10 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1979–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mink v. University of Chicagogreen1 sentence2026A is subject to liability to B"]; Snouffer v Snouffer , 1993 WL 248603 , *4 [Ohio Ct App, July 9, 1993] ["The administration of poison to a person generally constitutes a battery"]); Mink v Univ. of Chicago , 460 F Supp 713, 718 [ND Ill 1978] [holding that since injecting medicine into a plaintiff's arm to which she had not consented amounts to an offensive battery, giving her a pill to which she did not consent should likewise be a battery]; Genay v Norris , 1 SCL 6, 1784 WL 26 [SC Com Pl Gen Sess 1784] [approving award of punitive damages because putting "cantharides" into the "plaintiff's g | 1 | 1 |
Ponholzer v. Simmonsgreen1 sentence2017Here, plaintiffs allege in the complaint that “defendant physician knew that . . . she was exceeding the scope of . . . plaintiff’s consent by performing a medical procedure that . . . plaintiff had not authorized” (Ponholzer v Simmons, 78 AD3d 1495, 1496 [4th Dept 2010], lv dismissed 16 NY3d 886 [2011]) and, inasmuch as defendants do not challenge the battery claim with respect to the element of causation, we conclude that plaintiffs have stated such a claim. | 1 | 1 |
Bongiovanni v. Cavagnuologreen1 sentence2017We likewise reject that contention and conclude that defendants failed to meet their initial burden with respect to that part of the motion, thereby requiring denial of the motion to that extent “regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing] papers” (Bongiovanni v Cavagnuolo, 138 AD3d 12, 17 [2d Dept 2016]; see generally Winegrad v New York Univ. | 1 | 1 |
Guggenheimer v. Ginzburggreen2 sentences2015However, they affirm the granting of the branch of the defendants' motion which was to dismiss the battery claim for failure to state a cause of action, concluding that the defendants demonstrated, solely by virtue of the plaintiff's signature on the consent form, that the plaintiff's factual allegation that the defendants performed a total abdominal hysterectomy without her consent is "not a fact at all" ( Guggenheimer v Ginzburg , 43 NY2d 268, 275 ). 2015However, they affirm the granting of the branch of the defendants’ motion which was to dismiss the battery claim for failure to state a cause of action, concluding that the defendants demonstrated, solely by virtue of the plaintiff’s signature on the consent form, that the plaintiff’s factual allegation that the defendants performed a total abdominal hysterectomy without her consent is “not a fact at all” (Guggenheimer v Ginzburg, 43 NY2d 268, 275 [1977]). | 1 | 1 |
Villanueva v. Comparettogreen1 sentence2001“An action for battery may be sustained without a showing that the actor intended to cause injury as a result of the intended contact, but it is necessary to show that the intended contact was itself ‘offensive’, i.e., wrongful under all the circumstances.” (Zgraggen v Wilsey, 200 AD2d 818, 819 ; see, Villanueva v Comparetto, 180 AD2d 627 .) Lack of consent is considered in determining whether the contact was offensive. | 1 | 1 |
Dries v. Gregorgreen1 sentence1995As to the battery claim, it is true "that medical treatment beyond the scope of patient’s consent should not be considered” as a battery (Dries v Gregor, 72 AD2d 231, 235 [4th Dept 1980]). | 1 | 1 |
Alvarez v. Prospect Hospitalgreen1 sentence1995On this record the defendants, who have the burden of establishing their entitlement to summary judgment (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]) have failed to submit any competent evidence that there was such a practice with respect to the procedure performed here. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. . Selovergreen1 sentence1979(Varin v State of New York, Ct of Claims, Nov. 7, 1977, Lengyel, J.; see, also, Chapman v Selover, 172 App Div 858 , revd on other grounds 225 NY 417 ; Pawloski v State of New York, 45 Misc 2d 933 , supra.) In the present case, since the arrest was unlawful, a technical assault and battery occurred when the claimant was handcuffed and forcibly placed in the State Police car. | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Selovergreen1 sentence1979(Varin v State of New York, Ct of Claims, Nov. 7, 1977, Lengyel, J.; see, also, Chapman v Selover, 172 App Div 858 , revd on other grounds 225 NY 417 ; Pawloski v State of New York, 45 Misc 2d 933 , supra.) In the present case, since the arrest was unlawful, a technical assault and battery occurred when the claimant was handcuffed and forcibly placed in the State Police car. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Holtz v. Wildenstein & Co.
green
2 sentences2013The court also properly dismissed the assault claim because, like the battery claim, plaintiffs assertion that she was placed in imminent apprehension of harmful contact by defendant’s sexual advances was contradicted by the allegations of the complaint (see Holtz v Wildenstein & Co., 261 AD2d 336 [1st Dept 1999]). 2013The court also properly dismissed the assault claim because, like the battery claim, plaintiffs assertion that she was placed in imminent apprehension of harmful contact by defendant’s sexual advances was contradicted by the allegations of the complaint (see Holtz v Wildenstein & Co., 261 AD2d 336 [1st Dept 1999]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Henderson v. Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority
green
1 sentence2017Here, plaintiffs allege in the complaint that “defendant physician knew that . . . she was exceeding the scope of . . . plaintiff’s consent by performing a medical procedure that . . . plaintiff had not authorized” (Ponholzer v Simmons, 78 AD3d 1495, 1496 [4th Dept 2010], lv dismissed 16 NY3d 886 [2011]) and, inasmuch as defendants do not challenge the battery claim with respect to the element of causation, we conclude that plaintiffs have stated such a claim. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Messina v. Alan Matarasso, M.D., F.A.C.S., P. C.
green
1 sentence2009Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs argument that defendants waived the defense since they had notice of his intention to pursue a battery claim, the record shows that plaintiff consistently described his action as one for medical malpractice, not battery, and his allegations that defendants’ decision to perform a tenotomy resulted from their misdiagnosis of a torn biceps tendon as a superior labrum anterior-posterior tear, coupled with his consistent assertions that defendants treated him without his informed consent, are the essence of a claim for lack of informed consent (see Messina v Alan | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gilberg v. Barbieri
green
1 sentence2005A contrary holding would contravene precedent (see, Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449 , 456-457) and the concept of fairness underlying the doctrine of collateral estoppel (see, Gilberg v Barbieri, 53 NY2d 285 [1981]). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Zgraggen v. Wilsey
green
1 sentence2001“An action for battery may be sustained without a showing that the actor intended to cause injury as a result of the intended contact, but it is necessary to show that the intended contact was itself ‘offensive’, i.e., wrongful under all the circumstances.” (Zgraggen v Wilsey, 200 AD2d 818, 819 ; see, Villanueva v Comparetto, 180 AD2d 627 .) Lack of consent is considered in determining whether the contact was offensive. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Henry v. Bronx Lebanon Medical Center
green
1 sentence1995Ctr., 53 AD2d 476 [1st Dept 1976]) relied upon by defendants in their reply papers which supports the proposition that even if Dr. Morgenstern did perform the procedure, such act cannot give rise to a lack of informed consent claim much less to a battery claim, that case involved the presentation of competent evidence establishing a practice at Lenox Hill Hospital by attending physicians to allow residents to do a particular procedure. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Dannasch v. Bifulco
green
1 sentence1995(See, Dannasch v Bifulco, 184 AD2d 415 [1st Dept 1992].) Similarly, the defendants’ claim that the battery claim should be dismissed because the plaintiff actually consented to Dr. Morgenstern’s performance of the procedure by signing the aforementioned consent form was also raised for the first time in defendants’ reply. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Pawloski v. State
green
1 sentence1979(Varin v State of New York, Ct of Claims, Nov. 7, 1977, Lengyel, J.; see, also, Chapman v Selover, 172 App Div 858 , revd on other grounds 225 NY 417 ; Pawloski v State of New York, 45 Misc 2d 933 , supra.) In the present case, since the arrest was unlawful, a technical assault and battery occurred when the claimant was handcuffed and forcibly placed in the State Police car. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.