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23 , 28 , 202 A.2d 504 (1964); Humphrey v. Argraves, 145 Conn. 350 , 354 , 143 A.2d 432 (1958); Hoffman Wallpaper Co. v. Hartford, 114 Conn. 531 , 535 , 159 A. 346 (1932).

1997Ed. 1963 Rev.) § 43; Ballantine, Corporations (Rev.Ed.) § 136; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 14; see Vogel v. New Milford, 161 Conn. 490 , 494 , 290 A.2d 231 (1971); Tishman Equipment CT Page 10422 Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23 , 28 , 202 A.2d 504 (1964); Humphrey v. Argraves, 145 Conn. 350 , 354 , 143 A.2d 432 (1958); Hoffman Wallpaper Co. v. Hartford, 114 Conn. 531 , 535 , 159 A. 346 (1932).

1997Ed. 1963 Rev.) § 43; Ballantine, Corporations (Rev.Ed.) § 136; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 14; see Vogel v. New Milford, 161 Conn. 490 , 494 , 290 A.2d 231 (1971); Tishman Equipment CT Page 10422 Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23 , 28 , 202 A.2d 504 (1964); Humphrey v. Argraves, 145 Conn. 350 , 354 , 143 A.2d 432 (1958); Hoffman Wallpaper Co. v. Hartford, 114 Conn. 531 , 535 , 159 A. 346 (1932).

1997Ed. 1963 Rev.) § 43; Ballantine, Corporations (Rev.Ed.) § 136; 18 Am.Jur.2d, Corporations § 14; see Vogel v. New Milford, 161 Conn. 490 , 494 , 290 A.2d 231 (1971); Tishman Equipment CT Page 10422 Leasing, Inc. v. Levin, 152 Conn. 23 , 28 , 202 A.2d 504 (1964); Humphrey v. Argraves, 145 Conn. 350 , 354 , 143 A.2d 432 (1958); Hoffman Wallpaper Co. v. Hartford, 114 Conn. 531 , 535 , 159 A. 346 (1932).

1994Fowler v. Enfield, 138 Conn. 521 , 530 (1952) and Board of Education v. Ellington, 151 Conn. 1 , 6 (1963) are not of much help since those cases clearly involved activities having to do with the provision of education which when the board so acts makes it an agent of the state.

1994We conclude that a local school board acting to recover damages arising from the construction of the physical plant of a school building is not acting as a state agent and, therefore, would not be entitled to employ the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a shield from the defense of the statute of limitations." See also Cheshire v. McKenney, 182 Conn. 253 , 256 et seq. (1980), cf Little v. Booth, 10 Conn. LRptr 290 (1993).

1994Fowler v. Enfield, 138 Conn. 521 , 530 (1952) and Board of Education v. Ellington, 151 Conn. 1 , 6 (1963) are not of much help since those cases clearly involved activities having to do with the provision of education which when the board so acts makes it an agent of the state.

1986The trial court in this case, relying on New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 204 , 43 A.2d 155 (1945), held that Connecticut has extended immunity from a statute of limitations defense to municipalities when suing to vindicate “public or governmental rights as opposed to private or proprietary rights.” The court was correct.

1986The trial court in this case, relying on New Haven v. Torrington, 132 Conn. 194, 204 , 43 A.2d 155 (1945), held that Connecticut has extended immunity from a statute of limitations defense to municipalities when suing to vindicate “public or governmental rights as opposed to private or proprietary rights.” The court was correct.

1986The Supreme Court further articulated the appropriate test as follows. “[A] local board of education is bound by and may sue or be sued on contracts in the same manner as municipal corporations. 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. 1968 Rev.) § 49.60, p. 310; 1A Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law (1982) § 10.08; see Light v. Board of Education, 170 Conn. 35, 41 , 364 A.2d 229 (1975); Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 513, 520 , 356 A.2d 109 (1975); Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education, 162 Conn. 390, 416 , 294 A.2d 546 (1972).

1986The Supreme Court further articulated the appropriate test as follows. “[A] local board of education is bound by and may sue or be sued on contracts in the same manner as municipal corporations. 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. 1968 Rev.) § 49.60, p. 310; 1A Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law (1982) § 10.08; see Light v. Board of Education, 170 Conn. 35, 41 , 364 A.2d 229 (1975); Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 513, 520 , 356 A.2d 109 (1975); Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education, 162 Conn. 390, 416 , 294 A.2d 546 (1972).

1986The Supreme Court further articulated the appropriate test as follows. “[A] local board of education is bound by and may sue or be sued on contracts in the same manner as municipal corporations. 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. 1968 Rev.) § 49.60, p. 310; 1A Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law (1982) § 10.08; see Light v. Board of Education, 170 Conn. 35, 41 , 364 A.2d 229 (1975); Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 513, 520 , 356 A.2d 109 (1975); Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education, 162 Conn. 390, 416 , 294 A.2d 546 (1972).

1986The Supreme Court further articulated the appropriate test as follows. “[A] local board of education is bound by and may sue or be sued on contracts in the same manner as municipal corporations. 17 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. 1968 Rev.) § 49.60, p. 310; 1A Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law (1982) § 10.08; see Light v. Board of Education, 170 Conn. 35, 41 , 364 A.2d 229 (1975); Milford Education Assn. v. Board of Education, 167 Conn. 513, 520 , 356 A.2d 109 (1975); Waterbury Teachers Assn. v. Board of Education, 162 Conn. 390, 416 , 294 A.2d 546 (1972).