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19 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Somervillegreen2 sentences2006Each manifest necessity ruling is grounded in its own facts such that the manifest necessity standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying and often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal trial.” Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 , 35 L. 2006Each manifest necessity ruling is grounded in its own facts such that the manifest necessity standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula by which to judge the propriety of declaring a mistrial in the varying and often unique situations arising during the course of a criminal trial.” Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 462 , 35 L. | 3 | 5 |
Arizona v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 32 . ¶ 31 The manifest necessity standard cannot be applied mechanically “without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-31 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717 . 2025Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 32 . ¶ 31 The manifest necessity standard cannot be applied mechanically “without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-31 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717 . | 2 | 5 |
People v. Dahlberggreen2 sentences2023“The manifest necessity standard is a command to the trial court not to foreclose the defendant’s right to have a 6 particular tribunal decide his fate until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by continuing the proceedings.” People v. Dahlberg, 355 Ill. 2021“The manifest necessity standard is a command to the trial court not to foreclose the defendant’s right to have a particular tribunal decide his fate until a scrupulous exercise of judicial discretion leads to the conclusion that the ends of public justice would not be served by continuing the proceedings.” People v. Dahlberg, 355 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Segovianogreen2 sentences2023App. 3d 308, 314 (2005); see also People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000). 2021App. 3d 308, 314 (2005); see also People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 241 (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Renico v. Lettgreen2 sentences2020Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli 2020Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli | 2 | 2 |
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2020Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli 2019Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli | 2 | 2 |
Richardson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli 2019Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli | 2 | 2 |
Oregon v. Kennedygreen2 sentences2020Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli 2019Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli | 2 | 2 |
People v. Beangreen2 sentences2020Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli 2019Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 774 (2010); see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 121 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.) (a hung jury meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Richardson, 468 U.S. at 324 (“[W]e have constantly adhered to the rule that a retrial following a ‘hung jury’ does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 672 (1982) (a hung jury is the “prototypical example” that meets the “manifest necessity” standard); Washington, 434 U.S. at 509 (“the mistrial premised upon the trial judge’s beli | 2 | 2 |
People v. Streetgreen2 sentences2017LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 25.2(d) (3d ed. 2007); see Street, 316 Ill. 2003Street, 316 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Bishopgreen1 sentence2023See People v. Shoevlin, 2019 IL App (3d) 170258, ¶ 25 (“[W]hen a trial court declares a mistrial without the defendant’s consent, a second trial is prohibited unless the State demonstrates a manifest necessity for the mistrial.”) Although the court may have improperly used the term “manifest necessity,” the court, in essence, equated that term to whether Officer Bouch’s improper video comment juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case necessitated a mistrial, i.e., similar to the correct standard of whether “an error of such gravity has occurred that it has infected the fundamental fairness | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shoevlingreen1 sentence2023See People v. Shoevlin, 2019 IL App (3d) 170258, ¶ 25 (“[W]hen a trial court declares a mistrial without the defendant’s consent, a second trial is prohibited unless the State demonstrates a manifest necessity for the mistrial.”) Although the court may have improperly used the term “manifest necessity,” the court, in essence, equated that term to whether Officer Bouch’s improper video comment juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case necessitated a mistrial, i.e., similar to the correct standard of whether “an error of such gravity has occurred that it has infected the fundamental fairness | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Bagley
green
2 sentences2005Bagley , 338 Ill. 2005Bagley, 338 Ill. | 2 | 2005–2005 |
People v. Kimble
green
1 sentence2025Kimble, 2019 IL 122830, ¶ 32 . ¶ 31 The manifest necessity standard cannot be applied mechanically “without attention to the particular problem confronting the trial judge.” Washington, 434 U.S. at 506 , 98 S.Ct. at 830-31 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gori v. United States
green
1 sentence1991Ed. 2d 901 , 81 S. Ct. 1523 , which Jorn identified as a “variation” on the manifest necessity standard of appellate review. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States v. Jorn
green
2 sentences1991The Court stated: “ We upheld reprosecution after the mistrial in an opinion which, while applying the principle of Perez, appears to tie the judgment that there was no abuse of discretion in these circumstances to the fact that the judge was acting “in the sole interest of the defendant.” ’ ” (Jorn, 400 U.S. at 482 , 27 L. 1991The Court stated: “ We upheld reprosecution after the mistrial in an opinion which, while applying the principle of Perez, appears to tie the judgment that there was no abuse of discretion in these circumstances to the fact that the judge was acting “in the sole interest of the defendant.” ’ ” (Jorn, 400 U.S. at 482 , 27 L. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.