collateral consequences exception in Illinois

2026We recognize that “[t]here are exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including the collateral consequences doctrine.” Id. ¶ 9 (citing In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 361 (2009)).

2026The collateral consequences exception “ ‘allows for appellate review, even though a court order or incarceration has ceased, because a plaintiff has suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)” Id. (quoting In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 361 ). “ ‘[S]ubsistence of the suit requires *** that the continuing collateral consequences *** be either proved or presumed.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 361 ). ¶ 95 In Dawson, the defendant appealed her

2013In particular, respondent argues that three exceptions apply: the collateral consequences exception, the public interest exception, and the exception for issues capable of repetition yet avoiding review. -3- ¶8 The collateral consequences exception allows a reviewing court to consider an otherwise moot case where an order for involuntary treatment “ ‘could return to plague the respondent in some future proceedings or could affect other aspects of the respondent’s life.’ ” In re Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 10 (quoting In re Val Q., 396 Ill.

2013In particular, respondent argues that three exceptions apply: the collateral consequences exception, the public interest exception, and the exception for issues capable of repetition yet avoiding review. ¶ 10 The collateral consequences exception allows a reviewing court to consider a case that is otherwise moot where an order for involuntary treatment “could return to plague the respondent in some future proceedings or could affect other aspects of the respondent’s life.” In re Val Q., 396 Ill.

2011In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 355-62 (2009); J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350 ; In re Wathan, 104 Ill.

2011In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 355-62 (2009); J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350 ; In re Wathan, 104 Ill.

2025“The collateral consequences exception to mootness allows for appellate review, even though a court order or incarceration has ceased, because a plaintiff has ‘ “suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” ’ ” Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 361 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998), quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). ¶ 18 Here, the question of mootness arises because defendant’s sentence has been fully served.

2022The collateral consequences exception to mootness “allows for appellate review, even though***incarceration has ceased, because a plaintiff has suffered, or is threatened with, an actual inquiry traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 361 (2009) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)).

2015In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). ¶ 12 Reviewing courts, however, recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception, applicable where the order could return to plague the defendant in some fu

2014In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). ¶ 19 Reviewing courts, however, recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception, applicable where the order could have consequences for a party in some fut

2025“The collateral consequences exception to mootness allows for appellate review, even though a court order or incarceration has ceased, because a plaintiff has ‘ “suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” ’ ” Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 361 (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998), quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)). ¶ 18 Here, the question of mootness arises because defendant’s sentence has been fully served.

2009The Collateral Consequences Exception Respondent's third established exception to the mootness doctrine is the "collateral consequences exception." The collateral consequences exception to mootness allows for appellate review, even though a court order or incarceration has ceased, because a plaintiff has "`suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'" Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 , 118 S.Ct. 978, 983 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43, 49-50 (1998), quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 , 110

2023The collateral consequences exception applies when a party has “suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and [is] likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial determination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 361 , 910 N.E.2d 74, 83 (2009); see also In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 228 , 572 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1991) (Although the respondent had been released from involuntary admission, “[r]eview [was] nonetheless appropriate, as the collateral consequences related to the stigma of an involuntary admission may confront [t

2023The collateral consequences exception applies when a party has “suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and [is] likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial determination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 361 , 910 N.E.2d 74, 83 (2009); see also In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 228 , 572 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1991) (Although the respondent had been released from involuntary admission, “[r]eview [was] nonetheless appropriate, as the collateral consequences related to the stigma of an involuntary admission may confront [t

2021In re Dawn H., 2012 IL App (2d) 111013, ¶ 13 (2012) (citing -7- No. 1-20-0357 In re Val Q., 396 Ill.

2013App. 3d 155, 159 (2009)), appeal allowed, No. 115798 (May 29, 2013); see also In re Dawn H., 2012 IL App (2d) 111013, ¶ 13 .

2014The State disputed that review was appropriate under any exception to the mootness doctrine, but argued that even if review was proper, section 3-816(a) was merely directory, not mandatory, and thus noncompliance did not require reversal of the trial court’s order. ¶ 25 The appellate court reviewed the case under the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, and agreed with respondent that because section 3-816(a) is a -6- mandatory provision, the appropriate remedy for noncompliance is reversal. 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶¶ 10-11, 18-22 . ¶ 26 We allowed the State’s petition

2014The appellate court, however, noted that respondent had not been previously subject to involuntary treatment, and that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine “applies to a first involuntary-treatment order.” 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 10 (citing In re Linda K., 407 Ill.

2015Id. at 362 (citing In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225 , 228 - 10 - 1-12-3596 (1991) (applying the exception because collateral consequences related to the stigma of an involuntary admission may confront respondent in the future), In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 317 (1984) (finding review appropriate because the character of an involuntary commitment has been held to be of sufficient significance to permit the invoking of the collateral consequences exception), In re Alex T., 375 Ill.

2015Id. at 362 (citing In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225 , 228 - 10 - 1-12-3596 (1991) (applying the exception because collateral consequences related to the stigma of an involuntary admission may confront respondent in the future), In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 317 (1984) (finding review appropriate because the character of an involuntary commitment has been held to be of sufficient significance to permit the invoking of the collateral consequences exception), In re Alex T., 375 Ill.

2015Id. at 362 (citing In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225 , 228 - 10 - 1-12-3596 (1991) (applying the exception because collateral consequences related to the stigma of an involuntary admission may confront respondent in the future), In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 317 (1984) (finding review appropriate because the character of an involuntary commitment has been held to be of sufficient significance to permit the invoking of the collateral consequences exception), In re Alex T., 375 Ill.

2009See In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 228 (1991) (applying the collateral consequences exception); In re Hays, 102 Ill. 2d 314, 317 (1984) (also invoking the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine).

2014See also In re James H., 405 Ill.

2013In Rita P., 2013 IL App (1st) 112837, ¶ 12 , this court distinguished In re James H., 405 Ill.

2025The instant case involves parole status dependent upon close supervision ***.” ¶ 25 Over 40 years later, in People v. Dawson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170872 , the Fourth District again confronted the issue of whether the collateral consequences exception applies to an appeal from an order revoking a defendant’s probation if the defendant had fully served the sentence.

2022Thus, she lacks a personal stake in the question of the probation revocation, and this appeal is moot.” Dawson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170872, ¶ 19 (citing People v. Roberson, 212 Ill. 2d 430, 435 (2004)). ¶ 17 We agree with the reasoning of Dawson and conclude that the facts of this case support a finding of mootness because the collateral consequences exception does not apply.

2015In re Laura H., 404 Ill.

2015In re Laura H., 404 Ill.

2014The - 15 - court nonetheless found that the collateral consequences exception to mootness applied and proceeded to consider defendant’s appeal on the merits. 2013 IL App (2d) 120476, ¶ 4 . ¶ 42 The appellate court began its analysis with what must be the preeminent analytical proposition in this context: “The due process clause forbids conviction of a defendant who is unfit to stand trial.” 2013 IL App (2d) 120476, ¶ 5 .

2014The - 15 - court nonetheless found that the collateral consequences exception to mootness applied and proceeded to consider defendant’s appeal on the merits. 2013 IL App (2d) 120476, ¶ 4 . ¶ 42 The appellate court began its analysis with what must be the preeminent analytical proposition in this context: “The due process clause forbids conviction of a defendant who is unfit to stand trial.” 2013 IL App (2d) 120476, ¶ 5 .

2026In fact, defendant argues as much, asserting in his brief that the eviction order caused many of his applications for new housing under his housing assistance program to be denied. -7- No. 1-24-2032 ¶ 28 “Under this exception, where collateral consequences survive the expiration or cessation of a court order that are likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial determination, appellate review is permissible.” In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶ 31 . ¶ 29 Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the collateral consequences exception to mootness, we must affirm because the record on appeal is i

2025“Application of the collateral consequences exception is determined on a case-by-case basis.” Id. - 16 - 2025 IL App (2d) 240609 ¶ 42 To support her claim that a probation revocation is “a factor considered in determining whether an applicant is eligible for naturalization,” defendant cites two sources.

2024All exceptions to the mootness doctrine are “to be construed narrowly and require a clear showing of each criterion to bring the case within the terms.” In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350 . 4 ¶ 13 The Collateral-Consequences Exception ¶ 14 The collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies where the respondent has suffered, or is threatened with, an actual injury that is traceable to the medication order, and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

2013See In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 355-62 (2009); In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350 .

2015App. 3d 758, 763 (2007) (applying the collateral consequences exception in mental health case involving an involuntary admission order), and In re Sciara, 21 Ill.

1978App. 3d 889 , 316 N.E.2d 153 .) But where, as here, the commitment on appeal is not the first time the defendant has been treated for a mental disorder, the collateral consequences exception has no effect and the case remains moot.

2026Exceptions to the Rule Against Deciding Moot Appeals ¶ 35 Case law recognizes three exceptions to the rule against deciding moot appeals: “(1) the public-interest exception, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, and (3) the collateral- consequences exception.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Rob W., 2021 IL App (1st) 200149, ¶ 50 .

2025These include “(1) the public-interest exception, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Rob W., 2021 IL App (1st) 200149, ¶ 50 . ¶ 15 This court has applied the public interest exception to appeals from orders of protection.

2023The collateral consequences exception applies when a party has “suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and [is] likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial determination.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 361 , 910 N.E.2d 74, 83 (2009); see also In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 228 , 572 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1991) (Although the respondent had been released from involuntary admission, “[r]eview [was] nonetheless appropriate, as the collateral consequences related to the stigma of an involuntary admission may confront [t

2023App. 3d 748, 753 , 930 N.E.2d 1048, 1053 (2010) (applying the collateral consequences exception because the “collateral consequences of having been involuntary committed will attach to the respondent and could be used against him in future proceedings”). ¶ 45 In Carryl v. Fraser, 2016 IL App (1st) 152376-U , the First District reviewed an order of protection under the collateral consequences exception because “the [plenary order of protection], which involves his minor daughters and is based on a finding of abuse ***, has *** ramifications on his personal, family, and legal relationships.” Car

2025The Fourth District disagreed, stating: “[D]isabilities and adverse collateral consequences automatically flow from entry of the court’s judgment which foreclose an allegation of mootness even though the defendant has served his sentence. [Citations.] Here, the fact that the defendant has had his probation -8- 2025 IL App (2d) 240609 revoked might be submitted to another judge for his consideration in sentencing the defendant if he has the misfortune of again being convicted of some crime.” Id. ¶ 23 Monick, Sturdivant, and Halterman each stand for applying the collateral consequences exception

2023App. 3d 410 (1976)), while the Fifth District has found the collateral consequences exception did not apply (see Yackle, 42 Ill.

2024See In re Daniel K., 2013 IL App (2d) 111251, ¶ 16 (“[T]he recognize[d] exceptions to the mootness doctrine [are]: (1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception, applicable where the order could have consequences for a party in some future proceed

2020Because we can no longer provide the relief that the defendant seeks, as it has already occurred, the defendant’s appeal is moot. ¶9 However, courts recognize three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: “(1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exceptio

2015See McCoy, 2014 IL App (2d) 130632, ¶ 13 . ¶ 39 We note that Lakewood also argues that the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

2014In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998). ¶ 12 Reviewing courts, however, recognize exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) the public-interest exception, applicable where the case presents a question of public importance that -3- 2014 IL App (2d) 130632 will likely recur and whose answer will guide public officers in the performance of their duties, (2) the capable-of-repetition exception, applicable to cases involving events of short duration that are capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) the collateral-consequences exception, applicable where the order could return to pla