recognizes rule in Illinois

2000While there is not a precise test for contract divisibility, as a general matter "[a] divisible contract is one in which both parties have divided up their performance into units or installments in such a way that each past performance is the rough compensation for a corresponding past performance by the other party." Trapkus v. Edstrom’s, Inc. , 140 Ill.

2000While there is not a precise test for contract divisibility, as a general matter “[a] divisible contract is one in which both parties have divided up their performance into units or installments in such a way that each past performance is the rough compensation for a corresponding past performance by the other party.” Trapkus v. Edstrom’s, Inc., 140 Ill.

1996App. 3d 973, 980 , 427 N.E.2d 399 (1981), the court spoke as follows: "[W]ords may be added, deleted or changed in a statute to effectuate legislative intent. [Citation.] This recognizes the rule that the intention of the legislature is to be gathered not only from the language used but also from the reasons for the enactment and the purposes to be attained. [Citations.] Indeed, as the court noted in Smith v. County of Logan (1918), 284 Ill. 163, 165-66 , 119 N.E.2d 932 : 'In construing a statute, the court will not be confined to its literal meaning.

1996App. 3d 973, 980 , 427 N.E.2d 399 (1981), the court spoke as follows: "[W]ords may be added, deleted or changed in a statute to effectuate legislative intent. [Citation.] This recognizes the rule that the intention of the legislature is to be gathered not only from the language used but also from the reasons for the enactment and the purposes to be attained. [Citations.] Indeed, as the court noted in Smith v. County of Logan (1918), 284 Ill. 163, 165-66 , 119 N.E.2d 932 : 'In construing a statute, the court will not be confined to its literal meaning.

1990App. 3d at 9 , citing Underwood, 34 Ill. 2d at 371 ; see People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 564, 577 .) This exception, generally known as the plain error doctrine, finds greater application in criminal cases.

1990The appellate court, however, was correct in noting that this court recognizes an exception to the doctrine requiring a party to object to an error during trial in order to preserve it for review. ( 178 Ill.

1988App. 3d 113 , 420 N.E.2d 1187 ; People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350 , 418 N.E.2d 739 .) Though this court recognizes the doctrine of “plain error” (People v. Lurry (1979), 77 Ill.

1988App. 3d 113 , 420 N.E.2d 1187 ; People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350 , 418 N.E.2d 739 .) Though this court recognizes the doctrine of “plain error” (People v. Lurry (1979), 77 Ill.

1988App. 3d 113 , 420 N.E.2d 1187 ; People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350 , 418 N.E.2d 739 .) Though this court recognizes the doctrine of “plain error” (People v. Lurry (1979), 77 Ill.

1988App. 3d 113 , 420 N.E.2d 1187 ; People v. Jackson (1981), 84 Ill. 2d 350 , 418 N.E.2d 739 .) Though this court recognizes the doctrine of “plain error” (People v. Lurry (1979), 77 Ill.

1988App. 3d 108 , 395 N.E.2d 1234 ), we find that the prosecutor’s comments as noted above do not rise to a level of prejudice or inflammatory remark which could constitute plain error and which would require the granting of a new trial.

1952(Peadro v. Peadro, 400 Ill. 482 , 81 N.E. 2d 192 ; Strohm v. McMullen, 404 Ill. 453 , 89 N.E. 2d 383 .) In the Peadro case, at page 489, this court said: “This court recognizes the rule that a gift to persons named is a gift to them individually and not as a class, and will treat the gift as one to individuals, unless reasons are found in the language and structure of the will for deciding that the intent of the testator, which is, of course, paramount to the rule, would be best subserved by disregarding the rule and treating the gift as one to a class.” In Strohm v. McMullen, Justice Gunn, at

1952(Peadro v. Peadro, 400 Ill. 482 , 81 N.E. 2d 192 ; Strohm v. McMullen, 404 Ill. 453 , 89 N.E. 2d 383 .) In the Peadro case, at page 489, this court said: “This court recognizes the rule that a gift to persons named is a gift to them individually and not as a class, and will treat the gift as one to individuals, unless reasons are found in the language and structure of the will for deciding that the intent of the testator, which is, of course, paramount to the rule, would be best subserved by disregarding the rule and treating the gift as one to a class.” In Strohm v. McMullen, Justice Gunn, at

1952(Peadro v. Peadro, 400 Ill. 482 , 81 N.E. 2d 192 ; Strohm v. McMullen, 404 Ill. 453 , 89 N.E. 2d 383 .) In the Peadro case, at page 489, this court said: “This court recognizes the rule that a gift to persons named is a gift to them individually and not as a class, and will treat the gift as one to individuals, unless reasons are found in the language and structure of the will for deciding that the intent of the testator, which is, of course, paramount to the rule, would be best subserved by disregarding the rule and treating the gift as one to a class.” In Strohm v. McMullen, Justice Gunn, at

1952(Peadro v. Peadro, 400 Ill. 482 , 81 N.E. 2d 192 ; Strohm v. McMullen, 404 Ill. 453 , 89 N.E. 2d 383 .) In the Peadro case, at page 489, this court said: “This court recognizes the rule that a gift to persons named is a gift to them individually and not as a class, and will treat the gift as one to individuals, unless reasons are found in the language and structure of the will for deciding that the intent of the testator, which is, of course, paramount to the rule, would be best subserved by disregarding the rule and treating the gift as one to a class.” In Strohm v. McMullen, Justice Gunn, at

1951(Ollman v. Ollman, 396 Ill. 176 .) Appellee urges and the court recognizes the rule that the trial judge, having seen and heard the witnesses, is in a better position to determine the credence to be given the testimony than the Appellate Court on review.

1951(Mason v. Mason, 342 Ill.

1948Strauss v. Strauss, 363 Ill. 442 .

1931The facts stated in this plea come clearly within the rule laid down in Greer v. Young, 120 Ill. 184 , . . . and we see no good reason to depart from that rule. ’ ’ It will thus be seen that although the court recognizes the rule was different in other States, it adhered to the rule laid down in Greer v. Young, 120 Ill. 184 .

1931The facts stated in this plea come clearly within the rule laid down in Greer v. Young, 120 Ill. 184 , . . . and we see no good reason to depart from that rule. ’ ’ It will thus be seen that although the court recognizes the rule was different in other States, it adhered to the rule laid down in Greer v. Young, 120 Ill. 184 .

1924(Quigley v. Breckenridge, supra; Crist v. McCoy, 287 Ill. 641 .) This court has also laid down the rule that mere inadequacy of price will not justify a court of equity in setting aside a judicial sale where there is a right of redemption.

1924(Quigley v. Breckenridge, supra; Crist v. McCoy, 287 Ill. 641 .) This court has also laid down the rule that mere inadequacy of price will not justify a court of equity in setting aside a judicial sale where there is a right of redemption.

1916(Preston on Estates, 263; 2 Washburn on Real Property, sec. 1610; Glover v. Condell, 163 Ill. 566 ; Harvey v. Ballard, 252 id. 57.) The opinion of the majority of the court recognizes this rule and holds that the estate given to William Nowlan in trust was a fee.

1914(Green v. Oakes, 17 Ill. 249 ; City of Peoria v. Johnston, 56 id. 45; McCann v. Day, 57 id. 101; Snell v. Buresh, 123 id. 151; Newell v. Sass, supra; Hankins v. Hendricks, supra.) In all of these cases the court recognizes the rule contended for by the appellee and announced in Oswald v. Wolf, supra, that a court of equity will not take jurisdiction of a case of this character except where the proof is clear and convincing, so as to remove every substantial doubt of the existence of the right.

1914(Green v. Oakes, 17 Ill. 249 ; City of Peoria v. Johnston, 56 id. 45; McCann v. Day, 57 id. 101; Snell v. Buresh, 123 id. 151; Newell v. Sass, supra; Hankins v. Hendricks, supra.) In all of these cases the court recognizes the rule contended for by the appellee and announced in Oswald v. Wolf, supra, that a court of equity will not take jurisdiction of a case of this character except where the proof is clear and convincing, so as to remove every substantial doubt of the existence of the right.

1904The court say: “ For there can. be no such thing as probable cause for a prosecution to accomplish a purpose known .to the prosecutor to be unlawful.” In Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers’ Union, 120 U. S. 141 , the court recognizes as an exception to the general rule, that a conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive evidence of probable cause, the procurement by the defendant of the conviction by .fraud, oppression or other undue means, and after citing cases in support of the exception, say: “ This seems to reconcile the apparent contradiction in the authorities, and st

1899This court, in the Dauchy Iron Works case, supra, Mr. Justice Sears, speaking for the court, in reference to a discharge or release of a condition of á contract under seal, said: “ The well established rule is that such a release may be by parol.” See also Worrell v. Forsyth, 141 Ill. 22 ; and Moses v. Loomis, 156 Ill. 392 .

1899This court, in the Dauchy Iron Works case, supra, Mr. Justice Sears, speaking for the court, in reference to a discharge or release of a condition of á contract under seal, said: “ The well established rule is that such a release may be by parol.” See also Worrell v. Forsyth, 141 Ill. 22 ; and Moses v. Loomis, 156 Ill. 392 .