Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gregory v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The court reasoned that the defendant’s position was that the unlawful entry only occurred due to his need to defend himself from an attack that began outside and continued unabated inside and so both charges were based on the same action. 5 Id.; see Gregory v. State, 937 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding failure to provide self-defense instruction to charge of burglary with a battery was error where testimony provided the victim first pushed the defendant, who ended up inside the victim’s apartment after a shoving match). 2008Id. at 182 . | 1 | 2 |
Spradley v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Bracey v. State, 985 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Lewis v. State, 740 So.2d 82, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Lyles v. State, 724 So.2d 138, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bradley v. State, 540 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Spradley v. State, 537 So.2d 1058,1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Lyles v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Bracey v. State, 985 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Lewis v. State, 740 So.2d 82, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Lyles v. State, 724 So.2d 138, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bradley v. State, 540 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Spradley v. State, 537 So.2d 1058,1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Burgal v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Bracey v. State, 985 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Lewis v. State, 740 So.2d 82, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Lyles v. State, 724 So.2d 138, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bradley v. State, 540 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Spradley v. State, 537 So.2d 1058,1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Bracey v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Bracey v. State, 985 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Lewis v. State, 740 So.2d 82, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Lyles v. State, 724 So.2d 138, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bradley v. State, 540 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Spradley v. State, 537 So.2d 1058,1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Bradley v. Stategreen1 sentence2009Bracey v. State, 985 So.2d 704, 705 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008); Lewis v. State, 740 So.2d 82, 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Lyles v. State, 724 So.2d 138, 138 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Bradley v. State, 540 So.2d 185, 187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Spradley v. State, 537 So.2d 1058,1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Martin v. Stategreen1 sentence1996A battery instruction is improper in a homicide case. "[W]here a homicide has taken place, the proper jury instructions are restricted to all degrees of murder, manslaughter, and justifiable and excusable homicide." Martin v. State, 342 So.2d 501, 503 (Fla.1977) ("Whether an aggravated assault occurred as part of a crime that culminated in the death of the victim is patently immaterial."). | 1 | 1 |
Hahn v. Hahngreen1 sentence1995See Hahn v. Hahn, 595 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Wife's claim for battery was viable in a dissolution proceeding); In re Jaquis, 131 B.R. 1004 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1991) (Spouse's claim for infliction of genital herpes allowed in a dissolution proceeding). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fabbiano v. Demings
green
2 sentences2022Here, Plaintiff argues that if the appellant in Fabbiano can change his legal theory of recovery from negligence to battery, then she can “certainly add a wrongful termination whistleblower claim when she already has a claim for wrongful termination based on disability.” However, in Fabbiano, the battery claim was “based upon the identical operative facts as the negligence claim” and therefore “arose from the same occurrence” such that plaintiff was permitted to change his legal theory of recovery from negligence to battery. 91 So. 3d at 893 . 2013Id. at 894 . | 2 | 2013–2022 |
Barnett v. State
green
2 sentences2019Accordingly, both conditions are met, and Appellant was entitled to a battery instruction as requested. 3 Barnett v. State, 45 So. 3d 963 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010), is factually similar to Stoffel; the defendant argued he was entitled to a jury instruction on battery as a lesser included offense of lewd or lascivious molestation when the victim was under twelve and was the defendant’s step-daughter. 2019The Third District recognized that battery can be a permissive lesser included offense to the charge, but found that the information “did not include any language stating that the touching was against the will of the victim.” Id. at 964 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Khianthalat v. State
green
2 sentences2019The defendant’s argument in Khianthalat was similar to Appellant’s argument in the present case: the lack of consent element of battery was present in the information because “lack of consent is presumed by law in a child of tender years.” Khianthalat II, 974 So. 2d at 361-63 . 2019As a result, Appellant was entitled to the battery instruction with respect to the lewd or lascivious molestation counts, and “[t]he trial court was without discretion to rule otherwise.” Wong, 212 So. 3d at 361 (citing Khianthalat II, 974 So. 2d at 361 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Khianthalat v. State
green
2 sentences2019There, the defendant argued, as Appellant argues here, “that because the victim is a minor she was not legally capable of consenting to sexual activity; thus, he was entitled to a battery instruction even though the information did not specifically allege and the evidence did not establish that he 4 touched the victim against her will.” Khianthalat I, 935 So. 2d at 584 . 2019The defendant asked the trial court to instruct the jury on battery as a lesser included offense, arguing that “because the victim was a minor she was not legally capable of consenting to sexual activity; thus, he was entitled to a battery instruction even though the information did not specifically allege and the evidence did not establish that he touched the victim against her will.” Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Francis Wong v. State of Florida
green
1 sentence2019As a result, Appellant was entitled to the battery instruction with respect to the lewd or lascivious molestation counts, and “[t]he trial court was without discretion to rule otherwise.” Wong, 212 So. 3d at 361 (citing Khianthalat II, 974 So. 2d at 361 ). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Wimberly
green
2 sentences1998The facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929 (Fla.1986) as they pertain to the failure to give the battery instruction. 1998The facts of this case are indistinguishable from those in State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929 (Fla.1986) as they pertain to the failure to give the battery instruction. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Dixon v. State
green
2 sentences1996Dixon v. State, 101 Fla. 840 , 132 So. 684 (1931); City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23 (Fla.3d DCA 1960); Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 415 (Fla.1959). 1996Dixon v. State, 101 Fla. 840 , 132 So. 684 (1931); City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23 (Fla.3d DCA 1960); Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 415 (Fla.1959). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hutchinson v. Lott
green
1 sentence1996Dixon v. State, 101 Fla. 840 , 132 So. 684 (1931); City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23 (Fla.3d DCA 1960); Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 415 (Fla.1959). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
City of Miami v. Albro
green
1 sentence1996Dixon v. State, 101 Fla. 840 , 132 So. 684 (1931); City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23 (Fla.3d DCA 1960); Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 415 (Fla.1959). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Serotkin v. Flavin
green
1 sentence1996Dixon v. State, 101 Fla. 840 , 132 So. 684 (1931); City of Miami v. Albro, 120 So.2d 23 (Fla.3d DCA 1960); Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 115 So.2d 415 (Fla.1959). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Harris v. Jaquis (In Re Jaquis)
green
1 sentence1995See Hahn v. Hahn, 595 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Wife's claim for battery was viable in a dissolution proceeding); In re Jaquis, 131 B.R. 1004 (Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla. 1991) (Spouse's claim for infliction of genital herpes allowed in a dissolution proceeding). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.