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6 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Illinois v. Somervillegreen2 sentences1994B With respect to the manifest-necessity exception to double jeopardy, we heed the counsel provided by the United States Supreme Court in Somerville, supra, to decide each case on the basis of its own unique factual setting. 1994B With respect to the manifest-necessity exception to double jeopardy, we heed the counsel provided by the United States Supreme Court in Somerville, supra, to decide each case on the basis of its own unique factual setting. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1994See Arizona v Washington, 434 US 497 ; 98 S Ct 824 ; 54 L Ed 2d 717 (1978). [7] See FR Crim P 25(a): If by reason of death, sickness or other disability the judge before whom a jury trial has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court, upon certifying familiarity with the record of the trial, may proceed with and finish the trial. [8] Where the manifest-necessity test properly applies, only the mistrial, and not the events giving rise to it, must be necessary: [T]he double jeopardy clause does not require "manifest necessity" fo 1994See Arizona v Washington, 434 US 497 ; 98 S Ct 824 ; 54 L Ed 2d 717 (1978). [7] See FR Crim P 25(a): If by reason of death, sickness or other disability the judge before whom a jury trial has commenced is unable to proceed with the trial, any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the court, upon certifying familiarity with the record of the trial, may proceed with and finish the trial. [8] Where the manifest-necessity test properly applies, only the mistrial, and not the events giving rise to it, must be necessary: [T]he double jeopardy clause does not require "manifest necessity" fo | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bushgreen2 sentences1992See People v Bush, 187 Mich App 316, 324-325 ; 466 NW2d 736 (1991), and cases cited therein. 1992See People v Bush, 187 Mich App 316, 324-325 ; 466 NW2d 736 (1991), and cases cited therein. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fentongreen1 sentence1976State v Fenton, 19 Ariz App 274, 276; 506 P2d 665, 667 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Echavarria
green
2 sentences2018People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 363 ; 592 NW2d 737 (1999). 2018People v Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 363 ; 592 NW2d 737 (1999). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Perez
green
2 sentences1993In United States v Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579, 580; 6 L Ed 165 (1824), the manifest necessity rule was stated, holding that the discharge of the jury did not always bar a future trial for the same offense: We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. ... [S]uch a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings and gi 1993In United States v Perez, 22 US (9 Wheat) 579, 580; 6 L Ed 165 (1824), the manifest necessity rule was stated, holding that the discharge of the jury did not always bar a future trial for the same offense: We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. . . . [S]uch a discharge constitutes no bar to further proceedings and | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.