5 Virginia opinions name it 2 courts 2017–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Pike v. Eubankgreen2 sentences2023Thus, to properly plead a battery claim against a law enforcement officer, a plaintiff must allege “a wrongful act,” meaning that the law enforcement officer’s conduct lacked “justification or excuse.” Pike v. Eubank, 197 Va. 692, 700 (1956). 2023Thus, to properly plead a battery claim against a law enforcement officer, a plaintiff must allege “a wrongful act,” meaning that the law enforcement officer’s conduct lacked “justification or excuse.” Pike v. Eubank, 197 Va. 692, 700 (1956). | 2 | 2 |
Dabney v. Augusta Mut. Ins. Co.green2 sentences2017Co., 282 Va. 78, 86 , 710 S.E.2d 726, 731 (2011) (quoting Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 266 Va. 39, 43 , 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003)). intentional tort of battery as “a matter of prudence.” The plaintiff went on to explain that Dr. Allison’s March 7, 2014, deposition made clear that battery was a viable count, and that based on this factual development, the plaintiff was “adding a battery claim.” The plaintiff asserted that adding the battery claim would “allow[] for an additional instruction for the jury.” 3 The plaintiff has not assigned cross-error to Judge Devine’s dismissal with prejudice 2017Co., 282 Va. 78, 86 , 710 S.E.2d 726, 731 (2011) (quoting Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 266 Va. 39, 43 , 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003)). intentional tort of battery as “a matter of prudence.” The plaintiff went on to explain that Dr. Allison’s March 7, 2014, deposition made clear that battery was a viable count, and that based on this factual development, the plaintiff was “adding a battery claim.” The plaintiff asserted that adding the battery claim would “allow[] for an additional instruction for the jury.” 3 The plaintiff has not assigned cross-error to Judge Devine’s dismissal with prejudice | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. Bay House Associates, L.P.green2 sentences2017Co., 282 Va. 78, 86 , 710 S.E.2d 726, 731 (2011) (quoting Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 266 Va. 39, 43 , 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003)). intentional tort of battery as “a matter of prudence.” The plaintiff went on to explain that Dr. Allison’s March 7, 2014, deposition made clear that battery was a viable count, and that based on this factual development, the plaintiff was “adding a battery claim.” The plaintiff asserted that adding the battery claim would “allow[] for an additional instruction for the jury.” 3 The plaintiff has not assigned cross-error to Judge Devine’s dismissal with prejudice 2017Co., 282 Va. 78, 86 , 710 S.E.2d 726, 731 (2011) (quoting Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 266 Va. 39, 43 , 581 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2003)). intentional tort of battery as “a matter of prudence.” The plaintiff went on to explain that Dr. Allison’s March 7, 2014, deposition made clear that battery was a viable count, and that based on this factual development, the plaintiff was “adding a battery claim.” The plaintiff asserted that adding the battery claim would “allow[] for an additional instruction for the jury.” 3 The plaintiff has not assigned cross-error to Judge Devine’s dismissal with prejudice | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Grimes v. Suzukawa
green
1 sentence2020Thus in Grimes this Court held that the statute did not toll the elapsed limitations period on a plaintiff’s battery claim when her assailant wore a mask because “his use of the mask was intended to conceal his identity and not to obstruct her filing of an action within the intendment of Code § 8.01-229(D).” 262 Va. at 332 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Gerety v. Demers
green
2 sentences2017"To defeat a battery claim ... the information which must be disclosed is quite narrow in scope." Gerety v. Demers , 92 N.M. 396 , 589 P.2d 180 , 191 (1978). 2017"To defeat a battery claim ... the information which must be disclosed is quite narrow in scope." Gerety v. Demers , 92 N.M. 396 , 589 P.2d 180 , 191 (1978). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Morton v. WELLSTAR HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.
green
2 sentences2017We agree with the observation that to "premise a claim for medical battery on the assertion that [the patient] did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure otherwise covered by valid consent ... would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim." Morton v. Wellstar Health Sys. , 288 Ga.App. 301 , 653 S.E.2d 756 , 757 (2007). 2017We agree with the observation that to "premise a claim for medical battery on the assertion that [the patient] did not consent to the negligent performance of the medical procedure otherwise covered by valid consent ... would transform every medical malpractice claim into a battery claim." Morton v. Wellstar Health Sys. , 288 Ga.App. 301 , 653 S.E.2d 756 , 757 (2007). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Woolley v. Henderson
green
1 sentence2017These considerations lead us to conclude that a physician is not liable for a battery unless the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case that the physician performed an operation "against the patient's will or substantially at variance with the consent given." Woolley , 418 A.2d at 1133 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.