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11 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1993–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Moure v. Raeuchlegreen2 sentences1995The supreme court has refused to hear appeals from superior court decisions that expressly question the battery analysis, and instead has confirmed the viability of this law of informed consent in its recent decision in Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394 , 404 n. 8, 604 A.2d 1003 , 1008 n. 8 (1992) (“tort founded upon lack of informed consent is an intentional tort, i.e., a battery, and issue of negligence is not germane”). 1995The supreme court has refused to hear appeals from superior court decisions that expressly question the battery analysis, and instead has confirmed the viability of this law of informed consent in its recent decision in Moure v. Raeuchle, 529 Pa. 394 , 404 n. 8, 604 A.2d 1003 , 1008 n. 8 (1992) (“tort founded upon lack of informed consent is an intentional tort, i.e., a battery, and issue of negligence is not germane”). | 2 | 2 |
Grabowski v. Quigleygreen2 sentences2006Additionally, “[o]ur scope of review is plenary with regard to questions of law[,]” but, “we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law and, instead, we may reach our own inferences and conclusions.” Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 61 In explaining its reasons for granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, the trial court stated: “Pennsylvania law is clear that in the absence of a battery claim, which [Vogelsber-ger] did not plead, a breach of contract action against a physician for failure to perform a service will not lie where the factual averments essentially sound in 2006Additionally, “[o]ur scope of review is plenary with regard to questions of law[,]” but, “we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law and, instead, we may reach our own inferences and conclusions.” Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 61 In explaining its reasons for granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, the trial court stated: “Pennsylvania law is clear that in the absence of a battery claim, which [Vogelsber-ger] did not plead, a breach of contract action against a physician for failure to perform a service will not lie where the factual averments essentially sound in | 1 | 4 |
Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgalgreen2 sentences2002Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 742 A.2d 1125, 1134 (Pa.Super.1999). 2001He argues that, based on our holding in Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 742 A.2d 1125 (Pa.Super.1999) appeal granted, 563 Pa. 689 , 760 A.2d 855 (2000), claims of lack of informed consent are now grounded in negligence, not battery. 3 The Beys argue, *241 and the trial court properly held, that as of this date, Pennsylvania adheres to a battery standard for informed consent cases. | 1 | 2 |
Taylor v. Albert Einstein Medical Centergreen2 sentences1999See Taylor, supra at 1036 ; Joiner, supra at 520 (summary judgment was improperly granted where inconsistencies existed in the testimony regarding permission granted by patient to operating physician). 1999The court ruled that "Pennsylvania law permits a patient to specifically limit his or her consent to an invasive procedure to a particular surgeon." Id. at 1034 . ¶ 12 The same was held to be true in the case of Grabowski v. Quigley, 454 Pa.Super. 27 , 684 A.2d 610 (1996), allo. granted, 548 Pa. 670 , 698 A.2d 594 (1997), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 553 Pa. 75 , 717 A.2d 1024 (1998). | 1 | 2 |
Davis v. Hoffmangreen1 sentence1999Kelly v. Methodist Hospital, 444 Pa. Super. 427, 432-34 , 664 A.2d 148, 150 (1995); Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 313 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services, Inc.green2 sentences1999For example, Thompson does not provide a basis for extending strict liability principles to hospitals, Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services Inc., 430 Pa. Super. 480, 484 , 635 A.2d 151, 153 (1993), nor does it expose a hospital to corporate liability for failing to formulate certain policies relating to informed consent since mere negligence cannot satisfy the mental state requirement for a battery claim. 1999For example, Thompson does not provide a basis for extending strict liability principles to hospitals, Cafazzo v. Central Medical Health Services Inc., 430 Pa. Super. 480, 484 , 635 A.2d 151, 153 (1993), nor does it expose a hospital to corporate liability for failing to formulate certain policies relating to informed consent since mere negligence cannot satisfy the mental state requirement for a battery claim. | 1 | 1 |
Newton v. Portergreen2 sentences1999See also Newton v. Porter, 206 Ga.App. 19 , 424 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1992) (no need for patient to file an expert’s affidavit when pursuing a battery claim). ¶ 13 Before us is a battery case grounded on the lack of consent to the procedure itself, not a negligence case grounded on the act of inadequately advising the patient of the risks of or alternatives to the procedure (an “informed consent” case). 1999See also Newton v. Porter, 206 Ga.App. 19 , 424 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1992) (no need for patient to file an expert’s affidavit when pursuing a battery claim). ¶ 13 Before us is a battery case grounded on the lack of consent to the procedure itself, not a negligence case grounded on the act of inadequately advising the patient of the risks of or alternatives to the procedure (an “informed consent” case). | 1 | 1 |
Guin v. Sisongreen2 sentences1999See also Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga.App. 754 , 399 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1990) (a cause of action for battery exists when objected-to treatment is performed without the permission of the patient); Guin v. Sison, 552 So.2d 60, 61 (La.App.1989) (finding the essence of medical battery is a procedure neither contemplated nor anticipated by the patient). 1999See also Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga.App. 754 , 399 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1990) (a cause of action for battery exists when objected-to treatment is performed without the permission of the patient); Guin v. Sison, 552 So.2d 60, 61 (La.App.1989) (finding the essence of medical battery is a procedure neither contemplated nor anticipated by the patient). | 1 | 1 |
Joiner v. Leegreen2 sentences1999See also Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga.App. 754 , 399 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1990) (a cause of action for battery exists when objected-to treatment is performed without the permission of the patient); Guin v. Sison, 552 So.2d 60, 61 (La.App.1989) (finding the essence of medical battery is a procedure neither contemplated nor anticipated by the patient). 1999See also Joiner v. Lee, 197 Ga.App. 754 , 399 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1990) (a cause of action for battery exists when objected-to treatment is performed without the permission of the patient); Guin v. Sison, 552 So.2d 60, 61 (La.App.1989) (finding the essence of medical battery is a procedure neither contemplated nor anticipated by the patient). | 1 | 1 |
Kelly v. Methodist Hospitalgreen2 sentences1999Kelly v. Methodist Hospital, 444 Pa. Super. 427, 432-34 , 664 A.2d 148, 150 (1995); Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 313 (E.D. 1999Kelly v. Methodist Hospital, 444 Pa. Super. 427, 432-34 , 664 A.2d 148, 150 (1995); Davis v. Hoffman, 972 F. Supp. 308, 313 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Hoffman v. Brandywine Hospitalgreen2 sentences1995See Hoffman v. Brandywine Hosp., 443 Pa.Super. 245 , 661 A.2d 397 (1995) (patient who contracted AIDS through blood transfusion did not have informed consent cause of action; transfusion occurred several hours after surgery, not during surgery, and therefore surgeon did not have duty to obtain informed consent). 1995See Hoffman v. Brandywine Hosp., 443 Pa.Super. 245 , 661 A.2d 397 (1995) (patient who contracted AIDS through blood transfusion did not have informed consent cause of action; transfusion occurred several hours after surgery, not during surgery, and therefore surgeon did not have duty to obtain informed consent). | 1 | 1 |
Dible v. Vagleygreen2 sentences1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). 1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal
green
1 sentence2025Id. at 749 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Grossman v. Barke
green
1 sentence2006Additionally, “[o]ur scope of review is plenary with regard to questions of law[,]” but, “we are not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law and, instead, we may reach our own inferences and conclusions.” Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 61 In explaining its reasons for granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim, the trial court stated: “Pennsylvania law is clear that in the absence of a battery claim, which [Vogelsber-ger] did not plead, a breach of contract action against a physician for failure to perform a service will not lie where the factual averments essentially sound in | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Levenson v. Souser
green
2 sentences2004However, the discovery rule does not normally apply to cases “where the underlying cause of action is fundamentally one for battery . . . [because] a plaintiff will ordinarily know all he or she needs to know concerning the injury and its cause at the moment the battery occurs.” E.J.M., 424 Pa. Super. at 459 , 622 A.2d at 1393 (citing Levenson, 384 Pa. Super. 132 , 557 A.2d 1081 ). 2004However, the discovery rule does not normally apply to cases “where the underlying cause of action is fundamentally one for battery . . . [because] a plaintiff will ordinarily know all he or she needs to know concerning the injury and its cause at the moment the battery occurs.” E.J.M., 424 Pa. Super. at 459 , 622 A.2d at 1393 (citing Levenson, 384 Pa. Super. 132 , 557 A.2d 1081 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
E.J.M. v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia
green
2 sentences2004However, the discovery rule does not normally apply to cases “where the underlying cause of action is fundamentally one for battery . . . [because] a plaintiff will ordinarily know all he or she needs to know concerning the injury and its cause at the moment the battery occurs.” E.J.M., 424 Pa. Super. at 459 , 622 A.2d at 1393 (citing Levenson, 384 Pa. Super. 132 , 557 A.2d 1081 ). 2004However, the discovery rule does not normally apply to cases “where the underlying cause of action is fundamentally one for battery . . . [because] a plaintiff will ordinarily know all he or she needs to know concerning the injury and its cause at the moment the battery occurs.” E.J.M., 424 Pa. Super. at 459 , 622 A.2d at 1393 (citing Levenson, 384 Pa. Super. 132 , 557 A.2d 1081 ). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Grabowski v. Quigley
green
1 sentence1999The court ruled that "Pennsylvania law permits a patient to specifically limit his or her consent to an invasive procedure to a particular surgeon." Id. at 1034 . ¶ 12 The same was held to be true in the case of Grabowski v. Quigley, 454 Pa.Super. 27 , 684 A.2d 610 (1996), allo. granted, 548 Pa. 670 , 698 A.2d 594 (1997), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 553 Pa. 75 , 717 A.2d 1024 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Chandler v. Cook
green
2 sentences1999Chandler v. Cook, 438 Pa. 447 , 265 A.2d 794 (1970). 1999Chandler v. Cook, 438 Pa. 447 , 265 A.2d 794 (1970). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gouse v. Cassel
green
2 sentences1999Gouse v. Cassel, 532 Pa. 197 , 615 A.2d 331 (1992). 1999Gouse v. Cassel, 532 Pa. 197 , 615 A.2d 331 (1992). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Maliszewski v. Rendon
green
2 sentences1999Cases such as Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 (1978) and Maliszewski v. Rendon, 374 Pa.Super. 109 , 542 A.2d 170 (1988), which consider only negligence-based malpractice claims, are not applicable. ¶ 14 The primary issue in the medical battery claim at trial was whether Dr. Sehgal’s implantation of an inflatable pump penile prosthesis into Montgomery’s body constituted an unpermitted, intentional contact. 1999Cases such as Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 (1978) and Maliszewski v. Rendon, 374 Pa.Super. 109 , 542 A.2d 170 (1988), which consider only negligence-based malpractice claims, are not applicable. ¶ 14 The primary issue in the medical battery claim at trial was whether Dr. Sehgal’s implantation of an inflatable pump penile prosthesis into Montgomery’s body constituted an unpermitted, intentional contact. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Hamil v. Bashline
green
2 sentences1999Cases such as Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 (1978) and Maliszewski v. Rendon, 374 Pa.Super. 109 , 542 A.2d 170 (1988), which consider only negligence-based malpractice claims, are not applicable. ¶ 14 The primary issue in the medical battery claim at trial was whether Dr. Sehgal’s implantation of an inflatable pump penile prosthesis into Montgomery’s body constituted an unpermitted, intentional contact. 1999Cases such as Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256 , 392 A.2d 1280 (1978) and Maliszewski v. Rendon, 374 Pa.Super. 109 , 542 A.2d 170 (1988), which consider only negligence-based malpractice claims, are not applicable. ¶ 14 The primary issue in the medical battery claim at trial was whether Dr. Sehgal’s implantation of an inflatable pump penile prosthesis into Montgomery’s body constituted an unpermitted, intentional contact. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Zimmerman v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1999The court ruled that "Pennsylvania law permits a patient to specifically limit his or her consent to an invasive procedure to a particular surgeon." Id. at 1034 . ¶ 12 The same was held to be true in the case of Grabowski v. Quigley, 454 Pa.Super. 27 , 684 A.2d 610 (1996), allo. granted, 548 Pa. 670 , 698 A.2d 594 (1997), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 553 Pa. 75 , 717 A.2d 1024 (1998). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Keech v. Mead Johnson and Co.
green
2 sentences1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). 1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Foflygen v. R. ZEMEL, MD (PC)
green
2 sentences1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). 1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Friter v. Iolab Corp.
green
2 sentences1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). 1995See also Dible v. Vagley, 417 Pa.Super. 302 , 612 A.2d 493 (1992), app. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (since radiation treatments did not involve surgery, physician not liable for failing to obtain informed consent prior to administering them); Foflygen v. Zemel, 420 Pa.Super. 18 , 615 A.2d 1345 (1992), alloc. den., 535 Pa. 619 , 629 A.2d 1380 (1993) (informed consent cause of action must be analyzed under battery theory); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 414 Pa.Super. 622 , 607 A.2d 1111 (1992) (same); Keech v. Mead Johnson & Co., 398 Pa.Super. 329 , 580 A.2d 1374 (1990) (same). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Boyer v. Smith
green
2 sentences1993Since there is no touching involved outside of the surgery milieu, there was no technical battery. 5 *23 Boyer v. Smith, 345 Pa.Super. 66 , 497 A.2d 646 (1985), solidified the position of this court on this matter. 1993Since there is no touching involved outside of the surgery milieu, there was no technical battery. 5 *23 Boyer v. Smith, 345 Pa.Super. 66 , 497 A.2d 646 (1985), solidified the position of this court on this matter. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.