collateral consequences exception in Ohio

2026Id.

2016Erbes, supra; Baldridge, supra; Jagow, supra. We acknowledge that when supported by the record, the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine may be applied to the appeal of an expired protection order.

2022State v. Smith, 2016- Ohio-3521, 68 N.E.3d 114 , ¶ 4 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 237 , 325 N.E.2d 236 (1975), syllabus.

2022State v. Smith, 2016- Ohio-3521, 68 N.E.3d 114 , ¶ 4 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Wilson, 41 Ohio St.2d 236, 237 , 325 N.E.2d 236 (1975), syllabus.

2017The parties are to brief the issue stated at page 2 of the court of appeals’ entry filed November 21, 2016: “Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?” The conflict case is Wilder v. Perma, 174 Ohio App.3d 586 , 2007-Ohio-6635 (8th Dist.).

2017The parties are to brief the issue stated at page 2 of the court of appeals’ entry filed November 21, 2016: “Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?” The conflict case is Wilder v. Perma, 174 Ohio App.3d 586 , 2007-Ohio-6635 (8th Dist.).

2018While the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine developed out of the adverse consequences arising from criminal convictions, see State v. Golston , 71 Ohio St.3d 224 , 643 N.E.2d 109 (1994), syllabus, our consideration of collateral consequences should not take such a myopic view. {¶ 23} In this case, Rebecca and Curtis are subject to a shared-parenting plan and the domestic-relations court retains jurisdiction to modify or terminate the shared-parenting plan until their children reach the age of majority.

2018While the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine developed out of the adverse consequences arising from criminal convictions, see State v. Golston , 71 Ohio St.3d 224 , 643 N.E.2d 109 (1994), syllabus, our consideration of collateral consequences should not take such a myopic view. {¶ 23} In this case, Rebecca and Curtis are subject to a shared-parenting plan and the domestic-relations court retains jurisdiction to modify or terminate the shared-parenting plan until their children reach the age of majority.

2026“A collateral disability must be a substantial, individualized impairment, and . . . in the absence of demonstrated legal collateral consequences, the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply.” (Cleaned up.) R.S. v. Rindler, 2026-Ohio-584, ¶ 11-12 . {¶ 9} We review the trial court’s determination as to whether collateral consequences exist for abuse of discretion.

2025M.R. v. Niesen, 2022-Ohio-1130, ¶ 7 . {¶6} In Cyran, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that “in the absence of demonstrated legal collateral consequences, the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not apply to an expired domestic-violence civil protection order.” (Emphasis added.) Cyran at ¶ 7 .

2024No. 22AP-293, 2023-Ohio-4039, ¶ 23 , quoting Tschantz v. Ferguson, 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133 (1991).

2024No. 2012 CA 11, 2012-Ohio-3594, ¶ 5 . {¶ 28} Appellant contends, however, that even if the present appeal is moot, this court should address her assignments of error because two exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply, thus precluding dismissal of the appeal.5 {¶ 29} Appellant first asserts that the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine applies.

2018While collateral consequences, to save an appeal from mootness, may not be speculative, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106 , 108, 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), fn. 3, and must be more than a mere possibility, see Spencer v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1 , 14-16, 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), proof of their existence beyond a reasonable doubt is not required.

2018While collateral consequences, to save an appeal from mootness, may not be speculative, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106 , 108, 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), fn. 3, and must be more than a mere possibility, see Spencer v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1 , 14-16, 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), proof of their existence beyond a reasonable doubt is not required.

2018While collateral consequences, to save an appeal from mootness, may not be speculative, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106 , 108, 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), fn. 3, and must be more than a mere possibility, see Spencer v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1 , 14-16, 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), proof of their existence beyond a reasonable doubt is not required.

2018While collateral consequences, to save an appeal from mootness, may not be speculative, see Pennsylvania v. Mimms , 434 U.S. 106 , 108, 98 S.Ct. 330 , 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977), fn. 3, and must be more than a mere possibility, see Spencer v. Kemna , 523 U.S. 1 , 14-16, 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998), proof of their existence beyond a reasonable doubt is not required.

2018We also determined that a conflict exists between the Second Appellate District’s decision in this case and the Eighth Appellate District’s decision in Wilder on the following question of law: “Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?” Accordingly, we consolidated Curtis’s discretionary appeal with the certified- conflict case. 148 Ohio St.3d 1408 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 749 . {¶ 7} We reject both propositions o

2018We also determined that a conflict exists between the Second District's decision in this case and the Eighth District's decision in Wilder on the following question of law: "Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?" Accordingly, we consolidated Curtis's discretionary appeal with the certified-conflict case. 148 Ohio St.3d 1408 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 749 . {¶ 7} We reject both propositions of law and answer the

2018We also determined that a conflict exists between the Second Appellate District’s decision in this case and the Eighth Appellate District’s decision in Wilder on the following question of law: “Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?” Accordingly, we consolidated Curtis’s discretionary appeal with the certified- conflict case. 148 Ohio St.3d 1408 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 749 . {¶ 7} We reject both propositions o

2018We also determined that a conflict exists between the Second District's decision in this case and the Eighth District's decision in Wilder on the following question of law: "Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?" Accordingly, we consolidated Curtis's discretionary appeal with the certified-conflict case. 148 Ohio St.3d 1408 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 749 . {¶ 7} We reject both propositions of law and answer the

2018Proposition of Law No. 2: There is a rebuttable presumption that an appeal from an expired protection order is not moot. 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 6} On February 22, 2017, this court accepted Curtis’s discretionary appeal. 148 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 750 .

2018Proposition of Law No. 2: There is a rebuttable presumption that an appeal from an expired protection order is not moot. {¶ 6} On February 22, 2017, this court accepted Curtis's discretionary appeal. 148 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 750 .

2018We also determined that a conflict exists between the Second Appellate District’s decision in this case and the Eighth Appellate District’s decision in Wilder on the following question of law: “Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?” Accordingly, we consolidated Curtis’s discretionary appeal with the certified- conflict case. 148 Ohio St.3d 1408 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 749 . {¶ 7} We reject both propositions o

2018We also determined that a conflict exists between the Second District's decision in this case and the Eighth District's decision in Wilder on the following question of law: "Does the collateral consequences exception to mootness apply to an appeal from an expired protective order when the appellant faces possible collateral consequences that may not be ascertainable at the time of the appeal?" Accordingly, we consolidated Curtis's discretionary appeal with the certified-conflict case. 148 Ohio St.3d 1408 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 749 . {¶ 7} We reject both propositions of law and answer the

2018Proposition of Law No. 2: There is a rebuttable presumption that an appeal from an expired protection order is not moot. 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 6} On February 22, 2017, this court accepted Curtis’s discretionary appeal. 148 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 750 .

2018Proposition of Law No. 2: There is a rebuttable presumption that an appeal from an expired protection order is not moot. {¶ 6} On February 22, 2017, this court accepted Curtis's discretionary appeal. 148 Ohio St.3d 1409 , 2017-Ohio-573 , 69 N.E.3d 750 .

2018State v. Golston , 71 Ohio St.3d 224 , 227, 643 N.E.2d 109 (1994) (due to the numerous statutory restrictions imposed on convicted felons, an appeal of a felony conviction is not moot even if the entire sentence has been satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal); Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis , 129 Ohio St.3d 389 , 2011-Ohio-2673 , 953 N.E.2d 278 , ¶ 23, 31 (a misdemeanant demonstrates a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction even after the sentence has been completed when he contests the charges at trial and, after being convicted, seeks a stay of execution of sentence for the purpos

2018State v. Golston , 71 Ohio St.3d 224 , 227, 643 N.E.2d 109 (1994) (due to the numerous statutory restrictions imposed on convicted felons, an appeal of a felony conviction is not moot even if the entire sentence has been satisfied before the matter is heard on appeal); Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis , 129 Ohio St.3d 389 , 2011-Ohio-2673 , 953 N.E.2d 278 , ¶ 23, 31 (a misdemeanant demonstrates a substantial stake in the judgment of conviction even after the sentence has been completed when he contests the charges at trial and, after being convicted, seeks a stay of execution of sentence for the purpos

2016Erbes, supra; Baldridge, supra; Jagow, supra. We acknowledge that when supported by the record, the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine may be applied to the appeal of an expired protection order.