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9 Minnesota opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Minnesota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2014The manifest-necessity standard is generally not met when “bad-faith conduct by [a] judge or prosecutor threatens the harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant.” Id. at 508 , 98 S. Ct. at 831-32 . 2014The manifest-necessity standard is generally not met when “bad-faith conduct by [a] judge or prosecutor threatens the harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or declaration of mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the defendant.” Id. at 508 , 98 S. Ct. at 831-32 . | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Jorngreen2 sentences2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal 2006Somerville, 410 U.S. 458 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 , 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (noting that the standard “abjures the application of any mechanical formula,” id. at 462 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ; and “virtually all of the cases turn on the particular facts and thus escape meaningful categorization,” id. at 464 , 93 S.Ct. 1066 ); see also United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 480 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971) (noting, in a case affirming the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar retrial, that “a mechanical rule prohibiting retrial * * * would be too high a price to pay for the added assurance of personal | 1 | 1 |
Evelyn Louise Long v. Hubert H. Humphrey, IIIgreen2 sentences2000Id. at 761. 2000Id. at 761 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Kenneth Givens, Robert Turner, and Guinn Kellygreen2 sentences1997The manifest necessity standard “is a flexible standard which seeks fairness to the defendant, the government, and the public interest alike.” United States v. Givens, 88 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir.1996). 1997The manifest necessity standard "is a flexible standard which seeks fairness to the defendant, the government, and the public interest alike." United States v. Givens, 88 F.3d 608, 613 (8th Cir. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 547638green1 sentence1996Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 , 98 S.Ct. 824, 830-31 , 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). [1] The Eighth Circuit has indicated that the "strictest scrutiny" should be given to cases involving unavailability of prosecutorial evidence or harassment or improper tactics by the prosecution, while "great deference" should be afforded mistrial decisions granted for "trial problems," such as deadlocked juries or "jury taint." United States v. Dixon, 913 F.2d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.1990). *789 Federal courts have circumscribed the scope of the manifest necessity requirement. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Scott Dunbar Shafergreen2 sentences1996In holding that there can be no manifest necessity if other reasonable alternatives to mistrial exist, the Fourth Circuit stated: "[A] self-inflicted injury cannot be used to afford the government a second chance to prosecute * * *." United States v. Shafer, 987 F.2d 1054, 1059 (4th Cir.1993). 1996In holding that there can be no manifest necessity if other reasonable alternatives to mistrial exist, the Fourth Circuit stated: “[A] self-inflicted injury cannot be used to afford the government a second chance to prosecute * * United States v. Shafer, 987 F.2d 1054, 1059 (4th Cir.1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Minnesota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Long
green
2 sentences2025Long, 562 N.W.2d at 296 ; Gouleed, 720 N.W.2d at 800 . 2019The manifest-necessity standard is used only "when a mistrial is declared without the defendant's consent. " Id. (emphasis added). | 3 | 2005–2025 |
State v. Gouleed
green
2 sentences2025Long, 562 N.W.2d at 296 ; Gouleed, 720 N.W.2d at 800 . 2014The manifest-necessity standard “is a flexible one that seeks to achieve fairness for the prosecution, the defendant, and the public interest.” Gouleed, 720 N.W.2d at 800 . | 2 | 2014–2025 |
Illinois v. Somerville
green
2 sentences2009The manifest-necessity standard is flexible, and fact intensive, and “seeks to achieve fairness for the prosecution, the defendant, and the public interest.” Id. 2009“A high degree of necessity — not absolute necessity — must exist before a mistrial is appropriate.” Id. (quotation omitted). | 2 | 2006–2009 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.