Jordan motion in Georgia

2019Under this "highly deferential" clear-error standard, we will not reverse a trial court's factual findings "if there is any evidence to support them, and this holds true even if the findings are based upon circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which flow from them." Yarbrough v. State , 303 Ga. 594 , 596-597 (2), 814 S.E.2d 286 (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Under this “highly deferential” clear-error standard, we will not reverse a trial court’s factual findings “if there is any evidence to support them, and this holds true even if the findings are based upon circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which flow from them.” Yarbrough v. State, 303 Ga. 594, 596-597 (2) ( 814 SE2d 286 ) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted). 10 The record here supports the finding that Jordan’s trial lawyer was present in the courtroom during Feazell’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

2019In its order denying Jordan's motion for a new trial, the trial court expressly found that defense counsel "was present during all critical stages of the trial, and in fact was present in court when co-defendant [Feazell] invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege." As we have explained repeatedly, "a trial court's factual findings made in the course of deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim will be affirmed by the reviewing court unless clearly erroneous." Green v. State , 302 Ga. 816 , 818 (2), 809 S.E.2d 738 (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2019In its order denying Jordan's motion for a new trial, the trial court expressly found that defense counsel "was present during all critical stages of the trial, and in fact was present in court when co-defendant [Feazell] invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege." As we have explained repeatedly, "a trial court's factual findings made in the course of deciding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim will be affirmed by the reviewing court unless clearly erroneous." Green v. State , 302 Ga. 816 , 818 (2), 809 S.E.2d 738 (2018) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2025See Greene, 303 Ga. at 187-188 (3) (noting that inconsistencies in the evidence do not render a trial fundamentally unfair and are a matter for jury resolution). 24 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not err in denying Jordan’s motion for a new trial.

2022See Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 752 (2) ( 804 SE2d 1 ) (2017) (“Because the trial court decided the merits of a motion it lacked jurisdiction to decide, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss.”).

2022See Brooks v. State, 301 Ga. 748, 752 (2) ( 804 SE2d 1 ) (2017) (“Because the trial court decided the merits of a motion it lacked jurisdiction to decide, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand with instructions to dismiss.”).

2021See Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 890 (2) (692 SE2d 379) (2010) (defendant waived claim that felony murder count did not contain essential elements of predicate felony because he did not file timely special demurrer under OCGA § 17-7-110), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).

2021See Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 890 (2) (692 SE2d 379) (2010) (defendant waived claim that felony murder count did not contain essential elements of predicate felony because he did not file timely special demurrer under OCGA § 17-7-110), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).

2021The trial court concluded that, under Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 878 (8) (268 SE2d 316) (1980), Jordan did not have the right to withdraw his guilty plea because his was a “capital case,” even though the State did not seek the death penalty, because the crime of murder was a capital felony for which the death penalty was available.

2021The trial court concluded that, under Fair v. State, 245 Ga. 868, 878 (8) (268 SE2d 316) (1980), Jordan did not have the right to withdraw his guilty plea because his was a “capital case,” even though the State did not seek the death penalty, because the crime of murder was a capital felony for which the death penalty was available.

2021See Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 890 (2) (692 SE2d 379) (2010) (defendant waived claim that felony murder count did not contain essential elements of predicate felony because he did not file timely special demurrer under OCGA § 17-7-110), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).

2021See Thompson v. State, 286 Ga. 889, 890 (2) (692 SE2d 379) (2010) (defendant waived claim that felony murder count did not contain essential elements of predicate felony because he did not file timely special demurrer under OCGA § 17-7-110), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelly, 290 Ga. 29, 32 (1) (718 SE2d 232) (2011).

2020Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever is later.1 Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 ( 691 SE2d 247 ) (2010). 1 On March 19, 2018, Jordan filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

2020Under OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), a court may modify a sentence during the year after its imposition or within 120 days after remittitur following a direct appeal, whichever is later.1 Frazier v. State, 302 Ga. App. 346, 348 ( 691 SE2d 247 ) (2010). 1 On March 19, 2018, Jordan filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

2017In Everson v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Center, 341 Ga. App. 182, 192-193 (5) (b) ( 798 SE2d 667 ) (2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment.

2017In Everson v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Center, 341 Ga. App. 182, 192-193 (5) (b) ( 798 SE2d 667 ) (2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment.

2014This Code section has been repealed and replaced by OCGA § 24-8-801. 10 Dyers v. State, 277 Ga. 859, 860-861 (2) ( 596 SE2d 595 ) (2004). 7 Judgment affirmed.

2014This Code section has been repealed and replaced by OCGA § 24-8-801. 10 Dyers v. State, 277 Ga. 859, 860-861 (2) ( 596 SE2d 595 ) (2004). 7 Judgment affirmed.

2013See also OCGA §§ 16-2-20, 16-2-21. 17 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (III) (B) (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). 10 of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.”18 We are not required to address both the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the test if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on either one of them, and “a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”19 Pretermitting whether trial counsel was deficient in fai

2012As the Court of Appeals held, see Moses v. Jordan, 310 Ga.App. 637, 642 , 714 S.E.2d 262 (2011), the evidence in this case, construed in Moses's favor against Jordan's motion for summary judgment, may show that Jordan misappropriated from their partnership account a $180,000 fee around the time he decided to dissolve the partnership.

2012As the Court of Appeals held, see Moses v. Jordan, 310 Ga.App. 637, 642 , 714 S.E.2d 262 (2011), the evidence in this case, construed in Moses's favor against Jordan's motion for summary judgment, may show that Jordan misappropriated from their partnership account a $180,000 fee around the time he decided to dissolve the partnership.

2011Co. v. Martin, 296 Ga. App. 236, 237 ( 674 SE2d 92 ) (2009).

2011Co. v. Martin, 296 Ga. App. 236, 237 ( 674 SE2d 92 ) (2009).

2011Wright v. Swint, 224 Ga. App. 417, 418-419 (1) ( 480 SE2d 878 ) (1997) (reversing trial court’s grant of motion to dismiss because trial court improperly decided issue of fact). 2 *644 3.

2011Wright v. Swint, 224 Ga. App. 417, 418-419 (1) ( 480 SE2d 878 ) (1997) (reversing trial court’s grant of motion to dismiss because trial court improperly decided issue of fact). 2 *644 3.

2001See Adams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 42, 43 (2) ( 520 SE2d 746 ) (1999).

2001See Adams v. State, 239 Ga. App. 42, 43 (2) ( 520 SE2d 746 ) (1999).

2000See also Rogers v. State, 163 Ga. App. 641, 644 (4) ( 295 SE2d 140 ) (1982). 3.

2000See also Rogers v. State, 163 Ga. App. 641, 644 (4) ( 295 SE2d 140 ) (1982). 3.

2000Further, even if Jordan’s claim that it is possible that both police officers were wounded by the same shot were true, the resulting charges do not merge. “[T]he legislature did not intend one crime to be included within another if each crime affected a different person.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. State, 235 Ga. App. 44, 47 (5) ( 508 SE2d 703 ) (1998) (wherein one shot was fired, killing one person and wounding another).

2000Further, even if Jordan’s claim that it is possible that both police officers were wounded by the same shot were true, the resulting charges do not merge. “[T]he legislature did not intend one crime to be included within another if each crime affected a different person.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hall v. State, 235 Ga. App. 44, 47 (5) ( 508 SE2d 703 ) (1998) (wherein one shot was fired, killing one person and wounding another).

1997See also Davis, supra, 129 LE2d at 373 (defendant’s statement “ ‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer’ ” was not an unambiguous request for counsel). “[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Jordan at 444 , quoting Davis, supra. Therefore, as Tucker’s statement was not a clear invocation of his right to counsel, the

1997See also Davis, supra, 129 LE2d at 373 (defendant’s statement “ ‘Maybe I should talk to a lawyer’ ” was not an unambiguous request for counsel). “[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.” (Punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Jordan at 444 , quoting Davis, supra. Therefore, as Tucker’s statement was not a clear invocation of his right to counsel, the

1990As Jordan notes, the Supreme Court by footnote has intimated that “the assertion by a witness of his Fifth Amendment rights in the jury’s presence need not be harmful, and in many instances would be appropriate.” Lawrence v. State, 257 Ga. 423, 425 ( 360 SE2d 716 ) (1987).

1990As Jordan notes, the Supreme Court by footnote has intimated that “the assertion by a witness of his Fifth Amendment rights in the jury’s presence need not be harmful, and in many instances would be appropriate.” Lawrence v. State, 257 Ga. 423, 425 ( 360 SE2d 716 ) (1987).