recognizes claim in Texas

2008In the alternative, if this Court recognizes a claim for same-sex sexual harassment as cognizable under Texas law, the City contends that such a claim should require proof of an additional element identified in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 , 118 S.Ct. 998 , 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998).

2008In the alternative, if this Court recognizes a claim for same-sex sexual harassment as cognizable under Texas law, the City contends that such a claim should require proof of an additional element identified in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 , 118 S.Ct. 998 , 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998).

1998The Court recognizes that the standard indemnity provisions at issue here, under which the surety is authorized to settle claims in good faith, are "critical in enabling sureties to perform efficiently." 964 S.W.2d at 281 & n. 2.

1985See Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.1984); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1981); and Kaufman v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.1967).

1985See Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex.1984); Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson 617 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1981); and Kaufman v. Miller, 414 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.1967).

1982Crisp v. Parker, 516 S.W.2d 10 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1974, no writ).

1973Praetorians v. State, 184 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1944—writ dism'd.).

1973Praetorians v. State, 184 S.W.2d 299 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1944 — writ dism’d.).

1967In Strakos, supra, the Court clearly recognizes the principle I believe applicable here when it said: "These cases illustrate three approaches used to establish a common-law right of indemnity.

1967In Strakos, supra, the Court clearly recognizes the principle I believe applicable here when it said: “These cases illustrate three approaches used to establish a common-law right of indemnity.

1967One involves the concept of `different qualities' of negligence; another involves a breach of duty as between tortfeasors; the third gives indemnity to the tortfeasor who is only vicariously liable by operation of law." Finally, there is the case of Otis Elevator Company v. Cameron, 205 S.W. 852, 857 , Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, writ ref., heavily relied upon by Joseph but only mentioned, not discussed, by the majority.

1967One involves the concept of ‘different qualities’ of negligence; another involves a breach of duty as between tortfeasors; the third gives indemnity to the tortfeasor who is only vicariously liable by operation of law.” Finally, there is the case of Otis Elevator Company v. Cameron, 205 S.W. 852, 857 , Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, writ ref., heavily relied upon by Joseph but only mentioned, not discussed, by the majority.

1958In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. White, Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W.2d 452, 454 , the court recognizes the rule “ ‘where a claim is unliquidated or disputed, the cashing of a check marked “in full payment” is a binding accord and satisfaction and extinguishes the claim * * *.

1951In Eckford v. Berry, 87 Texas 415 , 28 S. W. 937 , it is stated that one of the reasons for this exception to the parol evidence rule was that “the skill of the conveyancer, aided by the stern rule of evidence, would have enabled the exacting creditor to overreach and finally crush the necessitous and defenseless debtor in a court of law, despite the equity of redemption created and cherished alone by the courts of equity for the protection of the debtor.” Without specifying the exact nature of the equitable remedy, the Texas courts in this situation have from the first disregarded the acts of

1951In Eckford v. Berry, 87 Texas 415 , 28 S. W. 937 , it is stated that one of the reasons for this exception to the parol evidence rule was that “the skill of the conveyancer, aided by the stern rule of evidence, would have enabled the exacting creditor to overreach and finally crush the necessitous and defenseless debtor in a court of law, despite the equity of redemption created and cherished alone by the courts of equity for the protection of the debtor.” Without specifying the exact nature of the equitable remedy, the Texas courts in this situation have from the first disregarded the acts of

1951In the ease which introduced this exception to the parol evidence rule into Texas jurisprudence, Stamper v. Johnson, 3 Tex. 1 , the Court recognizes that the exception is truly an equitable doctrine.

1920While this court recognizes the rule that a promise on several considerations, one of which is unlawful, is void, as announced in Edwards County v. Jennings, 89 Texas, 620 , 35 S. W., 1053 , yet it is just as well settled as declared in Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry.

1914The case of Rowlet v. Fulton, 5 Tex. 458 , has also been cited in support of the waiver of a general demurrer, but in fact the court said: “The record shows no action on the demurrer; and, unless the objections would be fatal on error, they cannot be noticed on appeal.” The court declined to examine into the alleged defects because the case was reversed upon another ground.

1914In the next ease, in the same volume, De Witt v. Miller, 9 Tex. 239 , the court recognizes the doctrine that defects in a petition may be of such character that they may be taken advantage of in the appellate court, though no demurrer was filed below.

1872The case of Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , was a suit on a note which fell due on the 1st of January, and the court says, that “ the holder could exercise due diligence “ only by suit.” And in the cases of Smith v. Harbert, 30 Texas, 669 ; Jopling v. Turner, 32 Texas, 281 ; Porter v. Buckholts, 32 Texas, 487 ; and in Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , the court clearly recognizes the doctrine, that when a note became due in 1862, if suit were brought to the fall term of 1865, that would be the exercise of sufficient diligence to fix the liability of the indorser.

1872The case of Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , was a suit on a note which fell due on the 1st of January, and the court says, that “ the holder could exercise due diligence “ only by suit.” And in the cases of Smith v. Harbert, 30 Texas, 669 ; Jopling v. Turner, 32 Texas, 281 ; Porter v. Buckholts, 32 Texas, 487 ; and in Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , the court clearly recognizes the doctrine, that when a note became due in 1862, if suit were brought to the fall term of 1865, that would be the exercise of sufficient diligence to fix the liability of the indorser.

1872The case of Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , was a suit on a note which fell due on the 1st of January, and the court says, that “ the holder could exercise due diligence “ only by suit.” And in the cases of Smith v. Harbert, 30 Texas, 669 ; Jopling v. Turner, 32 Texas, 281 ; Porter v. Buckholts, 32 Texas, 487 ; and in Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , the court clearly recognizes the doctrine, that when a note became due in 1862, if suit were brought to the fall term of 1865, that would be the exercise of sufficient diligence to fix the liability of the indorser.

1872The case of Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , was a suit on a note which fell due on the 1st of January, and the court says, that “ the holder could exercise due diligence “ only by suit.” And in the cases of Smith v. Harbert, 30 Texas, 669 ; Jopling v. Turner, 32 Texas, 281 ; Porter v. Buckholts, 32 Texas, 487 ; and in Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , the court clearly recognizes the doctrine, that when a note became due in 1862, if suit were brought to the fall term of 1865, that would be the exercise of sufficient diligence to fix the liability of the indorser.

1872The case of Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , was a suit on a note which fell due on the 1st of January, and the court says, that “ the holder could exercise due diligence “ only by suit.” And in the cases of Smith v. Harbert, 30 Texas, 669 ; Jopling v. Turner, 32 Texas, 281 ; Porter v. Buckholts, 32 Texas, 487 ; and in Brooks v. Breeding, 32 Texas, 752 , the court clearly recognizes the doctrine, that when a note became due in 1862, if suit were brought to the fall term of 1865, that would be the exercise of sufficient diligence to fix the liability of the indorser.