19 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Joiner v. Leegreen2 sentences2002See Dept. of Human Resources v. Phillips, 268 Ga. 316, 318 (1) ( 486 SE2d 851 ) (1997); Hightower v. Kendall Co., 225 Ga. App. 71, 72 (3) ( 483 SE2d 294 ) (1997). 2 Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga. App. 754, 756 (1) ( 399 SE2d 516 ) (1990). 3 While Bowling is now arguing a battery claim arising out of this conduct, she never asserted such a claim in her complaints or the pre-trial order, nor did she seek leave to amend the pre-trial order. 2002See Dept. of Human Resources v. Phillips, 268 Ga. 316, 318 (1) ( 486 SE2d 851 ) (1997); Hightower v. Kendall Co., 225 Ga. App. 71, 72 (3) ( 483 SE2d 294 ) (1997). 2 Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga. App. 754, 756 (1) ( 399 SE2d 516 ) (1990). 3 While Bowling is now arguing a battery claim arising out of this conduct, she never asserted such a claim in her complaints or the pre-trial order, nor did she seek leave to amend the pre-trial order. | 2 | 2 |
Lloyd v. Kramergreen2 sentences2024See id. (trial court erred in granting summary judgment where wife testified that she believed her husband’s signature on a release was a forgery); see also Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 375 (1) ( 503 SE2d 632 ) (1998) (“In light of the inconsistencies between the testimony of [the patient and doctor] regarding alleged misrepresentations relating to [the patient’s] consent, [the doctor] did not establish as a matter of law that he was entitled to judgment on the battery claim.”). 2024See id. (trial court erred in granting summary judgment where wife testified that she believed her husband’s signature on a release was a forgery); see also Lloyd v. Kramer, 233 Ga. App. 372, 375 (1) ( 503 SE2d 632 ) (1998) (“In light of the inconsistencies between the testimony of [the patient and doctor] regarding alleged misrepresentations relating to [the patient’s] consent, [the doctor] did not establish as a matter of law that he was entitled to judgment on the battery claim.”). | 1 | 1 |
Snipes v. Stategreen1 sentence2021See Snipes, 309 Ga. at 792 (3) (b). (e) Tyson contends that his trial counsel should have requested a mistrial and that the trial court should have granted it when the trial court improperly inquired about a battery instruction in the presence of the jury. 19 The transcript, however, does not reflect any inquiry on the part of the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Hamiltongreen2 sentences2021See Berry v. Hamilton, 246 Ga. App. 608, 610 ( 541 SE2d 428 ) (2000) (holding that mere conjecture is insufficient to defeat summary judgment)[.]” Cowart, supra at 636 (3) (d) (punctuation omitted). (c) Doe’s claims for attorney fees and punitive damages. 10 Doe reasons that his derivative claims for attorney fees and punitive damages should be reinstated to the extent his underlying claims discussed above survive summary judgment. 2021See Berry v. Hamilton, 246 Ga. App. 608, 610 ( 541 SE2d 428 ) (2000) (holding that mere conjecture is insufficient to defeat summary judgment)[.]” Cowart, supra at 636 (3) (d) (punctuation omitted). (c) Doe’s claims for attorney fees and punitive damages. 10 Doe reasons that his derivative claims for attorney fees and punitive damages should be reinstated to the extent his underlying claims discussed above survive summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Cowart v. Widenergreen1 sentence2021See Berry v. Hamilton, 246 Ga. App. 608, 610 ( 541 SE2d 428 ) (2000) (holding that mere conjecture is insufficient to defeat summary judgment)[.]” Cowart, supra at 636 (3) (d) (punctuation omitted). (c) Doe’s claims for attorney fees and punitive damages. 10 Doe reasons that his derivative claims for attorney fees and punitive damages should be reinstated to the extent his underlying claims discussed above survive summary judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Ferrell v. Mikulagreen2 sentences2020As we have explained, “[t]he only essential elements of the action being the detention and its unlawfulness, malice and the want of probable cause need not be shown.” Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 329 (2) ( 672 SE2d 7 ) (2008). 2020As we have explained, “[t]he only essential elements of the action being the detention and its unlawfulness, malice and the want of probable cause need not be shown.” Ferrell v. Mikula, 295 Ga. App. 326, 329 (2) ( 672 SE2d 7 ) (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Lawson v. Bloodsworthgreen2 sentences2020Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Walmart on the battery claim. 3 “A cause of action for battery will lie for any unlawful touching, that is, a touching of the plaintiff’s person, even if minimal, which is offensive.” (Citation omitted.) Lawson v. Bloodsworth, 313 Ga. App. 616, 618 ( 722 SE2d 358 ) (2012). 8 (b) False imprisonment “False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty.” OCGA § 51- 7-20. 2020Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Walmart on the battery claim. 3 “A cause of action for battery will lie for any unlawful touching, that is, a touching of the plaintiff’s person, even if minimal, which is offensive.” (Citation omitted.) Lawson v. Bloodsworth, 313 Ga. App. 616, 618 ( 722 SE2d 358 ) (2012). 8 (b) False imprisonment “False imprisonment is the unlawful detention of the person of another, for any length of time, whereby such person is deprived of his personal liberty.” OCGA § 51- 7-20. | 1 | 1 |
Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Clevelandgreen2 sentences2018Notably, the Court explained that "obtaining consent for medical treatment by an artifice that is directly related to the subject matter of the professional relationship-i.e.: diagnoses, treatments, procedures- may result in an unlawful touching that supports a battery claim." Id. at 301 , 528 S.E.2d 777 (3) (emphasis added). 2018Notably, the Court explained that "obtaining consent for medical treatment by an artifice that is directly related to the subject matter of the professional relationship-i.e.: diagnoses, treatments, procedures- may result in an unlawful touching that supports a battery claim." Id. at 301 , 528 S.E.2d 777 (3) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Belcher v. Folsomgreen2 sentences2016Where a trial court takes judicial notice of the record of the first-filed action in considering the propriety of a renewal action, “the record or portion thereof considered by the trial court should be designated to be included in the appeal if a party wishes to enumerate error on the ruling.” See Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108 ( 312 SE2d 107 ) (1984); Belcher v. Folsom, 258 Ga. App. 191, 192 ( 573 SE2d 447 ) (2002). 2016Where a trial court takes judicial notice of the record of the first-filed action in considering the propriety of a renewal action, “the record or portion thereof considered by the trial court should be designated to be included in the appeal if a party wishes to enumerate error on the ruling.” See Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108 ( 312 SE2d 107 ) (1984); Belcher v. Folsom, 258 Ga. App. 191, 192 ( 573 SE2d 447 ) (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Petkas v. Grizzardgreen2 sentences2016Where a trial court takes judicial notice of the record of the first-filed action in considering the propriety of a renewal action, “the record or portion thereof considered by the trial court should be designated to be included in the appeal if a party wishes to enumerate error on the ruling.” See Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108 ( 312 SE2d 107 ) (1984); Belcher v. Folsom, 258 Ga. App. 191, 192 ( 573 SE2d 447 ) (2002). 2016Where a trial court takes judicial notice of the record of the first-filed action in considering the propriety of a renewal action, “the record or portion thereof considered by the trial court should be designated to be included in the appeal if a party wishes to enumerate error on the ruling.” See Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108 ( 312 SE2d 107 ) (1984); Belcher v. Folsom, 258 Ga. App. 191, 192 ( 573 SE2d 447 ) (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Labovitz v. Hopkinsongreen2 sentences2016See Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108 ( 312 SE2d 107 ) (1984); Belcher v. Folsom, 258 Ga. App. 191, 192 ( 573 SE2d 447 ) (2002). 6 OCGA § 9-2-60 (c) provides: “When an action is dismissed under this Code section, if the plaintiff recommences the action within six months following the dismissal then the renewed action shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original action.” 7 We note that the trial court considered only the allegations of the 2014 Complaint in determining whether Carter should have filed an expert affidavit in support of her negligence claim. 8 However 2016See Petkas v. Grizzard, 252 Ga. 104, 108 ( 312 SE2d 107 ) (1984); Belcher v. Folsom, 258 Ga. App. 191, 192 ( 573 SE2d 447 ) (2002). 6 OCGA § 9-2-60 (c) provides: “When an action is dismissed under this Code section, if the plaintiff recommences the action within six months following the dismissal then the renewed action shall stand upon the same footing, as to limitation, with the original action.” 7 We note that the trial court considered only the allegations of the 2014 Complaint in determining whether Carter should have filed an expert affidavit in support of her negligence claim. 8 However | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Randolphgreen2 sentences2016See Kelley v. Randolph, 295 Ga. 721, 722 (1) ( 763 SE2d 858 ) (2014). 5 Moreover, we note that the trial court was entitled to take judicial notice of the record from the First Litigation in addressing the issue of whether the battery claim was part of that litigation, which was filed in the same court and heard before the same judge as the present case. 2016See Kelley v. Randolph, 295 Ga. 721, 722 (1) ( 763 SE2d 858 ) (2014). 5 Moreover, we note that the trial court was entitled to take judicial notice of the record from the First Litigation in addressing the issue of whether the battery claim was part of that litigation, which was filed in the same court and heard before the same judge as the present case. | 1 | 1 |
Paden v. Ruddgreen1 sentence2015Because the “purported failure to obtain . .. informed consent does not give rise to a claim of battery,” Paden, 294 Ga. App. at 605 (2), the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to the Defendants on Alicea’s battery claim based on the March 5 surgical procedure. | 1 | 1 |
Condon v. Vickerygreen2 sentences2007See Schulze v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. App. 305, 306 ( 496 SE2d 273 ) (1998). 3 The battery claim against Wild Adventures apparently relates to Hart’s effort to assist Bramble in handcuffing Mr. Touchton. 4 An earlier Supreme Court case suggests that this probable cause determination can be overcome if the plaintiff proves that the order denying the motion for directed verdict of acquittal“was procured by use of fraud or corruption.” Akins v. Warren, 258 Ga. 853, 854 (2) (375 *167 SE2d 605) (1989); see also Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 324 (1) ( 606 SE2d 336 ) (2004) (citing Akins). 2007See Schulze v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. App. 305, 306 ( 496 SE2d 273 ) (1998). 3 The battery claim against Wild Adventures apparently relates to Hart’s effort to assist Bramble in handcuffing Mr. Touchton. 4 An earlier Supreme Court case suggests that this probable cause determination can be overcome if the plaintiff proves that the order denying the motion for directed verdict of acquittal“was procured by use of fraud or corruption.” Akins v. Warren, 258 Ga. 853, 854 (2) (375 *167 SE2d 605) (1989); see also Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 324 (1) ( 606 SE2d 336 ) (2004) (citing Akins). | 1 | 1 |
Prince v. Espositogreen2 sentences2007See Prince v. Esposito, 278 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) (a) ( 628 SE2d 601 ) (2006) (“A patient who consents to a *304 medical touching . . . cannot sustain a battery claim.”) (footnote omitted). 2007See Prince v. Esposito, 278 Ga. App. 310, 311 (1) (a) ( 628 SE2d 601 ) (2006) (“A patient who consents to a *304 medical touching . . . cannot sustain a battery claim.”) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Schulze v. DeKalb Countygreen2 sentences2007See Schulze v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. App. 305, 306 ( 496 SE2d 273 ) (1998). 3 The battery claim against Wild Adventures apparently relates to Hart’s effort to assist Bramble in handcuffing Mr. Touchton. 4 An earlier Supreme Court case suggests that this probable cause determination can be overcome if the plaintiff proves that the order denying the motion for directed verdict of acquittal“was procured by use of fraud or corruption.” Akins v. Warren, 258 Ga. 853, 854 (2) (375 *167 SE2d 605) (1989); see also Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 324 (1) ( 606 SE2d 336 ) (2004) (citing Akins). 2007See Schulze v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. App. 305, 306 ( 496 SE2d 273 ) (1998). 3 The battery claim against Wild Adventures apparently relates to Hart’s effort to assist Bramble in handcuffing Mr. Touchton. 4 An earlier Supreme Court case suggests that this probable cause determination can be overcome if the plaintiff proves that the order denying the motion for directed verdict of acquittal“was procured by use of fraud or corruption.” Akins v. Warren, 258 Ga. 853, 854 (2) (375 *167 SE2d 605) (1989); see also Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 324 (1) ( 606 SE2d 336 ) (2004) (citing Akins). | 1 | 1 |
Akins v. Warrengreen1 sentence2007See Schulze v. DeKalb County, 230 Ga. App. 305, 306 ( 496 SE2d 273 ) (1998). 3 The battery claim against Wild Adventures apparently relates to Hart’s effort to assist Bramble in handcuffing Mr. Touchton. 4 An earlier Supreme Court case suggests that this probable cause determination can be overcome if the plaintiff proves that the order denying the motion for directed verdict of acquittal“was procured by use of fraud or corruption.” Akins v. Warren, 258 Ga. 853, 854 (2) (375 *167 SE2d 605) (1989); see also Condon v. Vickery, 270 Ga. App. 322, 324 (1) ( 606 SE2d 336 ) (2004) (citing Akins). | 1 | 1 |
Bowers v. Leegreen1 sentence2007This Court has made clear, however, that a plaintiff may not premise a claim for *303 medical battery on the assertion “[that] he . .. did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure” otherwise covered by a valid consent, because such a rule “would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim.” Bowers v. Lee, 259 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) (577 SE2d9) (2003), overruled on other grounds, Mateen v. Dicus, 281 Ga. 455 ( 637 SE2d 377 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Upson County Hospital, Inc. v. Headgreen2 sentences2007See also Upson County Hosp. v. Head, 246 Ga. App. 386, 389 (1) ( 540 SE2d 626 ) (2000) (An action for professional negligence exists when the plaintiffs claim addresses “the propriety of a professional decision rather than . . . the efficacy of conduct in the carrying out of a decision previously made. . . .”) (footnote omitted). 2007See also Upson County Hosp. v. Head, 246 Ga. App. 386, 389 (1) ( 540 SE2d 626 ) (2000) (An action for professional negligence exists when the plaintiffs claim addresses “the propriety of a professional decision rather than . . . the efficacy of conduct in the carrying out of a decision previously made. . . .”) (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Joe John Rodriguez v. City of Winter Parkgreen | 1 | 1 |
Blocker v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun 2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun | 1 | 1 |
| Arbee v. Collinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reese v. Clayton Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
Gilbert v. Richardsongreen2 sentences2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun 2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Cobbgreen | 1 | 1 |
Conley v. Dawsongreen2 sentences2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun 2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun | 1 | 1 |
| Georgia Department of Human Resources v. Possgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cameron v. Langgreen | 1 | 1 |
Poss v. Department of Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun 2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun 2005Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 The battery claim is ancillary to the false imprisonment claim because, under the allegations of the complaint, if the arrest was lawful no battery occurred. 2 Kraus v. Rodriguez, 262 Ga. App. XXV (2003). 3 Anderson v. Cobb, 258 Ga. App. 159, 160 (2) ( 573 SE2d 417 ) (2002). 4 Conley v. Dawson, 257 Ga. App. 665, 668 (2) ( 572 SE2d 34 ) (2002); compare Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (in a § 1983 action police officers who arrest the wrong person because his name is the same as that listed in a warrant are entitled to qualified immun | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Bonnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hightower v. Kendall Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Department of Human Resources v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Leadergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskinsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gowen v. Carpentergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gowen v. Cadygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences1999Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ; In the Interest of J.M., 237 Ga.App. 298 (1), 513 S.E.2d 742 . 1999Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 ; In the Interest of J.M., 237 Ga.App. 298 (1), 513 S.E.2d 742 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Gallant v. MacDowell
neutral
2 sentences2018(Emphasis in original.) Gallant , 295 Ga. at 332 n. 5, 759 S.E.2d 818 . 3 The trial court also found that MacDowell's claim for breach of contract was time-barred because based on the claim for medical malpractice and thus subject to the same two-year statute of limitations, and that the battery claim, with its two-year statute of limitations commencing "after the right of action accrues," also arose from Dr. Gallant's professional negligence and thus was also time-barred. 2018(Emphasis in original.) Gallant , 295 Ga. at 332 n. 5, 759 S.E.2d 818 . 3 The trial court also found that MacDowell's claim for breach of contract was time-barred because based on the claim for medical malpractice and thus subject to the same two-year statute of limitations, and that the battery claim, with its two-year statute of limitations commencing "after the right of action accrues," also arose from Dr. Gallant's professional negligence and thus was also time-barred. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Safi-Rafiq v. Balasubramaniam
green
2 sentences2016However, “[t]o be a good ‘renewal’ of an original suit, so as to suspend the running of the statute of limitations under OCGA § 9-2-61, the new petition must be substantially the same both as to the cause of action and as to the essential parties.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Safi-Rafiq v. Balasubramaniam, 298 Ga. App. 274 , *619 275 ( 679 SE2d 822 ) (2009). 2016However, “[t]o be a good ‘renewal’ of an original suit, so as to suspend the running of the statute of limitations under OCGA § 9-2-61, the new petition must be substantially the same both as to the cause of action and as to the essential parties.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Safi-Rafiq v. Balasubramaniam, 298 Ga. App. 274 , *619 275 ( 679 SE2d 822 ) (2009). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re LHR
green
2 sentences2008This Court held that a plaintiff may not "premise a claim for medical battery on the assertion that he did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure otherwise covered by a valid consent, because such a role would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim." (Punctuation omitted.) Id. (b) Withdrawal of life support was not rendered improper based on the employment status of the two physicians who participated with Dr. Jose in that decision. *891 Plaintiffs, also contend that the decision to withdraw Ella's life support amounted to an intentional tort 2008This Court held that a plaintiff may not "premise a claim for medical battery on the assertion that he did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure otherwise covered by a valid consent, because such a role would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim." (Punctuation omitted.) Id. (b) Withdrawal of life support was not rendered improper based on the employment status of the two physicians who participated with Dr. Jose in that decision. *891 Plaintiffs, also contend that the decision to withdraw Ella's life support amounted to an intentional tort | 1 | 2008–2008 |
In Re Jane Doe
green
2 sentences2008This Court held that a plaintiff may not "premise a claim for medical battery on the assertion that he did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure otherwise covered by a valid consent, because such a role would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim." (Punctuation omitted.) Id. (b) Withdrawal of life support was not rendered improper based on the employment status of the two physicians who participated with Dr. Jose in that decision. *891 Plaintiffs, also contend that the decision to withdraw Ella's life support amounted to an intentional tort 2008This Court held that a plaintiff may not "premise a claim for medical battery on the assertion that he did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure otherwise covered by a valid consent, because such a role would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim." (Punctuation omitted.) Id. (b) Withdrawal of life support was not rendered improper based on the employment status of the two physicians who participated with Dr. Jose in that decision. *891 Plaintiffs, also contend that the decision to withdraw Ella's life support amounted to an intentional tort | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Mateen v. Dicus
green
2 sentences2007This Court has made clear, however, that a plaintiff may not premise a claim for *303 medical battery on the assertion “[that] he . .. did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure” otherwise covered by a valid consent, because such a rule “would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim.” Bowers v. Lee, 259 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) (577 SE2d9) (2003), overruled on other grounds, Mateen v. Dicus, 281 Ga. 455 ( 637 SE2d 377 ) (2006). 2007This Court has made clear, however, that a plaintiff may not premise a claim for *303 medical battery on the assertion “[that] he . .. did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure” otherwise covered by a valid consent, because such a rule “would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim.” Bowers v. Lee, 259 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) (577 SE2d9) (2003), overruled on other grounds, Mateen v. Dicus, 281 Ga. 455 ( 637 SE2d 377 ) (2006). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| In Re JM green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.