shield defense in Ohio

1944Peterson v Feyereisen, 203 Wis., 294 , 234 N. W., 496 , 73 ALR, 571 , and note.” §11321 GC, provides: “When cross-demands have existed between persons under such* circumstances that if one had brought an action against the other a counterclaim or set-off could have been set up, neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by assignment by the other, or by his death.

1944Peterson v Feyereisen, 203 Wis., 294 , 234 N. W., 496 , 73 ALR, 571 , and note.” §11321 GC, provides: “When cross-demands have existed between persons under such* circumstances that if one had brought an action against the other a counterclaim or set-off could have been set up, neither can be deprived of the benefit thereof by assignment by the other, or by his death.

2019Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 383-384 , (1998), citing United States v. Collis, 128 F.3d 313, 321 (6th Cir.1997); State v. Bissantz, 3 Ohio App.3d 108, 110 (12th Dist.1982), rev’d on other grounds, State v. Bissant, 30 Ohio -11- Case No. 3-18-16 St.3d 120 (1987), quoting State v. Mullins, 26 Ohio App.2d 13, 18 (4th Dist.1971) (“‘A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as a sword or weapon of offense to enable persons to carry out contemplated crimes against society.’”).

2008Such assignments of error, however, "are only for the limited purpose of preventing the reversal of the judgment under review." Chapman , at 327-328 , citing Loewenstine v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 185 ; see, also, Parton v. Weilnau (1959), 169 Ohio St. 145 , 146 , paragraph seven of the syllabus (construing and applying former R.C. 2505.22 ) (holding the same as Chapman); Holstein v. Ohio Valley Vulcanizing, Inc. , Belmont App. No. 06 BE 41, 2007-Ohio-3329 , at ¶ 35 . {¶ 50} Accordingly, while defendants may not use their cross-assignment of error as a sword, they may use i

2008Such assignments of error, however, "are only for the limited purpose of preventing the reversal of the judgment under review." Chapman , at 327-328 , citing Loewenstine v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 185 ; see, also, Parton v. Weilnau (1959), 169 Ohio St. 145 , 146 , paragraph seven of the syllabus (construing and applying former R.C. 2505.22 ) (holding the same as Chapman); Holstein v. Ohio Valley Vulcanizing, Inc. , Belmont App. No. 06 BE 41, 2007-Ohio-3329 , at ¶ 35 . {¶ 50} Accordingly, while defendants may not use their cross-assignment of error as a sword, they may use i

1998In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, appellant must show that Hedric's dual representation was "an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335 , 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

1998In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment, appellant must show that Hedric's dual representation was "an actual conflict of interest adversely affect[ing] his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980), 446 U.S. 335 , 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

1993Terex Corp. v. Grim Welding Co. (1989), 58 Ohio App.3d 80 , 568 N.E.2d 739 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

1993Terex Corp. v. Grim Welding Co. (1989), 58 Ohio App.3d 80 , 568 N.E.2d 739 , paragraph one of the syllabus.

1982See, generally, Annotation, 125 A.L.R. 508 ; see, also, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar (C.A. 5, 1975), 518 F.2d 972 (where the court stated that the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege was to promote the administration of justice); United States v. Hoffa (C.A. 6, 1965), 349 F.2d 20 , affirmed (1966), 385 U.S. 293 ; State v. Karcher (1951), 155 Ohio St. 253 [ 44 O.O. 258 ]; State v. Mullins (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 13 [ 55 O.O.2d 30 ] (wherein the court, at page 18, stated: “A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as

1982See, generally, Annotation, 125 A.L.R. 508 ; see, also, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar (C.A. 5, 1975), 518 F.2d 972 (where the court stated that the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege was to promote the administration of justice); United States v. Hoffa (C.A. 6, 1965), 349 F.2d 20 , affirmed (1966), 385 U.S. 293 ; State v. Karcher (1951), 155 Ohio St. 253 [ 44 O.O. 258 ]; State v. Mullins (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 13 [ 55 O.O.2d 30 ] (wherein the court, at page 18, stated: “A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as

1982See, generally, Annotation, 125 A.L.R. 508 ; see, also, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar (C.A. 5, 1975), 518 F.2d 972 (where the court stated that the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege was to promote the administration of justice); United States v. Hoffa (C.A. 6, 1965), 349 F.2d 20 , affirmed (1966), 385 U.S. 293 ; State v. Karcher (1951), 155 Ohio St. 253 [ 44 O.O. 258 ]; State v. Mullins (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 13 [ 55 O.O.2d 30 ] (wherein the court, at page 18, stated: “A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as

1982See, generally, Annotation, 125 A.L.R. 508 ; see, also, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar (C.A. 5, 1975), 518 F.2d 972 (where the court stated that the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege was to promote the administration of justice); United States v. Hoffa (C.A. 6, 1965), 349 F.2d 20 , affirmed (1966), 385 U.S. 293 ; State v. Karcher (1951), 155 Ohio St. 253 [ 44 O.O. 258 ]; State v. Mullins (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 13 [ 55 O.O.2d 30 ] (wherein the court, at page 18, stated: “A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as

1982See, generally, Annotation, 125 A.L.R. 508 ; see, also, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar (C.A. 5, 1975), 518 F.2d 972 (where the court stated that the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege was to promote the administration of justice); United States v. Hoffa (C.A. 6, 1965), 349 F.2d 20 , affirmed (1966), 385 U.S. 293 ; State v. Karcher (1951), 155 Ohio St. 253 [ 44 O.O. 258 ]; State v. Mullins (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 13 [ 55 O.O.2d 30 ] (wherein the court, at page 18, stated: “A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as

1982See, generally, Annotation, 125 A.L.R. 508 ; see, also, United States v. Gordon-Nikkar (C.A. 5, 1975), 518 F.2d 972 (where the court stated that the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege was to promote the administration of justice); United States v. Hoffa (C.A. 6, 1965), 349 F.2d 20 , affirmed (1966), 385 U.S. 293 ; State v. Karcher (1951), 155 Ohio St. 253 [ 44 O.O. 258 ]; State v. Mullins (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 13 [ 55 O.O.2d 30 ] (wherein the court, at page 18, stated: “A privileged communication may be a shield of defense as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as

1973John’s Hospital (1956), 165 Ohio St. 467 , wherein it was held: “A corporation not for profit, which has as its purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, liable for the torts of its servants.” The defense of governmental immunity was also available to municipal hospitals operated not as a proprietary but as a governmental function (Hyde v. Lakewood [1965], 2 Ohio St. 2d 155 ), until this court’s decision in Sears v. Cincinnati (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d 157 .

1973John’s Hospital (1956), 165 Ohio St. 467 , wherein it was held: “A corporation not for profit, which has as its purpose the maintenance and operation of a hospital, is, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, liable for the torts of its servants.” The defense of governmental immunity was also available to municipal hospitals operated not as a proprietary but as a governmental function (Hyde v. Lakewood [1965], 2 Ohio St. 2d 155 ), until this court’s decision in Sears v. Cincinnati (1972), 31 Ohio St. 2d 157 .

1944In Bronson v. Mau, 31 Abs 653 , Eagle Svgs. & Loan Co. v West, 71 Oh Ap 485, in the latter opinion this Court, possibly in obiter, went further, stating at page. 496 of the opinion: “Indeed, the weight of authority goes further and holds that the use of a cause of action as a shield or defense is not precluded, even though the statutory period has run against its use for-affirmative relief at the time of the filing of the action in which it used.