collateral consequences doctrine in Connecticut

2021See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 , 10 n.9, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘since collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of law because of a criminal conviction, a case will not be declared moot even [when] the sentence has been fully served’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Putman v. Ken- nedy, 279 Conn. 162 , 176 n.14, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006) (‘‘the collateral consequences doctrine applies when the collateral consequences of the contested court action, such as the continuing stigma of a criminal conviction, constitute a continuing injury to the specific litigant, justifying the

2021See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 , 10 n.9, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘since collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of law because of a criminal conviction, a case will not be declared moot even [when] the sentence has been fully served’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Putman v. Ken- nedy, 279 Conn. 162 , 176 n.14, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006) (‘‘the collateral consequences doctrine applies when the collateral consequences of the contested court action, such as the continuing stigma of a criminal conviction, constitute a continuing injury to the specific litigant, justifying the

2009Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chimblo v. Monahan, 265 Conn. 650, 655-56 , 829 A.2d 841 (2003). *491 The court’s December 3, 2008 order rendered the defendant’s appeal moot.

2009Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chimblo v. Monahan, 265 Conn. 650, 655-56 , 829 A.2d 841 (2003). *491 The court’s December 3, 2008 order rendered the defendant’s appeal moot.

2024Finally, to the extent the petitioner’s counsel attempted to invoke the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine during oral argument before this court, we do not consider them because ‘‘[i]t is well settled that a claim cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Pro- tection, 337 Conn. 781 , 797 n.12, 256 A.3d 655 (2021).

2024Finally, to the extent the petitioner’s counsel attempted to invoke the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine during oral argument before this court, we do not consider them because ‘‘[i]t is well settled that a claim cannot be raised for the first time at oral argument.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Pro- tection, 337 Conn. 781 , 797 n.12, 256 A.3d 655 (2021).

2008“Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment, as in this case, the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 382-83 .

2008"Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment, as in this case, the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 382-83 , 944 A.2d 276 .

2017Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment ... the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Iacurci v. Wells , 108 Conn.App. 274 , 277, 947 A.2d 1034 (2008).

2017Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment ... the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Iacurci v. Wells , 108 Conn.App. 274 , 277, 947 A.2d 1034 (2008).

2017Similarly, in In re Jessica M. , supra, 303 Conn. at 588 , 35 A.3d 1072 , the companion case to In re Jose B. , this court rejected the petitioner's claim that "an adjudication of neglect pursuant to § 46b-129 (a) would enable her to seek ... juvenile status from the federal government," meaning that, under the collateral consequences doctrine, "her claim for an adjudication of neglect was not moot even if the trial court could not grant dispositional relief pursuant to § 46b-129 (j)." The court emphasized that, "not only did the trial court lack statutory authority to provide dispositional re

2017Similarly, in In re Jessica M. , supra, 303 Conn. at 588 , 35 A.3d 1072 , the companion case to In re Jose B. , this court rejected the petitioner's claim that "an adjudication of neglect pursuant to § 46b-129 (a) would enable her to seek ... juvenile status from the federal government," meaning that, under the collateral consequences doctrine, "her claim for an adjudication of neglect was not moot even if the trial court could not grant dispositional relief pursuant to § 46b-129 (j)." The court emphasized that, "not only did the trial court lack statutory authority to provide dispositional re

2025We have determined that a controversy continues to exist, affording the court jurisdiction, if the actual injury suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from which the court can grant relief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826 , 839–40, 256 A.3d 131 (2021). ‘‘[F]or a litigant to invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collat- eral consequences will occur. . . .

2025We have determined that a controversy continues to exist, affording the court jurisdiction, if the actual injury suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from which the court can grant relief.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Gomes, 337 Conn. 826, 839–40, 256 A.3d 131 (2021). ‘‘[F]or a litigant to invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigant must show that there is a reasonable possibility that prejudicial collat- eral consequences will occur. . . .

2024Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practi- cal relief in the future.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Claudia F., 93 Conn. App. 343 , 345–46, 888 A.2d 1138 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 924 , 895 A.2d 796 (2006); see also Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219 , 226–27, 802 A.2d 778 (2002).

2024Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practi- cal relief in the future.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Claudia F., 93 Conn. App. 343 , 345–46, 888 A.2d 1138 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 924 , 895 A.2d 796 (2006); see also Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219 , 226–27, 802 A.2d 778 (2002).

2024Because mootness goes to the power of this court to entertain an appeal, we address the issue as a threshold matter.’’ (Citation omit- ted.) In re Alba P.-V., 135 Conn. App. 744, 747 , 42 A.3d 393 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 917 , 46 A.3d 170 (2012). ‘‘Since mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction . . . [and] raises a question of law . . . our review of that issue is plenary. . . . ‘‘When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . .

2024Because mootness goes to the power of this court to entertain an appeal, we address the issue as a threshold matter.’’ (Citation omit- ted.) In re Alba P.-V., 135 Conn. App. 744, 747 , 42 A.3d 393 , cert. denied, 305 Conn. 917 , 46 A.3d 170 (2012). ‘‘Since mootness implicates subject matter jurisdiction . . . [and] raises a question of law . . . our review of that issue is plenary. . . . ‘‘When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot. . . .

2024Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practi- cal relief in the future.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Claudia F., 93 Conn. App. 343 , 345–46, 888 A.2d 1138 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 924 , 895 A.2d 796 (2006); see also Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219 , 226–27, 802 A.2d 778 (2002).

2024Whe[n] there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practi- cal relief in the future.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Claudia F., 93 Conn. App. 343 , 345–46, 888 A.2d 1138 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 924 , 895 A.2d 796 (2006); see also Williams v. Ragaglia, 261 Conn. 219 , 226–27, 802 A.2d 778 (2002).

2022Whe[n] there is no direct prac- tical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a sur- rogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Private Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Torres, 278 Conn. 291 , 298–99, 898 A.2d 768 (2006).

2022Whe[n] there is no direct prac- tical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a sur- rogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Private Healthcare Systems, Inc. v. Torres, 278 Conn. 291 , 298–99, 898 A.2d 768 (2006).

2021See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 , 10 n.9, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘since collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of law because of a criminal conviction, a case will not be declared moot even [when] the sentence has been fully served’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Putman v. Ken- nedy, 279 Conn. 162 , 176 n.14, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006) (‘‘the collateral consequences doctrine applies when the collateral consequences of the contested court action, such as the continuing stigma of a criminal conviction, constitute a continuing injury to the specific litigant, justifying the

2021See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 , 10 n.9, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘since collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of law because of a criminal conviction, a case will not be declared moot even [when] the sentence has been fully served’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Putman v. Ken- nedy, 279 Conn. 162 , 176 n.14, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006) (‘‘the collateral consequences doctrine applies when the collateral consequences of the contested court action, such as the continuing stigma of a criminal conviction, constitute a continuing injury to the specific litigant, justifying the

2021See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 , 10 n.9, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘since collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of law because of a criminal conviction, a case will not be declared moot even [when] the sentence has been fully served’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Putman v. Ken- nedy, 279 Conn. 162 , 176 n.14, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006) (‘‘the collateral consequences doctrine applies when the collateral consequences of the contested court action, such as the continuing stigma of a criminal conviction, constitute a continuing injury to the specific litigant, justifying the

2021See, e.g., State v. Jordan, 305 Conn. 1 , 10 n.9, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) (‘‘since collateral legal disabilities are imposed as a matter of law because of a criminal conviction, a case will not be declared moot even [when] the sentence has been fully served’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)); Putman v. Ken- nedy, 279 Conn. 162 , 176 n.14, 900 A.2d 1256 (2006) (‘‘the collateral consequences doctrine applies when the collateral consequences of the contested court action, such as the continuing stigma of a criminal conviction, constitute a continuing injury to the specific litigant, justifying the

2021Partnership, 86 Conn. App. 692, 698 , 862 A.2d 832 (2004). ‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has recognized, however, that a case does not necessarily become moot by virtue of the fact that . . . due to a change in circumstances, relief from the actual injury is unavailable. [Our Supreme Court has] determined that a controversy con- tinues to exist, affording the court jurisdiction, if the actual injury suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from which the court can grant relief. . . . [F]or a litigant to invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigan

2021Partnership, 86 Conn. App. 692, 698 , 862 A.2d 832 (2004). ‘‘[Our Supreme Court] has recognized, however, that a case does not necessarily become moot by virtue of the fact that . . . due to a change in circumstances, relief from the actual injury is unavailable. [Our Supreme Court has] determined that a controversy con- tinues to exist, affording the court jurisdiction, if the actual injury suffered by the litigant potentially gives rise to a collateral injury from which the court can grant relief. . . . [F]or a litigant to invoke successfully the collateral consequences doctrine, the litigan

2019Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fletcher, 183 Conn. App. 1 , 6–7, 191 A.3d 1068 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 918 , 193 A.3d 1212 (2018).

2019Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fletcher, 183 Conn. App. 1 , 6–7, 191 A.3d 1068 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 918 , 193 A.3d 1212 (2018).

2019Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fletcher, 183 Conn. App. 1 , 6–7, 191 A.3d 1068 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 918 , 193 A.3d 1212 (2018).

2019Where there is no direct practical relief available from the reversal of the judgment . . . the collateral consequences doctrine acts as a surrogate, calling for a determination whether a decision in the case can afford the litigant some practical relief in the future.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fletcher, 183 Conn. App. 1 , 6–7, 191 A.3d 1068 , cert. denied, 330 Conn. 918 , 193 A.3d 1212 (2018).

2018We recently considered the application of the collateral consequences doctrine in the context of immigration in State v. Jerzy G. , supra, 326 Conn. at 223 , 162 A.3d 692 , which held that a conviction that was not the sole reason for a petitioner's deportation nevertheless could have given rise to prejudicial collateral consequences that negatively affected the petitioner's ability to lawfully reenter the country or to *1152 become a citizen. 10 Explaining State v. Aquino , supra, 279 Conn. at 293 , 901 A.2d 1194 , this court observed that "courts have held that when a conviction, other than

2018We recently considered the application of the collateral consequences doctrine in the context of immigration in State v. Jerzy G. , supra, 326 Conn. at 223 , 162 A.3d 692 , which held that a conviction that was not the sole reason for a petitioner's deportation nevertheless could have given rise to prejudicial collateral consequences that negatively affected the petitioner's ability to lawfully reenter the country or to *1152 become a citizen. 10 Explaining State v. Aquino , supra, 279 Conn. at 293 , 901 A.2d 1194 , this court observed that "courts have held that when a conviction, other than

2017Vitek v. Jones, supra, 445 U.S. 488– 91.That analysis is not relevant to the present case. 8 Those courts have imported that requirement from Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 , 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 47 L.

2017Vitek v. Jones, supra, 445 U.S. 488– 91.That analysis is not relevant to the present case. 8 Those courts have imported that requirement from Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 , 96 S. Ct. 1155 , 47 L.

2014The reviewing court . . . determines, based upon the particular situation, whether, the prejudicial collateral consequences are reasonably possible.’’ (Cita- tion omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 18 .